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Introduction
The financial crisis has renewed the interest of researchers and policy makers in
the link between the financial economy and the real economy. In his speech of 13
December 2012, Benoît Coeuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European
Central Bank (ECB), said that “the financing environment and access to finance
for euro area corporates are important elements in the policy-making process of
the ECB, both for standard and non-standard monetary policy decisions”. The
motivation for this statement is that frictions and dysfunctionalities in financial
intermediation and the transmission mechanism influence firm investment, and
hence growth and price stability.
1
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Figure 1.1: Loans, capital formation, GDP and trade credit (euro area annual % changes)
Source: ECB and Eurostat, euro area integrated accounts. Notes: Annual % changes are the four-quarter sum of transac-
tions over the amounts outstanding four quarters earlier for the loans and trade credit. Trade credit channel is the average
of accounts receivable and payable, which are estimated by the ECB on the basis of partial information. The year-on-year
% changes in euro area GDP and gross capital formation are expressed in seasonally adjusted current prices.
This dissertation focuses on these financial market frictions and their impact on
firm investment and growth. Figure 1.1 shows the link between bank loans, invest-
ment (measured by gross capital formation) and GDP to illustrate the importance.
It can be clearly seen that loan growth is highly related to investment growth and
GDP growth. The figure also strikingly displays the recent financial crisis, with
its giant drop in investment growth and GDP growth, which was unprecedented in
the past decades. Therefore, a better insight on financial market frictions and their
transmission to investment and growth is of the utmost importance. Chapters 2
and 3 focus on firm investment and the role of financial constraints. Chapter 4 an-
alyzes whether firms substitute bank loans for trade credit in the production chain
if the firm’s access to regular finance has become difficult. Chapter 5, contributes
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to our understanding of the nature of financial constraints by investigating the de-
terminants of firms’ self-reported financial constraints during the recent financial
crisis.
In his speech, Benoît Coeuré further stated that “the ECB regards small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as a crucial component of the euro area econ-
omy and that the ECB’s deliberations on monetary policy systematically take into
account the financial health of, and the growth prospects for, euro area SMEs ...
Moreover, these SMEs are highly dependent on bank loans which are supplied at
a higher cost and with a higher rejection rate than for larger firms, due to asym-
metric information”. The ECB director thus highlights the importance of SMEs
in the euro area. This is not surprising since more than 99 percent of the European
firms are SMEs, but he also acknowledges that they might face different finan-
cial conditions than large firms, as they are more likely to suffer from financial
market frictions. Therefore, special attention is given to SMEs throughout this
dissertation.
As stated earlier, the second and third chapter of this dissertation focus on the
role of financial frictions for firm investment. More specifically, these chapters
contribute to an ongoing debate in the literature on investment-cash flow sensitiv-
ities. This literature took a flight after the seminal contribution of Fazzari et al.
(1988) and after the critique of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) on this seminal pa-
per. According to neoclassical investment models, the investment decision should
be independent of the financial decision. Stated differently, the actual investment
of a firm should depend only on its optimal investment level, while the question
whether the firm has the financial means to pursue this optimal investment should
be irrelevant. This should be since, in the neoclassical view, firms will always be
able to obtain the necessary funds in the financial market because financial mar-
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kets are assumed to be perfect. Fazzari et al. (1988) were the first to reject this
perfect financial market hypothesis by showing that the investment of firms does
not only depend on the optimal investment level but also on the firm’s own cash
flow. Moreover, they showed that investment is more sensitive to cash flow for
firms that are expected to have more difficulties to obtain funds from the financial
market. This is because cash flow works as a mitigating factor for the frictions in
the financial market, and those that suffer most from such frictions benefit most
from additional cash flow.
Using investment-cash flow sensitivities to show that financial markets are not per-
fect became a popular method after Fazzari et al. (1988), but it was also heavily
criticized. Many argued that there is no theoretical reason to assume that higher
investment-cash flow sensitivities automatically follow from higher financial con-
straints, and some even showed the opposite. (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cleary,
1999) Others argued that investment-cash flow sensitivities arise because in prac-
tice it is very difficult for economists to measure the firms optimal investment
level, and that cash flow is significant for investment not because it is a reflection
of constrained access to the financial market, but because cash flow is related to
growth opportunities, which are part of the optimal investment decision. (Alti,
2003; Erickson and Whited, 2000; Cummins et al., 2006) This basically summa-
rizes the ongoing debate and the second and third chapter of this dissertation try to
address three main issues in this literature. 1) Can investment-cash flow sensitivi-
ties be seen as an indication of financial constraints? 2) Is the correlation between
cash flow and growth opportunities responsible for the observed sensitivity of in-
vestment to cash flow? 3) How can the opposite findings between Fazzari et al.
(1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) be explained?
A new index to measure the access to external finance of firms is constructed in
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the second chapter. The advantage of the index is that it takes multiple compo-
nents of access to finance simultaneously into account. The index, for instance,
assumes that SMEs will suffer more from frictions in the financial market. It is
shown that firms that are classified as financially constrained according to this
index pay a higher interest rate on their external funds, which confirms that the
index provides a good measure of financial constraints. It is especially for these
constrained firms, which are characterised by a higher cost of finance, that a wind-
fall gain in cash flow results in a larger drop of the interest rate. This drop makes
external finance cheaper and hence more investment possible, resulting in positive
investment-cash flow sensitivities. Indeed, in the second chapter it is shown that
investment-cash flow sensitivities are larger for firms that face the most restricted
credit supply according to the index and it is advocated that the cost of finance is
the driving force behind investment-cash flow sensitivities. Thus, investment-cash
flow sensitivities are related to higher financial constraints.
In the third chapter of this thesis it is analyzed how the opposite findings in the
literature can be explained, given that the interest rate on external finance is the
driver of investment-cash flow sensitivities? It is shown that cash flow volatility
can explain this. The volatility of cash flow has implications for the signalling
and expectations formation after a windfall gain in cash flow because a firm’s
demand for external finance not only depends on its current cash flow, but also on
its future cash flow. For a given positive cash flow shock, it is more likely for firms
with low cash flow volatility that this change in cash flow falls outside the normal
fluctuations of the firm’s cash flow, and hence the firm has an incentive to change
its expectations about future cash flow. This will imply a larger relaxation of the
financial constraints and thus a larger drop in the cost of finance which instigates
more investment. It follows that investment-cash flow sensitivities are greater for
firms with low cash flow volatility. The opposite findings in the literature might
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thus be explained by the differences in the definitions of financial constraints used
by both sides. While it is shown in the second chapter that investment-cash flow
sensitivities are more pronounced for financially constrained firms (in line with
Fazzari et al. (1988)), the third chapter shows you may find the opposite if the
definition of financial constraints is related to high cash flow volatility (as is likely
the case for Kaplan and Zingales (1997); Cleary (1999)).
Both the second and third chapter of this thesis take into account that cash flow can
be correlated with growth opportunities. To rule out the possibility that investment-
cash flow sensitivities might be explained by this relationship a firm level con-
trol variable for such growth opportunities is included in the investment model,
namely employment growth. It is assumed that firms with better growth opportu-
nities will have higher employment growth. If investment is still sensitive to the
firm’s cash flow after controlling for growth opportunities, it is more certain to
conclude that these investment-cash flow sensitivities reflect the role of cash flow
in alleviating frictions in the financial market.
The first two studies thus show that investment-cash flow sensitivities decrease
with the access to external finance (one side of the literature), and that investment-
cash flow sensitivities decrease with the volatility of cash flow (which is related to
the definition of constraints used in the other side of the literature). However, the
driving mechanism behind investment-cash flow sensitivities is in both cases the
same, namely the cost of finance.
The fourth chapter of this dissertation investigates the link between trade credit
and firm growth. Figure 1.1 shows that there has been an increase in the use of
trade credit during the recent financial crisis, in particular from mid-2009, which
is likely to compensate the strong decline in short-term bank loans. Interestingly,
the decline in the annual growth of trade credit payable and receivable between
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non-financial firms has been less pronounced than that in nominal GDP growth,
which may indicate that trade credit between companies has played a buffer role
in the recent crisis.
In the presence of financial market frictions it is crucial for firms to receive trade
credit from their suppliers in order to prefinance production, but it is also impor-
tant to extend trade credit in order to sell goods to their constrained customers.
It is argued that not just the accounts payable or the accounts receivable matter,
but rather the sum of both, which works as a credit channel of trade. Further, it
is assumed that firms do not need to finance their accounts receivable with inter-
nal funds, but that firms may have a contract with a financial intermediary which
allows them to draw on short term liabilities to finance a large portion of their
accounts receivable. The interpretation is that this trade credit channel variable
gives an idea of how much of the firm’s operations are independent of frictions or
imperfections in the financial market. In this perspective, this chapter also adds to
the revived literature on the link between the financial sector and the real economy.
Using over 2.5 million observations for 600.000 firms in 8 euro area countries in
the period 1993-2009, it is shown that firms use the trade credit channel to finance
growth. In countries where the trade credit channel is more present, the marginal
impact of the trade credit channel on growth is lower, but the total impact is still
higher. In addition, firms that are more vulnerable to financial market imperfec-
tions and therefore more likely to be financially constrained (i.e. SMEs or young
firms), are found to rely more on the trade credit channel to grow. Finally, it is
shown that also the overall conditions of the financial market matter for the impor-
tance of the trade credit channel for growth, even after controlling for regulation
in the product market. When there are less bank loans or debt securities available
in the financial market, firms rely more on the trade credit channel to grow.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8
The fifth chapter of this dissertation focuses specifically on the access to finance
during the financial crisis. After the onset of the financial crisis, the ECB and
the European Commission initiated a survey to get a better view on the access to
finance (and other problems) of SMEs. Although this Survey on the Access to
Finance of small and medium sized Enterprises (SAFE) is quite detailed, it lacks
information on the balance sheet and profit & loss account of the firms, like most
other surveys.
Therefore, researchers have either used balance sheet and profit & loss account
data to show the link between firm characteristics and firm growth or used survey
data to show the link between financing obstacles and firm growth. It has thus
not yet been possible to relate financing obstacles directly to the financial char-
acteristics of firms, while this could potentially give us a better understanding of
the nature of financing obstacles. This gap in the literature is addressed by try-
ing to match 11886 firms from the SAFE survey dataset with their balance sheet
information out of an extended dataset with 2.3 million firms.
Financial constraints are measured through firms’ self-assessment on whether ac-
cess to finance constitutes their most pressing problem. It is then investigated
whether the firms that self-report to be financially constrained have different char-
acteristics than financially unconstrained firms. This measure relates to the per-
ception of firms about their access to finance. Therefore also a more objective
measure of financial constraints is considered, which is related to whether the
firms report to have actually applied for external finance. Again the character-
istics of those that successfully obtained external finance are compared to those
whose applications were rejected.
The empirical results based on a bivariate probit model show that financial ratios
are important in explaining financial constraints. Measures related to the prof-
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itability of the firm are more robust than liquidity measures or leverage measures.
The profitability of the firm is important to explain the actual financing obstacles
encountered by firms but not the perceived financing obstacles. The finding that
more profitable firms are less likely to face actual external financing obstacles can
be seen as support for the balance sheet channel. Indeed, restrictive monetary pol-
icy induces interest rates to go up, putting pressure on profitability and hence net
worth, leading to higher chances of facing a constrained credit supply. Further,
firms that finance a higher share of their assets with short term loans are more
likely to perceive access to finance as problematic. This is due to the fact that
these firms need to roll over a high share of their debt yearly and they expect that
this might become very difficult or costly when market conditions turn for the
worse. Finally, it is shown that firm age, but surprisingly not size, is negatively
related with perceived and actual access to external finance. In the chapter, it is ar-
gued that this can be due to the fact that small firms appear to self-select out of the
actual loan-application process due to ’fear of rejection’. The results indicate that
firms should strive for the highest profitability possible and should pounder on the
desired maturity structure of their debt. Still, policy makers should be aware that
firms may also be discriminated on the basis of age.
In sum, this dissertation explores the causes and consequences of the access to
finance of firms. Chapter five shows that profitability is an important condition to
obtain external finance and that the maturity structure of the firm’s debt can ex-
plain the perception of financial constraints by firms. Importantly, age seems to be
strongly related to both perceived and actual financing obstacles. Chapter 2 takes
some of these causes into account to measure the degree of frictions that firms face
to access the financial market. Moreover, it is shown that the investment of firms
reacts positively when these frictions are relaxed (by a windfall in cash flow). The
third chapter looks deeper into this investment literature. It provides an explana-
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tion for the conflicting evidence in this literature and shows how the volatility of
cash flow may explain the opposite findings. Finally, the fourth chapter focuses
on an alternative way to finance production, namely the trade credit channel. It is
found that firms use the trade credit channel to grow, and that this firm behaviour
is especially true for firms that are more likely to suffer from financial market
frictions.
As shown in this dissertation, access to finance is an important concern for firms
and financial constraints are transmitted via investment to the real economy. There-
fore, it is unlikely that the issue of access to finance will lose the attention of policy
makers any time soon.
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2
Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity and
the Cost of External Finance1
2.1 Introduction
In recent years there has been an intense academic debate on investment dynam-
ics and financial constraints. A firm is financially constrained if its investment
is limited by its generation of internal funds, because it cannot obtain sufficient
external funds to finance its investment plans. The empirical literature has found
1This chapter is the result of joint work with Koen Schoors and Bruno Merlevede
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financial constraints to be elusive, mainly because we lack a direct measure of fi-
nancial constraints everyone can agree on. Financial constraints are therefore usu-
ally measured indirectly through variables that are assumed to be related to finan-
cial constraints, but these assumptions always leave room for reasonable doubt.
The literature often resorts to interpreting investment-cash flow sensitivities as an
indication of firm-level constraints to obtain external finance. The fundamental
problem is that the only certain thing one can state about firms that exhibit high
investment-cash flow sensitivities is that their cash flow relates to investment, ei-
ther directly or indirectly. However, the equilibrium decision to finance invest-
ment with cash flow, observed by the econometrician, is by definition a mixed
supply and demand effect. The question remains whether these high sensitivi-
ties reflect an unsatisfied demand for external funds by the firm (supply effect),
the preference for internal funds over external funds for a variety of underlying
reasons (demand effect), or simply the fact that cash flow is correlated with an
omitted variable (e.g. opportunities) that is also positively associated with in-
vestment. The empirical challenge is to disentangle these effects in the face of
the understanding that a perfect identification methodology may not exist. To this
purpose we analyze a large sample of unquoted firms in Nordic countries, Western
European countries and Eastern European transition countries.
The first contribution to the literature is that we construct a new index to identify
the supply of external finance. We argue that it is mainly the supply side in the
market for external finance that is binding and restricts the investment of firms.
Investment reacts positively to cash flow because the latter relaxes the constraints
in the market for external finance, and this will be most prevalent for those that
the constraint is most binding. Therefore, we will focus on the (in)elasticity of
the supply curve for the identification of financial constraints. Besides traditional
variables as age and size, this index also incorporates the average profitability
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of the firm (cash flow). We find that firms that are considered to be constrained
according to our index show the highest investment cash flow sensitivities.
The second contribution is that we employ the additional information supplied by
implicit interest rates to disentangle supply and demand effects. We argue that
being financially constrained does not necessarily require that a firm is fully ex-
cluded from external funding, but merely that a firm cannot obtain external finance
at a reasonably low cost. Indeed, for a given demand for external finance, firms
that face a more restricted supply, pay a higher equilibrium interest rate for their
finance. We show that firms that are considered financially constrained according
to our index pay a higher interest rate. Moreover, using our measure of the interest
rate, we show that the elasticity of the supply of finance is an important constraint
in the market for external finance and that high interest rates may be a reliable
indicator of credit constraints for all countries under study. Thus, starting from
a given equilibrium in the market for external finance, a drop in the demand for
external funds following a windfall gain in cash flow implies a drop in the interest
rate, which will instigate additional investment and might explain the observed
positive correlation between investment and cash flow. We provide new evidence
consistent with the recent findings of Campbell et al. (2012) that the cost of capital
is the driving force behind investment and its relation with internal funds.
The third contribution of this paper is that our findings are not driven by the possi-
ble correlation between cash flow and investment opportunities. If an increase in
unobserved investment opportunities increases planned investment and implies el-
evated cash flows, then investment-cash flow sensitivities may arise in the absence
of credit constraints. To avoid that our observed investment-cash flow sensititiv-
ities would merely reflect the presence of investment opportunities, we augment
the empirical model with a firm level control variable for investment opportuni-
ties: employment growth. Firms will increase their workforce if they expect future
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growth opportunities. We show that employment growth is indeed positively re-
lated to both investment and cash flow and can thus be a good control variable.
Finally, unlike most studies investigating financial constraints, we investigate sev-
eral countries characterised by different economic and financial systems, as finan-
cial constraints may be specific to a country or a financial system, and restrict our
dataset to unquoted firms, which are much more likely to face financial constraints
than quoted firms.
The paper is organized as follows: we start in section 2.2 with an overview of the
related literature. We describe the dataset in section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents the
empirical approach and estimations, and finally, section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
In their pioneering paper, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) (hereinafter FHP)
find that the investment of firms with low dividend pay-out ratios (i.e. firms that
are more likely to face financial constraints) is highly sensitive to the availability
of cash flow. A number of subsequent contributions (Whited, 1992; Hoshi et al.,
1992; Carpenter et al., 1994; Kashyap et al., 1994; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Car-
penter et al., 1998; Mizen and Vermeulen, 2005) find results in line with FHP. The
FHP results were challenged in 1997 by Kaplan and Zingales (hereinafter KZ). KZ
show theoretically that a firm’s profit maximizing investment choices do not yield
a simple monotonic relation between financial constraints and investment-cash
flow sensitivities, which invalidates the empirical strategy of the FHP strand of
literature. In line with their theory, KZ show that in FHP’s low dividend pay-out
ratio sample, firm-year observations with weaker financial positions have lower
investment-cash flow sensitivities. KZ’s results were subsequently confirmed by
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a number of authors (Cleary, 1999, 2006; Cleary et al., 2007).
Several additional theoretical challenges to the FHP interpretation of investment-
cash flow sensitivities were later developed. Alti (2003) assumes that young firms
are uncertain about the quality of their projects and derive information about their
projects from cash realizations. In this environment investment-cash flow sensi-
tivities arise in the absence of any financial market imperfections, challenging the
classical FHP interpretations. Erickson and Whited (2000) and Cummins et al.
(2006) make similar comments that the significant role of cash flow for invest-
ment is related to investment opportunities, which are incorrectly measured by
Q. However, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and later Carpenter and Guariglia
(2008) still find that cash flow sensitivities are a reflection from underlying credit
frictions since cash flow remains significant even when Q is measured correctly
or, respectively, when investment opportunities are controlled for.
Another theoretical challenge comes from Cleary et al. (2007) who construct an
investment model with two opposite dynamics, a cost effect and a revenue effect.
They argue that the revenue effect prevails for firms with low (or negative) levels
of internal funds. When cash flow drops for these firms, they need to invest more
in order to generate more future revenues (cash flow). This results in a negative
relationship between investment and cash flow for these firms. For high cash flow
firms the cost effect dominates such that a drop in cash flow for these firms does
not encourage them to take additional external funds -since the cost for these ad-
ditional funds would be higher-, but to decrease investment, resulting in a positive
sensitivity. The two effects together yield a U-shaped investment curve, which is
in line with the basic KZ argument that there exists no simple monotonic relation
between financial constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivities.
The empirical literature has tried to realign the contradictory theoretical predic-
tions and empirical findings with respect to investment-cash flow sensitivities.
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Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) argue that some firms might be in such severe
financial distress that investment cannot respond to cash flow, implying a lower
sensitivity for financially more constrained firms. Their argument boils down to
the proposition that the found sensitivity for firms in distress reflects a lower in-
vestment demand, rather than a credit supply constraint. The current literature
appears to have reached a consensus about a U-shape form for the investment-
cash flow relationship, as predicted by Cleary et al. (2007). A recent paper by
Guariglia (2008) suggests that the opposite results found by FHP and KZ are due
to different measures of financial constraints: while the FHP strand of the lit-
erature uses proxies for external financial constraints, such as firm size, age or
dividend payout, the KZ strand of the literature uses proxies for firm liquidity that
capture internal financial constraints. Guariglia (2008) shows that the Cleary et al.
(2007) U-shape is present when considering a sample-split on the basis of internal
funding (the KZ case), while the investment-cash flow sensitivity increases mono-
tonically when splitting the sample according to external financial constraints (the
FHP case). Becchetti et al. (2010) combine the traditional information on external
financial constraints with qualitative information on self-declared credit rationing
from a panel of Italian firms to assess the validity of the different points of view
in the literature. They find that age and size are good predictors of the proba-
bility of being credit rationed. Also in support of the FHP results, Hadlock and
Pierce (2010) show that an index based on firm size and age performs much better
in predicting financial constraints than the widely used KZ index, although they
argue that investment-cash flow sensitivities are not a good setting to investigate
financial constraints.
Further, Duchin et al. (2010) show that investment dropped significantly in the
financial crisis due to the negative supply shock to external finance that character-
ized the recent crisis. They show that this drop is greatest for firms that are finan-
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cially constrained, but do not relate this to excess cash flow sensitivity. Campbell
et al. (2012) provide evidence that the cost of capital could be the intervening vari-
able that explains the relation between decreasing internal funds and decreasing
corporate investment. Contrary to what one would expect from the findings of
Duchin et al. (2010) and Campbell et al. (2012), Chen and Chen (2012) show that
investment-cash flow sensitivities have disappeared during the financial crisis and
conclude that they do not measure the credit frictions that were widely present
during that period.
2.3 Data
The data set used in this paper covers the period 1996-2008 and consists of the
profit and loss account and balance sheet data for six European countries gathered
by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing in the Amadeus database. To make
sure that none of our possible results are driven by country specific elements, we
choose six countries with different backgrounds and sufficient data on the regres-
sion variables available. Belgium and France are two standard West European
countries, Finland and Sweden represent the Scandinavian model and with the
Czech Republic and Hungary, our sample also contains two transition countries.
Following Cleary (1999), we exclude banks, insurance companies, other financial
companies and utility firms from the dataset and retain firms from the following
seven industries: agriculture and mining, manufacturing, construction, retail and
wholesale trade, hotel and restaurants, services, and health and others (see Ta-
ble 2.10 in the appendix for more details). Furthermore the sample consists of
unquoted firms, which are more likely to face financial constraints than publicly
quoted firms.
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Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest for our re-
search. Investment (Iit) is measured as the sum of depreciation in year t and
the change in tangible fixed assets from year t − 1 to year t. Using this mea-
sure of investment allows comparability with many other papers in the litera-
ture2. The replacement value of the capital stock is calculated with the perpet-
ual inventory formula (Blundell et al., 1992). Using tangible fixed assets as the
historic value of the capital stock and assuming that in the first period the his-
toric value equals the replacement cost, we calculate the capital stock as Kit+1 =
Kit ∗ (1− δ) ∗ (pt+1/pt)+ Iit+1. With δ representing the depreciation rate, which
we assume to be constant at 5.5% and pt is the price of investment goods, prox-
ied by the gross total fixed capital formation deflator. ∆sit is the change in the
log of real total sales, and measures sales growth. ∆empit is the change in the
log of real total costs of employees, and measures employment growth.3 We use
the costs of employees because the data on the actual number of employees has
a lot more missing values in Amadeus.4 Moreover, we can assume that the total
costs are a better reflection of the number of full time employed workers, rather
than the number itself. Later, in the empirical model we will use the beginning of
period employment growth. CFit/Kit−1 represents a firm’s cash flow, scaled by its
beginning of period capital.
Further, to control for outliers, large mergers or typing errors we drop observa-
tions in the 1% tails of the distribution of both the level and first difference of the
2See for instance Mizen and Vermeulen (2005); Bloom et al. (2007); Guariglia (2008).
3real sales and real costs of employees are obtained by deflating the nominal values with the
gdp deflator.
4We loose approximately 40 percent of the data when using the actual number of employees
rather than the cost of employees. Nonetheless, later in the paper we will estimate one of the
models with the actual number of employees as a robustness check.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics: sample means and standard deviations
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit/Kit−1 0.112 0.111 0.122 0.144 0.075 0.151
(0.102) (0.132) (0.149) (0.202) (0.128) (0.186)
kit−2− sit−2 -1.565 -1.860 -1.562 -1.848 -1.023 -1.360
(0.912) (0.690) (0.894) (1.316) (1.063) (0.975)
∆sit 0.020 0.009 0.023 0.007 -0.020 0.007
(0.122) (0.106) (0.179) (0.338) (0.210) (0.271)
∆empit 0.011 0.018 0.032 0.007 -0.008 0.060
(0.081) (0.106) (0.181) (0.467) (0.132) (0.207)
CFit/Kit−1 0.282 0.417 0.477 0.392 0.205 0.278
(0.309) (0.361) (0.513) (1.027) (0.317) (0.312)
# f irms 2,555 69,801 9,876 31,396 2,101 1,405
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Notes. The Table shows sample means and in parentheses the corresponding standard deviations. The subscript i indexes
firms, and the subscript t, time, where t = 1996-2008. I is the firm’s investment, K the replacement value of the firm’s
capital stock and k its logarithm, s is the logarithm of total sales, emp is logarithm of total costs of employees, and finally
CF represents a firm’s cash flow.
regression variables. We also excluded firms with accounting periods that differ
from the standard 12 months. Following Mizen and Vermeulen (2005) we also
have a consecutive run of at least five observations for each firm. The descriptive
statistics are relatively similar across the countries considered. The lower invest-
ment rate in the Czech Republic is partly due to the larger share of firms in the
agricultural sector in the sample.
The descriptive statistics in Table 2.1 show that our data is similar to what is
known from previous research. Investment levels are on average between 10 and
15 percent of the capital stock. Real sales growth is around 1 to 2 percent annually.
Interestingly, this also appears to be the case for employment growth. Cash flow
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levels vary from 20 percent to 47 percent of the capital stock.
2.4 Empirical approach and estimation
2.4.1 The investment model
Our reduced form investment model is based on the error correction model (2.1)
and follows the work of Bond et al. (2003), Mizen and Vermeulen (2005), Bloom
et al. (2007) and Guariglia (2008). Changes in the capital stock are related to the
optimal capital stock (k∗) and are dynamic, reflecting that capital adjustment is
costly. As in the previous cited research, we use the approximation that ∆kt ≈
Iit
Kit−1 − δi and make the assumption that the optimal capital stock is related to
output (k∗ ≈ s). This gives model (2.2) which can now be estimated with our
data. (See the Appendix for a full derivation of the model.) The widely used
structural Q-model of investment is not applicable because the firms in our dataset
are unquoted and hence it is not possible to construct a tobin’s q with our data.
∆kt = α1∆kt−1+α2(kit−2−k∗it−2)+α3∆k∗it +α4∆k∗it−1+υi+υt +υ jt +εit (2.1)
Iit
Kit−1
= α1
Iit−1
Kit−2
+α2(kit−2− sit−2)+α3∆sit +α4∆sit−1+υi+υt +υ jt + εit
(2.2)
Where I is the firm’s investment, K the replacement value of the firm’s capital
stock and k its logarithm, s is the logarithm of real total sales. The subscript i
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indexes firms, the subscript j industries and the subscript t, time, where t = 1996-
2008. The error term consists of four components: an unobserved firm specific
component υi, a time component to filter out business cycle effects υt , a time
component which varies over industries accounting for industry specific effects
υ jt and finally an idiosyncratic component εit . The error-correction term (kit−2−
sit−2) captures the long run equilibrium between capital and its target, proxied by
sales.
The reduced form investment model (2.2) (as well as the majority of structural
models in the literature) makes the assumption of perfect capital markets. This im-
plies that a firm’s investment decision is independent of its financial decision, and
therefore, financial variables should not play a role for investment. Fazzari et al.
(1988) were the first to test this assumption by including cash flow in the empirical
specification. Since then, including cash flow has become a common way in the
literature to test for capital market frictions, so we augment model (2.2) with cash
flow ( CFitKit−1 ) to obtain the baseline model (2.3). As Bond and Van Reenen (2005)
point out, this approach is valid in a structural model because all information
about investment opportunities is captured by q and thus any information content
of cash flow can be expected to reflect capital market imperfections.5 While our
reduced form model (2.3) bypasses the known problems with measurement error
in q, it does not control for the possible information content of cash flow regarding
investment opportunities and the expectation about future marginal revenue. To
control for the latter, model (2.3) is augmented with firm level employment growth
(∆empit−1) under the assumption that firms will increase their workforce if they
5This approach is no longer valid if the structural model is not correctly specified or when
marginal q does not fully capture the future marginal revenue of investing. See Erickson and
Whited (2000) and Cummins et al. (2006) on the problems with measurement error in q.
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expect good investment opportunities.6 Labour chosen at the beginning of the
period thus controls for the unobserved opportunity shock. As labour is assumed
to be more flexible than capital in the production process, employment reacts in
period t and investment in period t+1 to expected opportunities Et [oppt+1]. When
the opportunities hence realise in period t+1, they will affect cash flow in t+1
which might coincide with the augmented planned investment in t+1 due to op-
portunity shock. If investment reacts to cash flow because it reveals investment
opportunities, cash flow should not be significant anymore after the inclusion of
beginning of period employment growth as shown in model (2.4).
Iit
Kit−1
= α1
Iit−1
Kit−2
+α2(kit−2− sit−2)+α3∆sit +α4∆sit−1
+α6
CFit
Kit−1
+υi+υt +υ jt + εit (2.3)
Iit
Kit−1
= α1
Iit−1
Kit−2
+α2(kit−2− sit−2)+α3∆sit +α4∆sit−1
+α5∆empit−1+α6
CFit
Kit−1
+υi+υt +υ jt + εit (2.4)
All specifications are estimated with the first difference General Method of Mo-
ments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The first differ-
ence GMM estimator is appropriate since it controls for biases due to unobserved
firm-specific effects and the endogeneity of explanatory variables. Note that we
are estimating a reduced form model and therefore we need to be careful in in-
terpreting the results. Moreover, as the instruments used in the estimations some-
times differ between countries, we shall focus on the economic importance of the
6The literature on the identification of production functions uses a similar approach to control
for shocks that are observed by the firm but not the econometrician. See for instance Olley and
Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg et al. (2006).
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findings rather than on the cross country comparison. The measure of the interest
rate introduced in section 2.4.3 will help us draw valid conclusions from the re-
sults. The instruments used for the endogenous variables are Iit−2/Kit−3, ∆sit−2,
kit−2 − sit−2, ∆empt−2, CFit−2/Kit−3 and/or further lags. The exogenous time
dummies and industry-time dummies are instrumented by themselves. Roodman
(2009) warns for issues related to too many instruments used in the first difference
GMM, but especially in the system GMM. Roodman (2009) points to efficiency
problems that arise when the number of instruments is close to the number of
crossections, which is likely not an issue in our case. Another issue relates to the
weak power of the J-test when instruments are many, but note that few guidelines
exist in the literature about how many instruments are too many to trust the J-
statistic. Therefore, we try to cap the number of instruments per period as much
as possible.
Table 2.2 presents the estimates of specification (2.3). The lagged investment
term is negative in some countries and zero in others. The error correction term
always has a significant negative sign, indicating that when capital is lower than
its desired level, investment increases, ensuring a return to the equilibrium level.
Table 2.2 further indicates a significant positive relationship between sales growth
and investment. The positive and significant value for cash flow implies that an
increase in cash flow enables firms to invest more. Since all the firms in our sample
are unquoted it is likely that this observed investment-cash flow sensitivity is an
indication of financial constraints. A bit surprising, while the point estimate of
cash flow in Hungary is very similar to that in other countries, it is not significant
at the 10 percent level, but we will come back to this when we do some robustness
checks. Quantitatively, our results are similar across countries and consistent with
previous research. Finally, m2 provides no indication that the instruments would
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Table 2.2: Baseline Estimation: model (2.3)
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit−1/Kit−2 -0.085 -0.182*** -0.204*** -0.008 0.016 -0.094**
(0.054) (0.028) (0.021) (0.103) (0.027) (0.044)
kit−2− sit−2 -0.218*** -0.191*** -0.247*** -0.165*** -0.127*** -0.195***
(0.045) (0.020) (0.023) (0.026) (0.022) (0.063)
∆sit 0.214*** -0.075 0.152*** 0.183*** 0.123*** 0.082
(0.063) (0.101) (0.036) (0.028) (0.035) (0.063)
∆sit−1 0.209*** 0.153*** 0.258*** 0.173*** 0.141*** 0.216***
(0.042) (0.031) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.044)
CFit/Kit−1 0.080*** 0.057*** 0.029*** 0.042*** 0.078*** 0.073
(0.023) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.025) (0.049)
sector/year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
#instruments 139 89 283 117 251 167
m2 0.94 0.07 0.51 0.44 0.25 0.31
J 0.53 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.37 0.87
# f irms 2,555 69,801 9,876 31,396 2,101 1,405
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (2.3). The estimates are robust
to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial
correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments,
under the null of instrument validity. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at the 5% or 1%
level.
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be correlated with the error term. The null hypothesis of no second order serial
correlation cannot be rejected in all our regressions. Also the null hypothesis of
instrument validity, known as the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions (J),
cannot be rejected in all our specifications.
As argued earlier, it could however be that the found investment-cash flow sen-
sitivities in Table 2.1 are not a reflection of underlying financial constraints, but
arise automatically because cash flow is related to investment opportunities and is
hence also related to increased investment. To control for this we augment speci-
fication (2.3) with firm level employment growth and estimate model (2.4). Firms
with better investment opportunities are likely to increase their workforce while
firms with bad investment opportunities are likely to lay off some employees.
Table 2.3: Investment opportunities proxied by employment growth: correlations
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Corr(∆empt−1, It/Kt−1) 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.17*** 0.17***
Corr(∆empt−1,CFt/Kt−1) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.17*** 0.14***
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13.697 7,443
Notes. The Table shows correlations between employment growth and investment and between employment growth and
cash flow. * indicates that the correlation is significantly different from zero at the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at
the 5% or 1% level.
Table 2.3 shows the correlation between employment growth on the one hand,
and the investment level and cash flow on the other hand. Investment is positively
related to employment growth in all the countries under investigation, showing
that higher opportunities are indeed associated with higher levels of investment.
It can also be seen that cash flow has a positive relation with employment growth,
again in every country. This could be an indication that also cash flow is associ-
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ated with higher opportunities. If this is what drives the sensitivity of investment
to cash flow, then the sensitivity should disappear after including employment
growth in the regression. However, it is clear from Table 2.4 that it must be some-
thing else that drives the investment-cash flow sensitivity. In Belgium, France,
Finland, Sweden and the Czech Republic investment still reacts significantly pos-
itive to a windfall in cash flow. In Hungary, the investment is not sensitive to the
availability of cash flow, but that was already the case before the inclusion of em-
ployment growth. Given that our sample contains mostly small firms this finding
is consistent with Carpenter and Guariglia (2008), who augmented a Q-model of
investment with firm level opportunities and found that the cash flow sensitivity
remains unchanged (or even increased) for small firms. In contrast to Carpenter
and Guariglia (2008) our proxy for firm level opportunities is a measure of em-
ployment growth, which has the advantage of being available in many datasets.
Further, the estimates for the lagged investment, the error correction term and sales
growth parameters of model (2.4) are very comparable to those in model (2.3).
The evidence on the impact of employment growth is not entirely robust. It is
significantly positive in 5 countries and positive but insignificant in Belgium. This
is however not so important, as for our purpose it is only necessary that it takes up
any effect of opportunities on investment. After controlling for opportunities we
are more confident in interpreting the significance of cash flow as a rejection of
the perfect capital market hypothesis. Table 2.11 in the appendix shows that these
findings broadly hold when we use employment growth calculated from the actual
number of employees instead of the cost of employees to control for opportunities.
CHAPTER 2. ICFS AND THE COST OF EXTERNAL FINANCE 28
Table 2.4: Baseline Estimation: model (2.4)
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit−1/Kit−2 -0.088** -0.083 -0.218*** -0.121 0.007 -0.118**
(0.044) (0.085) (0.020) (0.079) (0.039) (0.048)
kit−2− sit−2 -0.220*** -0.157*** -0.260*** -0.198*** -0.130*** -0.208***
(0.038) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.049)
∆sit 0.204*** -0.027 0.180*** 0.147*** 0.120*** 0.115**
(0.059) (0.079) (0.034) (0.023) (0.039) (0.052)
∆sit−1 0.210*** 0.148*** 0.265*** 0.201*** 0.131*** 0.224***
(0.036) (0.032) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.048)
∆empit−1 0.005 0.197*** 0.014*** 0.003* 0.054*** 0.052***
(0.012) (0.080) (0.005) (0.002) (0.015) (0.017)
CFit/Kit−1 0.081*** 0.123*** 0.024** 0.033*** 0.078** 0.074
(0.023) (0.017) (0.011) (0.007) (0.032) (0.047)
sector/year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
#instruments 158 119 356 181 296 201
m2 0.96 0.67 0.39 0.76 0.35 0.85
J 0.81 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.50
# f irms 2,555 69,801 9,876 31,396 2,101 1,405
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (2.4). The estimates are robust
to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted
with sector dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial
correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments,
under the null of instrument validity. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at the 5% or 1%
level.
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2.4.2 The identification of financial constraints
To get a better identification of possible financial constraints, we focus on cate-
gories of firms that we ex-ante believe to have different probabilities of suffering
from financial constraints. To do this we identify the supply curve that firms face
in the market for external finance and calculate the implicit interest rate that firms
pay on their external finance. If our identification is correct we should observe
that, for a given demand for external finance, firms that are more constrained (i.e.
face a more restricted supply) pay a higher interest rate on their debt.
Figure 2.1: The market for external finance
As shown in Figure 2.1 we think of firm size, age and the average cash flow
level as determinants of the supply curve. With respect to firm size and age, we
believe that it is easier for financial institutions to gather sufficient information
on larger firms (Bernanke et al., 1996) while older firms have better proven track
records than young firms (Schiantarelli, 1995), which both decrease the degree of
asymmetric information between lender and borrower. This, in turn, will increase
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the supply of external finance to larger and older firms (Rauh, 2006; Hadlock and
Pierce, 2010). Further, since higher cash flows enable firms to repay their debt,
external lenders will be less resilient in funding firms with higher cash flows.
Firms with higher levels of cash flow will therefore be less likely to forgo net
present value investments due to the lack of external finance available to them.
Figure 2.2 shows what we have in mind. If investment-cash flow sensitivities arise
because cash flow relaxes constraints that firms face in the financial market, then
this should be particularly important for firms that pay the highest interest rate for
a given level of demand; or stated differently, for those firms that face the most
inelastic supply of external funds. For such firms, a windfall gain in cash flow
implies a greater drop in the cost of finance and hence a larger relaxation of the
constraint.
Figure 2.2: The market for external finance: constrained vs unconstrained
In order to approximate the (elasticity of the) supply of finance to firms we mea-
sure for each of the above stated determinants whether a firm is scoring below or
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above the median of its industry in a given year. A firm gets a score of 1 for age
if the firm is younger than the median firm in the same industry in our sample in a
given year, and 2 otherwise. We then proceed in the same way for the size of the
firm and the mean cash flow of the firm. We then sum the three scores and obtain
for each firmyear a score between 3 (constrained supply of external finance) and
6 (unconstrained supply of external finance).
The main advantage of this approach is that it compiles multiple determinants of
supply into one measure, that it is easy to compute, and applicable to almost any
dataset available in economics. A scoring system like this is also flexible in the
weight that is given to a certain discriminating variable. By using for instance the
75th percentile instead of the median, one can choose to put more or less weight
on a variable. As we have no a priori assumptions on the importance that the
four variables play in the supply of external finance, nor on the different role they
might play across countries, we use the median as cut-off for each of them. A
disadvantage of this approach is the interpretation of the index itself. While the
interpretation of the scores 3 and 6 is still feasible (A score of 3 indicates that a
firm is relatively young, relatively small and has relatively low levels of cash flow,
and vice versa for a score of 6.), the scores in between are less straightforward to
interpret.
Now, for the estimation purposes and to capture possible nonlinear effects of
financial constraints, we generate a categorical variable f incon = LOWit which
takes the value 1 if firm i gets a score of 5 or 6 in year t, and 0 otherwise, meaning
unconstrained supply of external finance. Next, f incon = HIGHit takes the value
1 if firm i scores 3 or 4 in year t, and 0 otherwise, and implies that firm i faces
a constrained supply of finance in year t. We interact these categorical variables
with cash flow and estimate model (2.5) to test whether the most constrained firms
display the highest investment-cash flow sensitivities. Table 2.8 in the Appendix
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shows that this approach classifies around 60 percent of the sample as uncon-
strained and 40 percent as highly constrained. Table 2.9 in the Appendix learns
that the probability that a firm stays within a certain category for several years is
rather high, especially for unconstrained firms. On average, every year less than 5
percent of the firms switch to a different constraint-group. This can be explained
by the fact that two of our three determinants (size and age) do not change quickly
over time. Nonetheless, a reasonable amount of firms in the sample do switch
between groups over time.
Iit/Kit−1 = α1Iit−1/Kit−2+α2(kit−2− sit−2)+α3∆sit +α4∆sit−1+α5∆empit−1
+ α6a [CFit/Kit−1 ∗ f incon = LOWit ]
+ α6b [CFit/Kit−1 ∗ f incon = HIGHit ]+υi+υt +υ jt + εit (2.5)
Before estimating model (2.5), we want to be more certain that our index is a cor-
rect measure of the supply of finance. As can be seen in Figure 2.2, constrained
firms are expected to pay a higher interest rate on their external finance, and hence
the interest rate that firms pay on their financial debt could be an important con-
firmation of our identification strategy. Therefore, we will try to actually measure
this interest rate, and, in line with previous research, we will try to exploit this firm
heterogeneity in the interest rate and relate it to investment-cash flow sensitivities
in the next sections.
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2.4.3 Interest rates as an additional measure of financial con-
straints
Our measure of the interest rate is calculated as the ratio of the total interest paid
(as reported in the profit and loss account) over the interest carrying liabilities,
which are defined as the sum of the long term liabilities and the short term finan-
cial liabilities.
Implicit interest rates are themselves the result of demand and supply effects. We
argue that the interest rates of the firms and countries in our sample are on av-
erage consistent with a restricted supply of external finance and thus reflect the
constraints in the financial market. We find indications for this conjecture by cor-
relating the implicit interest rate with net trade credit, where net trade credit is
defined as firm level trade credit liabilities minus firm level trade credit assets. Pe-
tersen and Rajan (1997) argue that debt enforcement theories and the equity-stake
theory of trade credit explain why suppliers are still willing to lend to financially
constrained firms. They find evidence suggesting that firms use more trade credit
when credit from financial institutions or markets is limited or unavailable. In line
with their suggestion that financially constrained firms use more trade credit, we
find positive correlations between interest rates and net trade credit for all coun-
tries considered in our study (see Table 2.5, panel A). This is consistent with the
interpretation that firms with more difficult access to external finance (higher in-
terest rates) substitute external finance for net trade credit, while firms with easy
access to external finance (low interest rates) also draw on external finance to
invest in net trade credit. This indicates that it is mainly the supply of external
finance and the associated cost of finance that is binding for firms.
Before analysing Table 2.5 it is important to note that the results are only designed
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to compare within countries. Several reasons come to mind. Cross country analy-
sis might be hard to do since there are important institutional differences that we
are (un)aware of and are hard to filter out (e.g. different central bank policy). The
composition of the samples is not exactly the same in all countries, in terms of
firm characteristics, sectoral presence, or even in terms of the years (boom/reces-
sion) that they are present. These reservations do however allow within country
analysis as the construction of constraint-index is done for firms within the same
year, within the same sector (and obviously within the same country).
Table 2.5: Financial constraints and the interest rate
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Panel A
Corr(R, netTCK ) 0.13*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.08*** 0.15***
Panel B
R ( f incon = LOW ) 2.79% 2.26% 2.99% 3.70% 4.93% 4.67%
t-test H0 : low−high = 0 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
R ( f incon = HIGH) 3.29% 2.68% 3.79% 5.08% 6.23% 5.45%
I/K ( f incon = LOW ) 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.08 0.15
t-test H0 : low−high = 0 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.49
I/K ( f incon = HIGH) 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.15
#obs 17,126 404,366 58,097 141,475 13.697 7,443
Notes. Panel A reports correlations of the implicit interest rate (R) with net trade credit (accounts payable (TCP) minus
accounts receivable (TCR)). Where the net trade credit is denoted by the capital stock, and R is the ratio of the total interest
paid over the interest carrying debt. The interest carrying liabilities are the sum of the long term liabilities and the short
term financial liabilities. Panel B shows the average R that firms pay on their debt and the average investment level (I/K)
for all the firms classified in a given constraint group. * indicates that the either the correlation or the conducted t-test is
significantly different from zero at the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at the 5% or 1% level.
As argued above, if our identification of constrained supply of external finance
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is correct, we should observe that firms that are more constrained pay a higher
interest rate on their debt. Panel B of Table 2.5 shows that firms that are more
constrained according to our index pay -on average- a higher interest rate on their
financial debt. A t-test on the equality of the means shows that the mean interest
rates are in each country statistical significantly different from each other for each
constraint-group. Secondly, Table 2.5 documents that firms that face a constrained
supply of external finance invest significantly less than unconstrained firms in all
countries but Hungary. The evidence that firms for which external finance is more
costly invest less should not be surprising as can be seen in Figure 2.2: a low
supply of external finance is associated with a higher cost of finance and a lower
amount of borrowed funds, which indirectly implies that constrained firms cannot
invest as much as unconstrained firms. However, this can be seen as another
indication that the index correctly measures the supply of finance. If the index
would be positively correlated with the demand for finance, it could be possible
to observe a demand driven higher interest rate for those firms that we consider
financially constrained, but then they should also invest more instead of less. Table
2.5 thus shows that financial market frictions have real effects as firms that have
more costly access to finance invest significantly less. Also Minton and Schrand
(1999) found this direct negative relation between capital costs and investment
levels.
2.4.4 Main results and robustness
Table 2.6 presents the estimates of model (2.5) for all the countries under inves-
tigation. Again we find the negative sign for the lagged investment level and
the error correction term. Sales growth is positively related to investment and
so are opportunities, as proxied by beginning of period employment growth. As
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predicted, investment-cash flow sensitivities increase as the supply of external
finance decreases. The impact of cash flow on investment for firms that are con-
sidered to be financially constrained is larger in every country and significantly
larger in five out of six countries. Also note that in Hungary investment-cash
flow sensitivities are present for the subsample of firms that face a restricted sup-
ply of external finance. This confirms our hypothesis. As shown in the previous
section constrained firms pay the highest interest rate on their debt, indicative of
the restricted, more inelastic supply curve of external finance. As a consequence,
a windfall gain in cash flow for these firms implies a larger drop in the cost of
finance, leading to significantly higher investment.
In this paper we have argued that investment-cash flow sensitivities arise in the
presence of financial market imperfections. In this case, the mechanism should
not play any role for firms that do not have external funds. We try to falsify our
hypothesis by estimating our simple model (2.4) for firms that do not make use of
bank loans, which is the most important source of external finance for the firms
in our sample. The results are shown Table 2.12 in the Appendix and support our
hypothesis. Investment-cash flow sensitivities have disappeared in all countries.
On average, around 17 percent of the firms in our data set do not have short and
long term bank loans on their balance sheet. Remarkably, in Hungary more than
half of the firms in the data set do not seem to have bank loans on their balance
sheet, which could explain why we did not find significant investment-cash flow
sensitivities for Hungary in Table 2.2 and Table 2.4, while we did for the other
countries. This provides further evidence that investment-cash flow sensitivities
are related to the relaxation of credit constraints (i.e. a drop in the cost of finance),
induced by a windfall gain in cash flow.
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Table 2.6: Investment-cash flow sensitivities: constrained vs unconstrained firms
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit−1/Kit−2 -0.093* -0.068 -0.209*** -0.116 -0.000 -0.143***
(0.051) (0.119) (0.022) (0.077) (0.044) (0.036)
kit−2− sit−2 -0.216*** -0.147*** -0.252*** -0.189*** -0.132*** -0.230***
(0.042) (0.028) (0.024) (0.021) (0.030) (0.040)
∆sit 0.171*** 0.024 0.231*** 0.134*** 0.121*** 0.130***
(0.045) (0.075) (0.050) (0.023) (0.045) (0.041)
∆sit−1 0.207*** 0.133*** 0.267*** 0.193*** 0.134*** 0.242***
(0.040) (0.037) (0.024) (0.021) (0.032) (0.035)
∆empit−1 0.016 0.204*** 0.008 0.004** 0.054*** 0.049***
(0.012) (0.075) (0.005) (0.002) (0.015) (0.015)
CFit/Kit−1*fincon=LOW 0.044** 0.127*** 0.021* 0.021*** 0.077*** 0.053
(0.021) (0.026) (0.012) (0.006) (0.030) (0.045)
CFit/Kit−1*fincon=HIGH 0.095*** 0.167*** 0.048*** 0.064*** 0.107** 0.153***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.018) (0.013) (0.044) (0.058)
sector/year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
#instruments 341 113 197 209 341 277
m2 0.57 0.71 0.78 0.74 0.44 0.68
J 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.20 0.11 0.80
# f irms 2,555 69,801 9,876 31,396 2,101 1,405
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Wald tests
H0 : low−high = 0 0.04** 0.00*** 0.03** 0.00*** 0.35 0.02**
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (2.5). The estimates are robust
to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial
correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments,
under the null of instrument validity. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at the 5% or 1%
level.
CHAPTER 2. ICFS AND THE COST OF EXTERNAL FINANCE 38
Moreover, our findings do not seem to be driven by country specific elements as
we find that investment-cash flow sensitivities are highest for constrained firms
in almost all countries investigated. As argued above, the instruments used in the
regressions are not exactly the same in every country, nor is the composition of the
sample exactly the same across countries; therefore, a cross-country comparison
of the size of the mechanism should be avoided. Nonetheless, it is clear that -
unrelated to the economic structure of a country- a windfall gain in cash flow
instigates most investment to those firms that face the most restricted credit supply.
2.5 Conclusion
Consensus on what drives investment-cash flow sensitivities has yet to be reached.
In this paper, we show that investment-cash flow sensitivities are related to capital
market imperfections and rise with the interest rate on external funds. First, we
create a new index to identify the supply of external finance that firms face in
six European countries with different economic systems and institutions between
1996 and 2008. Firms that are classified as most constrained according to our
index, pay on average the highest interest rate on their financial debt. Moreover,
we show that the elasticity of the supply of external finance is important since
firms that face a higher cost of external finance resort significantly more to other
means (net trade credit) to finance their operations and have lower investment
levels.
Further, we argue that it is especially for these constrained firms, characterised by
a higher cost of finance, that a windfall gain in cash flow results in a larger drop of
the interest rate, thereby making new investment possible. Indeed, the investment-
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cash flow sensitivities are largest for the firms that face the most restricted credit
supply according to our index.
Importantly, these findings are not related to the possible correlation between cash
flow and investment opportunities (Erickson and Whited, 2000; Cummins et al.,
2006), because we control for this relationship by augmenting the empirical model
with a firm level control variable for opportunities: beginning of period employ-
ment growth. Firms will increase their workforce if they expect future growth
opportunities. We show that employment growth is positively related to both in-
vestment and cash flow and can thus be a good control variable.
By providing new evidence consistent with the recent findings of Campbell et al.
(2012) that the cost of capital is the driving force behind investment-cash flow
sensitivities, this paper advocates the interpretation that these sensitivities reflect
the role of cash flow in alleviating credit frictions, rather than differences in credit
demand or investment opportunities. Our results also imply that credit market
imperfections are still widely present and that policymakers may do well to ponder
on the question how they could further alleviate these financial frictions and make
investment and economic growth less dependent on internal cash flow generation.
We propose that future research on financial constraints complements the data on
quantity outcomes with the information provided by implicit interest rates to en-
sure a better identification of financial constraints and more consistent tests of the
underlying financial theories. Our results would be further reinforced if future
studies affirm our findings with different measures of investment opportunities,
possibly based on different data sources, such as firm surveys. Finally, this pa-
per investigated the dynamics of investment in tangible fixed assets. Investigating
investment-cash flow sensitivities in the context of other important types of invest-
ment such as for instance inventory investment is an interesting avenue for future
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research.
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2.6 Appendix
Table 2.7: Definition of variables
p ft gross fixed capital formation deflatort
pgt GDP deflatort
Iit+1 (tangible f ixed assetsit+1/p
f
t+1− tangible f ixed assetsit/p ft +depreciationit+1/p ft+1
Kit=0 tangible f ixed assetsit=0
Kit+1 Kit ∗ (1−δ)∗ (p ft+1/p ft )+ Iit+1
kit log(Kit )
salesit nominal salesit/p
g
t
sit log(salesit)
CFit cash f lowit/p
g
t
cost o f employeesit nominal cost o f employeesit/p
g
t
∆empit log(cost o f employees)it − log(cost o f employees)it−1
net TCit (accounts payableit −accounts receivableit)/pgt
Rit interest paidit/(noncurrent liabilitiesit + current liabilitiesit −accounts payableit)
bank loans current liabilities loans + noncurrent liabilities long term debt
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Model derivation
The error correction model for investment follows Bond et al. (2003), Mizen and
Vermeulen (2005) and Guariglia (2008). This model starts from the assumption
that the desired capital stock can be written as a log linear function of output (yit)
and the real user cost of capital7 ( jit) and is shown by equation (2.6).
kit = υi+ yit +σ jit (2.6)
To account for adjustment costs, an autoregressive distributed lag specification
with up to second-order dynamics of equation (2.6) is considered. Note that the
long run unit elasticity of capital with respect to output in equation (2.6) implies
the restriction that (1−α1−α2)/(β0+β1+β2)=1 in equation (2.7).
kit = α1kit−1+α2kit−2+β0yit +β1yit−1+β2yit−2 (2.7)
This model can be rewritten to obtain the regression model (2.1). First subtract
kt−1 from the left and right hand side to obtain equation (2.8). In the next step, add
and subtract (α1−1)kt−2 from the right hand side to obtain equation (2.9). Next,
add and subtract β0yt−1 from the right hand side to obtain equation (2.10). Finally,
add and subtract (β0+β1)yit−2 from the right hand side to obtain equation (2.11).
Using the restriction that (1−α1−α2)/(β0 + β1 + β2) is equal to 1, equation
(2.11) can be rewritten to get equation (2.12).
7In the empirical model, variation in the real user cost of capital is controlled for by time
dummies and further subsumed by the fixed effects.
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∆kit = (α1−1)kit−1+α2kit−2+β0yit +β1yit−1+β2yit−2 (2.8)
∆kit = (α1−1)∆kit−1+(α1−1+α2)kit−2+β0yit +β1yit−1+β2yit−2 (2.9)
∆kit = (α1−1)∆kit−1− (1−α1−α2)kit−2+β0∆yit +(β0+β1)yit−1+β2yit−2(2.10)
∆kit = (α1−1)∆kit−1− (1−α1−α2)kit−2+β0∆yit +(β0+β1)∆yit−1
+(β0+β1+β2)yit−2 (2.11)
∆kit = (α1−1)∆kit−1− (1−α1−α2)(kit−2− yit−2)+β0∆yit +(β0+β1)∆yit−1(2.12)
Now equation (2.12) can easily be transformed into the empirical model (2.2) as
shown below. It is assumed that the optimal capital stock is related to output
(y≈ s), and that the percentage change in the capital stock is the investment rate:
∆kt ≈ IitKit−1 − δi, where δi is firm specific depreciation and is subsumed by the
fixed effect.
Iit
Kit−1
= α1
Iit−1
Kit−2
+α2(kit−2− sit−2)+α3∆sit +α4∆sit−1+υi+υt +υ jt + εit
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Table 2.8: Descriptive statistics: identification of financial constraints
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
f incon = LOW 55% 56% 58% 53% 67% 64%
f incon = HIGH 45% 44% 42% 47% 33% 36%
age 29 18 18 25 12 10
total assets 1.34 0.68 0.94 0.58 0.62 1.22
meanCF/K 0.37 0.51 0.69 0.44 0.28 0.66
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13.697 7,443
Notes. In the top part, the Table shows the share of firms in a country that are classified in a given constraint group. In the
bottom part, the variable means are presented for the given variables that are used to calculated the position of the supply
curve of external finance. Age is in number of year. Totalassets is in million euro. For non-euro countries the exchange
rate used for conversion is that of januari 1999. In concreto: EXR swedish krona/euro = 9.0826, EXR Czech koruna/euro
= 35.107, EXR Hungarian forint/euro = 250.79 . Mean CF/K is the average cash flow to capital ratio of all observations
for a given firm. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of the firm’s cash flow to capital ratio, scaled by the
firm’s mean cash flow to capital ratio.
Table 2.9: Transition probabilities: chance of being in the same constraint group next
period
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
f incon = LOW 97% 98% 98% 97% 98% 96%
f incon = HIGH 95% 94% 93% 96% 84% 80%
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,168 141,475 13.697 7,443
Notes. In the top part, the Table shows the share of firms in a country that are classified in a given constraint group. In
the bottom part, the variable means are presented for the given variables that are used to calculated the position of the
supply curve of external finance. Age is in number of year. Totalassets is in million euro for Belgium, France and Finland;
otherwise in million units local currency. Mean CF/K is the average cash flow to capital ratio of all observations for a given
firm. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of the firm’s average cash flow to capital ratio, scaled by the
firm’s mean cash flow to capital ratio.
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Table 2.10: Descriptive statistics: industrial composition of the sample
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
agriculture and mining 1% 1% 4% 5% 12% 6%
manu f acturing 38% 20% 24% 21% 50% 41%
construction 11% 18% 15% 15% 8% 12%
retail and wholesale 39% 32% 26% 27% 20% 36%
hotel and restaurant 1% 11% 4% 4% 1% 0%
services 9% 11% 19% 21% 7% 5%
health and other 1% 7% 8% 7% 2% 1%
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13.697 7,443
Notes. The Table shows the share of firms in a country that belong to the given sector in our sample. The nace 2-digit level
is used to compose the sectors.
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Table 2.11: Baseline Estimation: number of employees
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit−1/Kit−2 -0.141** -0.137 -0.259*** -0.177** 0.014 -0.264
(0.063) (0.142) (0.034) (0.082) (0.034) (0.528)
kit−2− sit−2 -0.265*** -0.177*** -0.293*** -0.247*** -0.116*** -0.300
(0.052) (0.049) (0.039) (0.028) (0.031) (0.332)
∆sit 0.225*** 0.196 0.223*** 0.134*** 0.076* 0.092
(0.060) (0.126) (0.039) (0.027) (0.042) (0.163)
∆sit−1 0.251*** 0.181*** 0.303*** 0.231*** 0.123*** 0.206
(0.046) (0.080) (0.036) (0.026) (0.030) (0.290)
∆empit−1 0.005 0.089** 0.014*** 0.005 0.016*** -0.001
(0.014) (0.040) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.069)
CFit/Kit−1 0.053* 0.120*** 0.015 0.053*** 0.070** -0.045
(0.027) (0.038) (0.017) (0.014) (0.035) (0.256
sector/year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
#instruments 145 104 334 164 187 117
m2 0.40 0.99 0.37 0.44 0.66 0.95
J 0.31 0.18 0.77 0.95 0.10 0.93
#obs 14,551 335,002 36,144 89,917 11,548 651
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (2.4), but uses the actual
number of employees instead of the cost of employees to calculate ∆empit−1. The estimates are robust to heteroscedastic
standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with sector dummies.
m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial correlation. Values
presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments, under the null of
instrument validity. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at the 5% or 1% level.
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Table 2.12: Baseline Estimation: no bank loans
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit−1/Kit−2 -0.303*** -0.166*** -0.241*** -0.178*** -0.116 -0.117**
(0.079) (0.044) (0.055) (0.034) (0.079) (0.056)
kit−2− sit−2 -0.365*** -0.180*** -0.252*** -0.235*** -0.214*** -0.187***
(0.070) (0.067) (0.060) (0.039) (0.064) (0.066)
∆sit 0.140*** 0.126 0.178*** 0.208*** 0.150*** 0.055
(0.055) (0.143) (0.042) (0.034) (0.043) (0.070)
∆sit−1 0.359*** 0.180* 0.263*** 0.236*** 0.193*** 0.202***
(0.065) (0.098) (0.054) (0.037) (0.060) (0.061)
∆empit−1 -0.041 0.038 0.002 0.003 0.040 0.054***
(0.028) (0.068) (0.010) (0.003) (0.032) (0.020)
CFit/Kit−1 0.028 0.079 0.025 0.010 0.022 0.103
(0.034) (0.051) (0.021) (0.013) (0.025) (0.071)
sector/year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
#instruments 154 104 354 166 296 158
m2 0.18 0.52 0.58 0.50 0.52 0.41
J 0.50 0.36 0.53 0.29 0.39 0.83
#obs 2,505 91,436 10,779 22,736 2,381 4,764
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (2.4), but only for the subsample
that has no bankloans on their balance sheet. Bank loans include both short term and long term bank debt. The estimates
are robust to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies
interacted with sector dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null
of no serial correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the
instruments, under the null of instrument validity. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at the
5% or 1% level.
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3
Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity: The
Role of Cash Flow Volatility1
3.1 Introduction
Despite the large contradictions between Fazzari et al. (1988) and Kaplan and Zin-
gales (1997), more than two decades later the academic society is still debating
about investment-cash flow sensitivities. Understandable, not only is the concept
of investment-cash flow sensitivities very appealing and relatively simple; invest-
1This chapter is the result of joint work with Koen Schoors and Bruno Merlevede.
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ment itself may be the single most important determinant of economic growth. At
first, researchers have tried to settle the debate by confirming or rejecting find-
ings on either side, leading to an impressive number of papers, but no conclusion.
In later contributions, some authors provided explanations for the conflicting ev-
idence in the literature by focussing on the small differences between both sides,
but they were unable to give a satisfactory answer to the question what drives
investment-cash flow sensitivities. This paper takes a different approach. We
focus on what both sides have in common, namely investment-cash flow sensitivi-
ties, because the key should lie in what drives these sensitivities, and check if cash
flow volatility could be the omitted variable that can explain the findings in both
sides of the literature.
In line with recent evidence of Campbell et al. (2012), we find that changes in the
cost of external finance are the driving force behind investment-cash flow sensitiv-
ities. Moreover, we show that cash flow volatility plays a large role in the change
of the cost of external finance and investment-cash flow sensitivities. While this
literature is huge, by our knowledge, only a handful of papers have tried to relate
cash flow volatility to investment-cash flow sensitivities. Our paper relates most to
Cleary (2006), who suggested that cash flow volatility might be negatively related
to investment-cash flow sensitivities, although he declared that it was beyond the
scope of his paper to provide any formal tests. In contrast to Cleary (2006), it is
exactly the contribution of this paper to clarify the role that cash flow volatility
plays for investment-cash flow sensitivities.
We argue that a firm’s demand for external finance does not only depend on current
cash flow but also on future expected cash flow. This is important because now
cash flow volatility has an indirect impact on the firm’s demand for external funds.
Firms with high cash flow volatility are less likely to derive much information
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from a positive cash flow shock today about cash flow tomorrow. In contrast, after
a positive shock to cash flow today, the probability is higher that this shock falls
outside the normal cash flow fluctuations for firms with low cash flow volatility,
and therefore, they are also more likely to increase their expectations about future
cash flow. As a result, the demand for and the price of external funds will drop
more after a windfall gain in cash flow for firms with low cash flow volatility,
leading to more investment. Our empirical analysis confirms that firms with low
cash flow volatility display the highest investment-cash flow sensitivities.
After investigating how the demand for external finance is crucial for the interest
rate on external funds, we include the supply of external finance in our analysis. It
has been shown before that the more inelastic the supply of external finance is, the
more the cost of external finance will change for a given change in demand. We
show that investment-cash flow sensitivities are negatively related to the supply of
external finance, which is in line with the findings of Fazzari et al. (1988). How-
ever, we also show that investment-cash flow sensitivities are negatively related
to cash flow volatility. And as Cleary (2006) pointed out, cash flow volatility is
inherently related to financial health, which is in line with Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) and Cleary (1999). We thus show that although the results in both sides
seem to be opposite, they are driven by the same mechanism: changes in the cost
of external finance.
This paper further differs from the existing literature as, unlike most studies in-
vestigating financial constraints, the firms in our dataset are unquoted firms which
are more likely to face financial constraints than publicly quoted firms. Moreover,
we investigate six European countries characterised by different economies and
financial systems. Belgium and France represent the West-European model, two
Scandinavian countries are Finland and Sweden, and with the Czech Republic and
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Hungary, two transition countries are investigated.
The paper is organized as follows: we start in section 3.2 with an overview of the
related literature. We describe the dataset in section 3.3. The empirical approach
and the estimations are presented in section 3.4, and finally, section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Related literature
In the seminal paper in this literature, Fazzari et al. (1988) (hereinafter FHP) ar-
gue that the investment of financially constrained firms is more likely to depend on
the availability of internal funds, than the investment of unconstrained firms. They
provide evidence for their case by showing that the investment of firms with low
dividend pay-out ratios is highly sensitive to the availability of cash flow. The sim-
ple rationale behind FHP’s theory initiated a large number of contributions using
different classifications of financial constraints, broadly confirming their results
(Whited, 1992; Hoshi et al., 1992; Carpenter et al., 1994; Kashyap et al., 1994;
Bond and Meghir, 1994; Carpenter et al., 1998; Mizen and Vermeulen, 2005). A
big challenge to this literature came by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (hereinafter
KZ), who show in their theoretical contribution that a firm’s profit maximizing
investment choices do not yield a simple monotonic relation between financial
constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivities. This invalidates the empirical
strategy of the FHP strand of literature. In line with their theory, KZ show that in
FHP’s low dividend pay-out ratio sample, firm-year observations with weaker fi-
nancial positions have lower investment-cash flow sensitivities. KZ’s results were
subsequently confirmed by a number of authors (Cleary, 1999, 2006; Cleary et al.,
2007).
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While in the meantime the FHP interpretation of investment-cash flow sensitiv-
ities was criticized from both a theoretical (Alti, 2003; Cleary et al., 2007) and
an empirical (Erickson and Whited, 2000; Cummins et al., 2006) point of view, a
number of authors have tried to reconcile the conflicting empirical evidence. For
instance, Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) argue that some firms might be in such
severe financial distress that investment cannot respond to cash flow, implying a
lower sensitivity for financially more constrained firms. Their argument boils
down to the proposition that the sensitivity for firms in distress reflects a lower
investment demand, rather than a credit supply constraint. Moyen (2004) simu-
lates data from two models: an unconstrained model (access to external finance)
and a constrained model (no access). After pooling the simulated data from both
models, Moyen shows that unconstrained firms have higher investment-cash flow
sensitivities than constrained firms (the KZ result). However, using the same data
she also shows that firms with low dividends display the highest sensitivity (the
FHP result). This follows from her model where low dividend firms are mostly
from the unconstrained sample. This feature, however, does not stroke with what
is found using real data. In fact, Cleary (2006) shows the opposite for 6 out of
7 large OECD countries. A recent paper by Guariglia (2008) suggests that the
opposite results found by FHP and KZ are due to different measures of financial
constraints: while the FHP strand of the literature uses proxies for external finan-
cial constraints, such as firm size, age or dividend payout, the KZ strand of the
literature uses proxies for firm liquidity that capture internal financial constraints.
Guariglia (2008) shows that the Cleary et al. (2007) U-shape is present when
considering a sample-split on the basis of internal funding (the KZ case), while
the investment-cash flow sensitivity increases monotonically when splitting the
sample according to external financial constraints (the FHP case). Finally, Cleary
(2006) investigates the interrelationships between the proxies used in both sides
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of the debate. Besides showing that the proxies are indeed related to each other,
he hints that the contradictory findings in the literature might be caused by the
volatility of cash flow. Cleary (2006) descriptively shows that the groups with on
average lower cash flow volatility have the highest investment-cash flow sensi-
tivity. Most authors that have tried to realign the conflicting results mainly have
tried to explain the differences between both sides and acknowledge that they do
not find an answer to the fundamental question of what is then driving investment-
cash flow sensitivities. More recently, however, Campbell et al. (2012) and Mulier
et al. (2013) provide evidence that the driving factor behind investment-cash flow
sensitivities is the cost of external finance. Constrained firms pay a higher interest
rate on their debt because they face a more inelastic supply of finance. Conse-
quently, a windfall in cash flow results in a relatively larger drop of the cost of
external funds for constrained firms, which instigates relatively more investment
than for unconstrained firms.
The literature on cash flow volatility focuses mostly on risk management of corpo-
rations because cash flow volatility is costly. The costs of cash flow volatility can
be related either to underinvestment in case of bad cash flow years (Stulz, 1990),
to the increased probability of needing relatively expensive external finance (Froot
et al., 1993; Minton and Schrand, 1999), or to the fact that firms with volatile cash
flows are generally perceived as more risky, which increases the cost of exter-
nal finance supplied to these firms (Minton and Schrand, 1999). Minton et al.
(2002) show that cash flow volatility is an important variable in forecasting fu-
ture cash flow and earnings levels. Despite extensive research on these topics, to
our knowledge, only a handful of authors have considered cash flow volatility in
the context of investment-cash flow sensitivities. Boyle and Guthrie (2003) con-
struct an investment model with capital market frictions where firms with higher
uncertainty about the ability to finance their investments (i.e. cash flow volatility)
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have a lower threshold to justify that investment, leading to higher investment and
hence higher investment-cash flow sensitivities. In contrast to the predictions of
Boyle and Guthrie’s model, Cleary (2006) shows that high investment-cash flow
sensitivities coincide with low cash flow volatility. Without formal testing, Cleary
(2006) suggests that cash flow volatility could play an important role in this sensi-
tivity debate and might even be responsible for the contradictory findings of FHP
and KZ. Finally, D’Espallier et al. (2009) find that investment-cash flow sensitiv-
ity is negatively related to cash flow volatility for a sample of quoted firms in the
United States.
3.3 Data
Our data set covers the period 1996-2008 and consists of the profit and loss ac-
count and balance sheet data for six European countries gathered by Bureau Van
Dijk Electronic Publishing in the Amadeus database. To make sure that none
of our results are driven by country specific elements, we choose six countries
with different backgrounds for which we have good data coverage. Belgium and
France are two standard West European countries, Finland and Sweden repre-
sent the Scandinavian model and with the Czech Republic and Hungary, our sam-
ple also contains two transition countries. Following Cleary (1999), we exclude
banks, insurance companies, other financial companies and utility firms from the
dataset and retain firms from the following seven industries: agriculture and min-
ing, manufacturing, construction, retail and wholesale trade, hotel and restaurants,
services, and health and others (see Table 3.9 in the appendix for more details).
Furthermore the sample consists of unquoted firms, which are more likely to face
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financial constraints than publicly quoted firms.
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest for our re-
search. Investment (Iit) is measured as the sum of depreciation in year t and the
change in tangible fixed assets from year t− 1 to year t. The replacement value
of the capital stock is calculated with the perpetual inventory formula (Blundell
et al., 1992). Using tangible fixed assets as the historic value of the capital stock
and assuming that in the first period the historic value equals the replacement cost,
we calculate the capital stock as Kit+1 = Kit ∗ (1− δ) ∗ (pt+1/pt)+ Iit+1. With δ
representing the depreciation rate, which we assume to be constant at 5.5% and pt
is the price of investment goods, proxied by the gross total fixed capital formation
deflator. ∆sit is the change in the log of real total sales, and measures sales growth.
∆empit is the change in the log of real total costs of employees, and measures em-
ployment growth.2 We use the costs of employees because the data on the actual
number of employees has considerably more missing values in Amadeus. More-
over, we can assume that the total costs are a better reflection of the number of full
time employed workers, rather than the number itself. In the empirical model we
use the beginning of period employment growth. CFit/Kit−1 represents a firm’s
cash flow, scaled by its beginning of period capital. Finally we use two differ-
ent ways to measure cash flow volatility. The first uses the standard deviation of
the cash flow to capital ratio (stdevi(CFit/Kit−1)), the second is the coefficient of
variation of cash flow (CVCFi), which is the ratio of the standard deviation of cash
flow to the mean of cash flow. Both cash flow volatility measures are thus time
invariant for the firms in our sample.
2real sales and real costs of employees are obtained by deflating the nominal values with the
gdp deflator.
CHAPTER 3. ICFS: THE ROLE OF CASH FLOW VOLATILITY 61
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics: sample means and standard deviations
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit/Kit−1 0.112 0.111 0.122 0.144 0.075 0.151
(0.102) (0.132) (0.149) (0.202) (0.128) (0.186)
kit−2− sit−2 -1.565 -1.860 -1.562 -1.848 -1.023 -1.360
(0.912) (0.690) (0.894) (1.316) (1.063) (0.975)
∆sit 0.020 0.009 0.023 0.007 -0.020 0.007
(0.122) (0.106) (0.179) (0.338) (0.210) (0.271)
∆empit 0.011 0.018 0.032 0.007 -0.008 0.060
(0.081) (0.106) (0.181) (0.467) (0.132) (0.207)
CFit/Kit−1 0.282 0.417 0.477 0.392 0.205 0.278
(0.309) (0.361) (0.513) (1.027) (0.317) (0.312)
stdevi(CFit/Kit−1) 0.303 0.364 0.643 0.492 0.293 1.062
(0.484) (0.289) (0.790) (0.739) (0.655) (3.742)
CVCFi 0.579 0.552 0.642 1.439 0.814 0.790
(0.635) (0.382) (0.542) (2.115) (1.230) (1.159)
# f irms 2,555 69,801 9,876 31,396 2,101 1,405
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Notes. The Table shows sample means and in parentheses the corresponding standard deviations. The subscript i indexes
firms, and the subscript t, time, where t = 1996-2008. I is the firm’s investment, K the replacement value of the firm’s
capital stock and k its logarithm, s is the logarithm of total sales, emp is logarithm of total costs of employees, and finally
CF represents a firm’s cash flow. CVCFi is the coefficient of variation of cash flow.
Further, to control for outliers, large mergers or typing errors we drop observa-
tions in the 1% tails of the distribution of both the level and first difference of the
regression variables. We also excluded firms with accounting periods that differ
from the standard 12 months. Following Mizen and Vermeulen (2005) we also
have a consecutive run of at least five observations for each firm. The descriptive
statistics are relatively similar across the countries considered. The lower invest-
ment rate in the Czech Republic is partly due to the larger share of firms in the
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agricultural sector in the sample.
The descriptive statistics in Table 3.1 show that our data is very similar to what
is known from previous research. Investment levels are on average between 10
and 15 percent of the capital stock. Real sales growth is around 1 to 2 percent
annually. Also employment growth is around 2 percent on average in our sample.
Average cash flow levels vary from 20 percent to 47 percent of the capital stock.
Finally, the volatility of cash flow is very comparable across countries. Hungarian
firms appear to have the most volatile cash flows when the standard deviation of
cash flow to capital is used to measure volatility. This is no longer true when look
at the coefficient of variation of cash flow. Here it seems that Swedish firms have
quite high cash flow volatility.
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3.4 Empirical approach and estimation
3.4.1 The baseline specification
The baseline specification is the error correction model (3.1) that follows the work
of Bond et al. (2003), Mizen and Vermeulen (2005), Guariglia (2008) and Bloom
et al. (2007). (See Appendix 2.6 for a full derivation of the model)
Iit
Kit−1
= α0+α1
Iit−1
Kit−2
+α2(kit−2− sit−2)+α3∆sit +α4∆sit−1
+α5∆empit−1+α6
CFit
Kit−1
+υi+υt +υ jt + εit (3.1)
Where I is the firm’s investment, K the replacement value of the firm’s capital
stock and k its logarithm, s is the logarithm of real total sales, emp is the log of
real total costs of employees, and finally CF represents a firm’s cash flow. The
subscript i indexes firms, the subscript j industries and the subscript t, time, where
t = 1996-2008. The error term consists of four components: an unobserved firm
specific component υi, a time component to filter out business cycle effects υt ,
a time component which varies over industries accounting for industry specific
effects υ jt and finally an idiosyncratic component εit . The error-correction term
(kit−2−sit−2), which is derived from the capital adjustment cost, captures the long
run equilibrium between capital and its target, proxied by sales.
The Q-model of investment cannot be used here as the firms in our dataset are
unquoted. This bypasses the problems with measurement error in marginal q
(Erickson and Whited, 2000; Alti, 2003; Cummins et al., 2006), but might not
sufficiently control for the possible information content of cash flow regarding
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investment opportunities. We control for the latter by including firm level em-
ployment growth under the assumption that firms that expect good investment op-
portunities will increase their workforce as in Mulier et al. (2013). If investment
reacts to cash flow because it reveals investment opportunities, cash flow should
not be significant anymore after the inclusion of beginning of period employment
growth in (3.1). Controlling for this possible relationship might be especially im-
portant if one assumes that the revelation of investment opportunities by cash flow
is different if cash flow is highly volatile or not (cf. (3.2) and (3.3) below).
All specifications are estimated with the first difference General Method of Mo-
ments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The first differ-
ence GMM estimator is appropriate since it controls for biases due to unobserved
firm-specific effects and the endogeneity of explanatory variables. Note that we
are estimating a reduced form model and therefore we need to be careful in in-
terpreting the results. Moreover, the instruments used in the estimations some-
times differ between countries, so the parameters should not be the subject of a
cross-country comparison. The instruments used for the endogenous variables are
Iit−2/Kit−3, ∆sit−2, kit−2− sit−2, ∆empt−2, CFit−2/Kit−3 and/or further lags. The
exogenous time dummies and industry-time dummies are instrumented by them-
selves. Roodman (2009) warns for issues related to too many instruments used
in the first difference GMM, but especially in the system GMM. Roodman (2009)
points to efficiency problems that arise when the number of instruments is close to
the number of crossections, which is likely not an issue in our case. Another issue
relates to the weak power of the J-test when instruments are many, but note that
few guidelines exist in the literature about how many instruments are too many to
trust the J-statistic. Therefore, we try to cap the number of instruments per period
as much as possible.
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Table 3.2: Baseline Estimation
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit−1/Kit−2 -0.088** -0.083 -0.218*** -0.121 0.007 -0.118**
(0.044) (0.085) (0.020) (0.079) (0.039) (0.048)
kit−2− sit−2 -0.220*** -0.157*** -0.260*** -0.198*** -0.130*** -0.208***
(0.038) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.049)
∆sit 0.204*** -0.027 0.180*** 0.147*** 0.120*** 0.115**
(0.059) (0.079) (0.034) (0.023) (0.039) (0.052)
∆sit−1 0.210*** 0.148*** 0.265*** 0.201*** 0.131*** 0.224***
(0.036) (0.032) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.048)
∆empit−1 0.005 0.197*** 0.014*** 0.003* 0.054*** 0.052***
(0.012) (0.080) (0.005) (0.002) (0.015) (0.017)
CFit/Kit−1 0.081*** 0.123*** 0.024** 0.033*** 0.078** 0.074
(0.023) (0.017) (0.011) (0.007) (0.032) (0.047)
sector/year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
#instruments 158 119 356 181 296 201
m2 0.96 0.67 0.39 0.76 0.35 0.85
J 0.81 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.50
# f irms 2,555 69,801 9,876 31,396 2,101 1,405
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (3.1). The estimates are robust
to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted
with sector dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial
correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments,
under the null of instrument validity. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at the 5% or 1%
level.
Table 3.2 presents the estimates of specification (3.1) for our six countries. The
lagged investment term is negative in some countries and zero in others. The
error correction term always has a significant negative sign, indicating that when
capital is below its desired level, investment increases, ensuring a return to the
equilibrium level. Table 3.2 further indicates a significant positive relationship
between sales growth and investment. Further, firms with better opportunities,
as proxied by employment growth, invest significantly more in France, Finland,
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Sweden, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The positive and significant coefficient
for cash flow implies that an increase in cash flow enables firms to invest more,
even after controlling for investment opportunities. Since all firms in our sample
are unquoted it is very likely that this observed investment-cash flow sensitivity
is an indication of financial constraints. Although the point estimate of cash flow
in Hungary is very similar to that in other countries, it is not significant at the
10 percent level. Quantitatively, our results are quite similar across countries and
consistent with previous research. Finally, the m2-statistic provides no indication
that the instruments are correlated with the error term. The null hypothesis of
no second order serial correlation cannot be rejected in all our regressions. The
null hypothesis of instrument validity, known as the Sargan test of overidentifying
restrictions (J), can also not be rejected in all our specifications.
3.4.2 The identification of the volatility effect
As argued in Mulier et al. (2013), being financially constrained is not so much a
question of finding sufficient external finance, but the question is at which cost a
firm is able to obtain external finance. Figure 3.1 shows how the price of external
finance is set for a given firm. A firm’s demand depends positively on the marginal
return on investment and negatively on its cash balance and available cash flow.
Moreover, as shown in Figure 3.1 we assume that a firm’s demand for external
finance is forward looking, and hence that a firm’s current demand for finance also
depends on its future expected cash flow.3 The supply of finance to the firm will
increase with its average profitability (mean cash flow). The supply of finance will
also increase as the information asymmetry (measured by age and size) between
firm and lender decreases. Further, we assume that firms do not have sufficient
3For brevity and simplicity Figures 3.1 and 3.2 take only CFt+1 and CFt+2 as future cash flow.
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internal funds to finance their investment and thus have to resort to external funds,
therefore the interest rate on external funds can be seen as a proxy for the marginal
cost of investment. Firms will demand external funds until the marginal cost (R)
of investment equals the marginal benefit of their planned investment level.
Figure 3.1: The market for external finance
From this, it follows that an increase in cash flow shifts the demand curve down
to the left, which implies a drop in the cost of external finance R. So, the marginal
cost of investment has decreased and it has become profitable to start some invest-
ment projects which were not profitable before. Profit maximizing behaviour im-
plies that a firm will then increase investment until a new equilibrium is reached.
In this way, investment reacts positively to changes in cash flow, resulting in the
observed investment-cash flow sensitivities.
When a firm’s demand not only depends on its current cash flow, but also on its
future cash flow, it bears important implications for the firm’s reaction to a pos-
itive cash flow shock, as shown in Figure 3.2. In this setup, cash flow volatility
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Figure 3.2: The market for external finance: forward looking demand
becomes an important notion for the expectations formation of cash flow because
it influences the information that a firm will derive from a windfall gain in cash
flow. For a given change in cash flow, it is more likely for firms with high cash
flow volatility that this change falls within the normal fluctuations of the firm’s
cash flow, and hence the firm has no incentive to change its expectations about
future cash flow. Assume that a firm with low cash flow volatility and a firm with
high cash flow volatility observe exactly the same positive increase in cash flow
(CFt is now CF t) and had the same initial demand for external finance D
0. For the
firm with high cash flow volatility, changes in cash flow are quite uninformative,
so this will be the only factor that changes and consequently its demand curve
shifts slightly to the left. The firm with low cash flow volatility, on the contrary,
will also adjust his expectations about future cash flow upwards (CFt+1 and CFt+2
are now CF t+1 and CF t+2), so its demand curve will shift more to the left. Con-
sequently, keeping everything else equal, the more the demand curve shifts down
in reaction to a windfall gain in cash flow, the more the interest rate on external
finance decreases, the more the marginal cost of investment decreases, and the
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more the actual investment will increase. Given that both actions resulted from
the same increase in cash flow, it follows that the investment-cash flow sensitivity
is greater for firms with low cash flow volatility.
We thus derive the hypothesis that firms with lower cash flow volatility should
display the highest investment-cash flow sensitivities. To test this hypothesis, we
use two different measures of cash flow volatility: the standard deviation of the
cash flow to capital ratio (stdevi(CFit/Kit−1)) and the coefficient of variation of
cash flow (CVCFi). The distribution of these volatility measures is used to gener-
ate several categorical variables, which we then interact with cash flow to obtain
specification (3.2), that augments (3.1) with several interaction terms.
Iit/Kit−1 = α0+α1Iit−1/Kit−2+α2(kit−2− sit−2)+α3∆sit +α4∆sit−1+α5∆empit−1
+ α6a [CFit/Kit−1 ∗LOWVOLit ]
+ α6b [CFit/Kit−1 ∗MEDVOLit ] (3.2)
+ α6c [CFit/Kit−1 ∗HIGHVOLit ]+υi+υt +υ jt + εit
Where LOWVOL1it takes the value 1 if firm i’s standard deviation of cash flow to
capital is among the lowest 25 percentile of its industry in year t, and 0 otherwise.
Vice versa HIGHVOL1it , takes the value 1 if firm i’s standard deviation of the
cash flow to capital ratio is in the highest quartile in i’s industry in year t, and 0
otherwise. The dummy MEDVOL1it represents then all remaining observations,
i.e. 1 - LOWVOL1it - HIGHVOL1it .
We also create, LOWVOL2it , MEDVOL2it and HIGHVOL2it , where LOWVOL2it
takes the value 1 if firm i’s coefficient of variation of cash flow is lower than the
25 percentile of its industry coefficient of variation of cash flow in year t, and 0
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otherwise. MEDVOL2it , takes the value 1 if firm i’s coefficient of variation of cash
flow lies in the second or third quartile in its industry in year t, and 0 otherwise.
The dummy HIGHVOL2it is equal to 1 when firm i’s coefficient of variation of
cash flow is among the highest 25 percentile in its industry in year t, and is equal
to 0 otherwise.
Note that these categorical variables are time-varying, in contrast to the volatility
variables on which they are based. This is important in order to address the unbal-
anced nature of our panel data. Think of firms A and B with the same measured
cash flow volatility, but firm A is present in our dataset from 1996 to 2000 and firm
B from 2004 to 2008, where the latter includes the start of the financial crisis. It is
obvious that due to macroeconomic influences, the measured cash flow volatility
of firms A and B, although nominally the same, should not necessarily be valued
the same. Our approach thus allows that firm A is classified as having highly
volatile cash flow, while firm B is classified as having low cash flow volatility. A
possible drawback of this approach is that a firm can be classified as having low
cash flow volatility in year t and having medium cash flow volatility in year t+1,
even though it was based on the same value.
The above stated procedure of determining low, medium, and high cash flow
volatility firms makes the difference between the variance of the cash flow itself
and the variance of shocks to the cash flow unimportant, as long as the cash flow of
firms in a specific industry follows the same data generating process. Suppose for
example that cash flow is generated by an AR(1) process CFt = δ+θCFt−1+ εt .4
With σ2 as variance of ε, the variance of CF becomes σ2/
(
1−θ2). The differ-
ence between both variances now depends on the parameter θ, if θ is the same
4Note that under an AR(1) process an equally large shock is likely to shift future expectations
relatively more for firms with a small variance of ε.
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across firms in a given industry the use of either σ2 or σ2/
(
1−θ2) will classify
firms in the same volatility categories. Given the nature of our data, we are unable
to estimate a firm-specific θi. Estimates for e.g. Belgium reveal θ= 0.34, splitting
the sample along age or size criteria reveals no statistically different θs for small
and large firms or for young and old firms.
In Table 3.3, the estimates of model (3.2) are presented using the standard de-
viation of the cash flow to capital ratio as measure of volatility. Again we find
the negative sign for the lagged investment level and the error correction term.
Sales growth is positively related to investment and so are opportunities. As our
theory predicted, the sensitivity of investment to changes in cash flow decreases
with the volatility of cash flow. The effect is quite large: the investment-cash
flow sensitivity is more than twice as large in firmyears with the lowest cash flow
volatility compared to firmyears with the highest cash flow volatility. A Wald test
shows that this difference in investment-cash flow sensitivity is significant in ev-
ery country. In Finland and Hungary, the sensitivities even disappear for the most
volatile group. Remarkably, in contrast to the baseline model, investment does
seem to react to cash flow in Hungary for some subsamples, but the significance
is modest. The fact that we do not find significant investment-cash flow sensitiv-
ities in Hungary actually fits our model, given that Hungarian firms tend to have
the highest cash flow volatility (as shown in Table 3.1).
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Table 3.3: Volatility interactions: standard deviation of CFit/Kit−1
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit−1/Kit−2 -0.096** -0.124*** -0.205*** -0.113*** -0.001 -0.161*
(0.044) (0.020) (0.027) (0.013) (0.029) (0.092)
kit−2− sit−2 -0.232*** -0.210*** -0.246*** -0.169*** -0.140*** -0.221***
(0.038) (0.019) (0.030) (0.014) (0.024) (0.062)
∆sit 0.194*** -0.165** 0.265*** 0.146*** 0.094*** 0.113**
(0.053) (0.079) (0.071) (0.027) (0.033) (0.055)
∆sit−1 0.218** 0.228*** 0.265*** 0.175*** 0.136*** 0.237***
(0.036) (0.027) (0.031) (0.014) (0.024) (0.060)
∆empit−1 0.005 0.053 0.004 0.002 0.057*** 0.046***
(0.012) (0.039) (0.006) (0.002) (0.015) (0.016)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗LOWVOL1it (α6a) 0.188*** 0.076*** 0.144*** 0.200*** 0.319*** 0.278***
(0.064) (0.027) (0.047) (0.074) (0.119) (0.103)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗MEDVOL1it (α6b) 0.125*** 0.051*** 0.065*** 0.201*** 0.091** 0.166**
(0.033) (0.017) (0.023) (0.028) (0.036) (0.069)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗HIGHVOL1it (α6c) 0.049** 0.038*** 0.024 0.045*** 0.059** 0.075
(0.023) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.027) (0.066)
sector/year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
#instruments 205 140 175 153 319 156
m2 0.88 0.18 0.91 0.07 0.31 0.71
J 0.98 0.09 0.43 0.13 0.13 0.76
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Wald tests
H0 : α6a−α6b = 0 0.27 0.08* 0.05** 0.98 0.05** 0.09*
H0 : α6b−α6c = 0 0.02** 0.05** 0.02** 0.00*** 0.41 0.23
H0 : α6a−α6c = 0 0.03** 0.03** 0.01*** 0.03** 0.03** 0.07*
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (3.2). The estimates are robust
to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial
correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments,
under the null of instrument validity. The Wald test shows the p-values. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and
***, respectively at the 5% or 1% level.
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Table 3.4: Volatility interactions: coeficient of variation of CFit
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit−1/Kit−2 -0.050 -0.193*** -0.205*** -0.198*** -0.012 -0.156**
(0.042) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) (0.065)
kit−2− sit−2 -0.179*** -0.203*** -0.243*** -0.204*** -0.144*** -0.248***
(0.037) (0.020) (0.037) (0.020) (0.024) (0.075)
∆sit 0.133*** 0.132 0.179*** 0.188*** 0.111*** 0.129**
(0.051) (0.098) (0.044) (0.032) (0.034) (0.060)
∆sit−1 0.173*** 0.219*** 0.252*** 0.207*** 0.143*** 0.251***
(0.035) (0.048) (0.036) (0.017) (0.024) (0.065)
∆empit−1 0.012 0.046 0.014*** 0.001 0.053*** 0.052***
(0.013) (0.089) (0.005) (0.002) (0.016) (0.016)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗LOWVOL2it (α6a) 0.111*** 0.036** 0.032** 0.054*** 0.110** 0.209***
(0.039) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.045) (0.061)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗MEDVOL2it (α6b) 0.076** 0.027 0.028** 0.030*** 0.097*** 0.057
(0.030) (0.020) (0.013) (0.008) (0.035) (0.050)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗HIGHVOL2it (α6c) 0.026 -0.012 0.020 0.042*** 0.023 0.059
(0.031) (0.028) (0.021) (0.015) (0.025) (0.059)
sector/year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
#instruments 241 110 364 118 340 267
m2 0.70 0.09 0.38 0.99 0.36 0.73
J 0.26 0.87 0.09 0.25 0.08 0.85
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Wald tests
H0 : α6a−α6b = 0 0.41 0.39 0.79 0.08* 0.72 0.00**
H0 : α6b−α6c = 0 0.21 0.03** 0.68 0.43 0.04** 0.98
H0 : α6a−α6c = 0 0.08* 0.02** 0.56 0.52 0.05** 0.04**
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (3.2). The estimates are robust
to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial
correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments,
under the null of instrument validity. The Wald test shows the p-values. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and
***, respectively at the 5% or 1% level.
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Table 3.4 also shows the results from estimating specification (3.2), but now cash
flow is interacted with dummies measuring volatility by the coefficient of variation
of cash flow. For brevity only the interaction parameters with cash flow will be
discussed. Again, the investment-cash flow sensitivities are greatest for the group
with the lowest cash flow volatility, but the effect seems to be less strong between
the low and the medium volatility subsample than in Table 3.3. The difference
between the low and the high volatility group is still considerable and a Wald
test shows that this differnce in the sensitivity is significant in all countries except
Finland and Sweden. However, in Sweden the sensitivity of the low volatility
group is significantly higher then the medium volatile group at the ten percent
level.
Our findings thus do not seem to be driven by country specific elements as we find
that investment-cash flow sensitivities are highest for firms with low cash flow
volatility in all countries investigated. Neither are the results driven by the time
invariant nature of the cash flow volatility measures. Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 in
the Appendix show that the results of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are robust when we use a
time varying counterpart of the standard deviation of the cash flow to capital ratio
or a time varying counterpart of the coefficient of variation of cash flow. As argued
above, the instruments used in the regressions are not exactly the same in every
country, nor is the sectoral composition of the sample exactly the same across
countries; therefore, a cross-country comparison of the size of the mechanism
should be avoided. Nonetheless, the evidence shows that a windfall gain in cash
flow instigates the most investment for those firms that are most likely to increase
their expectations about future cash flows, namely those with the lowest cash flow
volatility. Importantly, this finding is not related to investment opportunities that
might be better reflected by cash flow in the low volatility sample than in the high
volatility sample.
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3.4.3 The interaction with financial constraints
When investment-cash flow sensitivities result from the change in the cost of ex-
ternal finance following a change in cash flow, then investment cash flow sensitiv-
ities are likely to be stronger for firms facing a more inelastic (constrained) supply
of external funds. Combining the recent evidence of Campbell et al. (2012) and
Mulier et al. (2013) with the predictions derived in the previous section, we should
find that investment-cash flow sensitivities are highest for financially constrained
firms with low cash flow volatility and lowest for financially unconstrained firms
with high cash flow volatility. Figure 3.3 shows this mechanism for a firm facing
an unconstrained supply (left) and a constrained supply of external finance (right).
Figure 3.3: Low vs high cash flow volatility for unconstrained firms (left) or constrained
firms (right)
To identify the supply of external finance to firms, we focus on categories of firms
that we ex-ante believe to have different probabilities of suffering from financial
constraints. We think of firm size, age, and average cash flow levels as determi-
nants of the supply curve (cf. Figure 3.1). With respect to firm size and age, it
is easier for financial institutions to gather sufficient information on larger firms
(Bernanke et al., 1996) while older firms have better track records than young
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firms (Schiantarelli, 1995). Both decrease the degree of asymmetric information
between lender and borrower. This, in turn, will increase the supply of external
finance to larger and older firms (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). Further, since higher
cash flows enables firms to repay their debt, external lenders will be less resilient
in funding firms with higher cash flows. Firms with higher levels of cash flow will
therefore be less likely to forgo net present value investments due to the lack of
external finance available to them.
In order to approximate the supply of finance we calculate for each of the above
stated determinants whether a firm is scoring below or above the median of its
industry in a given year. A firm gets a score of 1 for age if the firm is younger than
median firm in the same industry in our sample in a given year, and 2 otherwise.
We then proceed in the same way for the size of the firm and the mean cash flow
of the firm. We then sum the three scores and obtain for each firmyear a score
between 3 (constrained supply of external finance) and 6 (unconstrained supply
of external finance).
To allow for possible nonlinear effects of financial constraints, we generate a cat-
egorical variable f inconLOWit which takes the value 1 if firm i gets a score of 5
or 6 in year t, and 0 otherwise, meaning unconstrained supply of external finance.
Next, f inconHIGHit takes the value 1 if firm i scores 3 or 4 in year t, and 0 other-
wise, and implies that firm i faces a constrained supply of finance in year t. These
categorical variables are interacted with cash flow to estimate model (3.3) and test
whether the most constrained firms with low cash flow volatility display the high-
est investment-cash flow sensitivities. Table 3.8 in the Appendix shows that this
approach classifies around 60 percent of the sample as unconstrained and around
40 percent as constrained.
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Iit/Kit−1 = α0+α1Iit−1/Kit−2+α2(kit−2− sit−2)+α3∆sit +α4∆sit−1+α5∆empit−1
+ α6a [ f inconLOWit ∗CFit/Kit−1 ∗LOWVOLit ]
+ α6b [ f inconLOWit ∗CFit/Kit−1 ∗MEDVOLit ]
+ α6c [ f inconLOWit ∗CFit/Kit−1 ∗HIGHVOLit ] (3.3)
+ α7a [ f inconHIGHit ∗CFit/Kit−1 ∗LOWVOLit ]
+ α7b [ f inconHIGHit ∗CFit/Kit−1 ∗MEDVOLit ]
+ α7c [ f inconHIGHit ∗CFit/Kit−1 ∗HIGHVOLit ]+υi+υt +υ jt + εit
Table 3.5 presents the results of the estimation of model (3.3), where the standard
deviation of cash flow scaled by capital is used to discriminate among volatility
groups. As in the previous section, only the investment-cash flow sensitivities
will be discussed for brevity. A first observation is that as in Table 3.3, cash flow
seems to be more important for investment if the firm has low cash flow volatility
instead of high cash flow volatility, and this appears to be mainly true for firms
facing a constrained supply of external finance. Taking a closer look on the fi-
nancially constrained firms and comparing the investment-cash flow sensitivity
between the low and high cash flow volatility subsample firms, a Wald test shows
that firms with the lowest volatility display a higher sensitivity in all countries but
Hungary. Secondly, in line with previous research, firms with high financial con-
straints seem to have higher investment-cash flow sensitivities than firms with low
constraints. The sensitivity of 15 out of 18 volatility subsamples is higher for con-
strained firms than unconstrained firms in the same volatility subsample. Looking
at the low cash flow volatility subsample and comparing the investment-cash flow
sensitivity between the high and low constrained firms, a Wald test shows that
constrained firms display a higher sensitivity in 4 out of 6 countries. A third
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interesting observation is that even among financially constrained firms a large
heterogeneity of investment-cash flow sensitivities can be found, independent of
to the degree of constraints they face. These findings are perfectly in line with the
hypotheses derived in the previous section and the implications of these findings
will be discussed in detail below.
In Table 3.6 the estimation results of model (3.3) are shown, where the coefficient
of variation of cash flow is used to measure cash flow volatility. It can be seen
that the main findings of Table 3.5 are generally confirmed. Investment-cash flow
sensitivities tend to be larger for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms,
and investment-cash flow sensitivities seem to be negatively related to cash flow
volatility. Taking a closer look on the financially constrained firms and comparing
the low with the high volatility subsample, the Wald test indicates that sensitiv-
ities are highest for low cash flow volatility firms in all countries except France
and Finland. Looking at the firms with low cash flow volatility and comparing
the low with the high financially constrained subsample, a Wald test shows that
sensitivities are highest for constrained firms in all countries except the Czech
Republic and Hungary. Moreover, the results seem to be unrelated to country spe-
cific elements, as they hold for all six countries investigated. Again, the results
are not driven by the time invariant nature of the cash flow volatility measures.
Tables 3.13 and 3.14 in the Appendix show that the results of Tables 3.3 and 3.4
are quite robust when we use a time varying counterpart of the standard deviation
of the cash flow to capital ratio or a time varying counterpart of the coefficient of
variation of cash flow.
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Table 3.5: Financial constraints and volatility interactions: standard deviation of
CFit/Kit−1
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit−1/Kit−2 -0.139*** -0.128*** -0.221*** -0.103*** -0.014 -0.236
(0.046) (0.016) (0.023) (0.014) (0.058) (0.296)
kit−2− sit−2 -0.264*** -0.204*** -0.264*** -0.162*** -0.144*** -0.240*
(0.040) (0.018) (0.026) (0.015) (0.057) (0.0140)
∆sit 0.183*** -0.064 0.250*** 0.106*** 0.075 0.134
(0.049) (0.061) (0.044) (0.024) (0.064) (0.087)
∆sit−1 0.245*** 0.236*** 0.281*** 0.167*** 0.135*** 0.251**
(0.037) (0.023) (0.025) (0.014) (0.055) (0.103)
∆empit−1 0.010 0.051* 0.007 0.003* 0.051*** 0.058***
(0.013) (0.030) (0.005) (0.002) (0.018) (0.018)
f inconLOWit∗
CFit/Kit−1 ∗LOWVOL1it (α6a) 0.114 0.087*** 0.071 0.102 0.588*** 0.098
(0.084) (0.026) (0.047) (0.087) (0.183) (0.135)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗MEDVOL1it (α6b) 0.087** 0.063*** 0.030* 0.173*** 0.085* 0.071
(0.036) (0.015) (0.017) (0.028) (0.049) (0.118)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗HIGHVOL1it (α6c) 0.034 0.046*** 0.026** 0.032*** 0.095* 0.069
(0.025) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.050) (0.067)
f inconHIGHit∗
CFit/Kit−1 ∗LOWVOL1it (α7a) 0.203*** 0.111*** 0.148*** 0.306*** 0.415*** 0.291***
(0.069) (0.024) (0.041) (0.085) (0.158) (0.107)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗MEDVOL1it (α7b) 0.109*** 0.068*** 0.064*** 0.252*** 0.185** 0.180*
(0.042) (0.015) (0.022) (0.037) (0.089) (0.101)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗HIGHVOL1it (α7c) 0.086*** 0.050*** 0.019 0.069*** 0.088 0.188
(0.032) (0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.060) (0.188)
sector/year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
#instruments 263 191 336 216 151 248
m2 0.66 0.27 0.86 0.14 0.35 0.71
J 0.38 0.04 0.20 0.53 0.21 0.16
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Wald tests
H0 : α7a−α7c = 0 0.10* 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.05** 0.55
H0 : α7a−α6a = 0 0.23 0.08* 0.06* 0.03** 0.22 0.08*
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (3.3). The estimates are robust
to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial
correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments,
under the null of instrument validity. The Wald test shows the p-values. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and
***, respectively at the 5% or 1% level.
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Table 3.6: Financial constraints and volatility interactions: coefficient of variation of CFit
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit−1/Kit−2 -0.126*** -0.370*** -0.224*** -0.094*** -0.012 -0.115***
(0.048) (0.111) (0.021) (0.032) (0.029) (0.037)
kit−2− sit−2 -0.247*** -0.326*** -0.265*** -0.200*** -0.124*** -0.197***
(0.042) (0.036) (0.023) (0.020) (0.030) (0.038)
∆sit 0.209*** 0.104 0.209*** 0.164*** 0.113*** 0.110**
(0.047) (0.074) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.055)
∆sit−1 0.238*** 0.411*** 0.275*** 0.202*** 0.103*** 0.205***
(0.040) (0.055) (0.022) (0.017) (0.043) (0.039)
∆empit−1 0.008 0.301*** 0.011** 0.002 0.161*** 0.048***
(0.012) (0.080) (0.005) (0.002) (0.043) (0.016)
f inconLOWit∗
CFit/Kit−1 ∗LOWVOL2it (α6a) 0.105** 0.027 0.006 0.044*** 0.162*** 0.154**
(0.044) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) (0.063) (0.070)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗MEDVOL2it (α6b) 0.070** 0.028 0.019 0.024*** 0.134*** 0.052
(0.028) (0.026) (0.012) (0.008) (0.035) (0.047)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗HIGHVOL2it (α6c) 0.064** 0.014 0.011 0.025 0.044 0.079
(0.029) (0.024) (0.019) (0.016) (0.039) (0.059)
f inconHIGHit∗
CFit/Kit−1 ∗LOWVOL2it (α7a) 0.228*** 0.048** 0.056** 0.089*** 0.243*** 0.261***
(0.068) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.066) (0.083)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗MEDVOL2it (α7b) 0.107*** 0.057** 0.031* 0.060*** 0.099** 0.152**
(0.032) (0.025) (0.017) (0.019) (0.049) (0.070)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗HIGHVOL2it (α7c) 0.022 0.051** 0.016 0.044** -0.017 -0.054
(0.057) (0.025) (0.026) (0.022) (0.095) (0.103)
sector/year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
#instruments 262 143 538 139 457 257
m2 0.46 0.15 0.42 0.91 0.87 0.78
J 0.60 0.29 0.21 0.08 0.25 0.65
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Wald tests
H0 : α7a−α7c = 0 0.01*** 0.84 0.17 0.10* 0.04** 0.00***
H0 : α7a−α6a = 0 0.07* 0.03** 0.02** 0.04** 0.20 0.16
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (3.3). The estimates are robust
to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial
correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments,
under the null of instrument validity. The Wald test shows the p-values. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and
***, respectively at the 5% or 1% level.
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In line with the seminal findings of FHP, we have shown that investment-cash flow
sensitivities are higher for firms that face a restricted supply of external finance.
However, within the group of constrained firms, investment-cash flow sensitivi-
ties are highest for firms with low cash flow volatility and lowest for firms with
high cash flow volatility. This experiment is closely related to that of KZ. Among
the constrained group of FHP, they classified firms as unconstrained if their CFO
stated to have solid financial positions. Cleary (2006) notes that these are prob-
ably the firms that are likely to have relatively low cash flow volatility, and thus
it is not surprising that KZ find that these unconstrained firms have the highest
investment-cash flow sensitivities. On the other end, Allayannis and Mozumdar
(2004) showed that KZ’s constrained group was dominated by very distressed
firms. Note that these are exactly the firms that will not have changing expecta-
tions about future cash flows and are therefore likely to have lower investment-
cash flow sensitivities.
In fact, as Cleary (2006) states, the very nature of indexes like the Z-score im-
ply that firms with low cash flow volatility are classified as financially healthier.
This relates to the point of Guariglia (2008) that both sides of the literature use
different proxies to measure financial constraints. While the FHP strand of the
literature typically uses variables as age or size that determine the supply of ex-
ternal finance, the KZ strand of the literature uses variables that measure financial
health, which mainly influences the demand because financial health is probably
strongly correlated with cash flow volatility.
This literature is centred around financial constraints and many authors have there-
fore focused on the supply of external finance, but surprisingly not on the price of
external finance. Recent findings5 have shown that the price of external finance
5See Campbell et al. (2012) and Mulier et al. (2013).
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plays the intermediating role for investment and investment-cash flow sensitivi-
ties. When one considers the price of external finance as subject of investigation,
it is also important to consider the impact of the demand side, which is exactly the
innovation of this paper. Our findings are important because, in contrast to earlier
research, they are not only able to explain the contradictory findings between FHP
and KZ, which are caused by cash flow volatility, but they also give a clear indi-
cation that they are driven by the same mechanism, namely, changes in the cost of
external finance.
3.5 Conclusion
Recent evidence by Campbell et al. (2012) has shown that the cost of capital plays
a fundamental role for investment-cash flow sensitivities. At first sight, this notion
strongly supports the findings of Fazzari et al. (1988) (FHP), however, if true, it
should also be compatible with the results of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (KZ).
In this paper we provide evidence that cash flow volatility can explain the con-
tradictory findings in the literature. Cash flow volatility influences the change in
the demand for external finance after a cash flow shock, because the demand for
external finance is forward looking and also depends on future expected cash flow.
For a given cash flow shock, it is more likely that this signals firms with low cash
flow volatility as the probability is higher for them that this shock falls outside
their normal cash flow fluctuations, and therefore, they are also more likely to
change their expectations about future cash flow. This implies that, for the same
contemporaneous increase in cash flow, the demand for external finance will drop
more for firms with low cash flow volatility, and consequently also the cost of
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external finance drops more. As a drop in the cost of external finance enables
additional investment, the incentive to invest will be largest for those firms with
the highest drop, namely those with low cash flow volatility. Empirical analysis in
6 countries confirms that investment-cash flow sensitivities are highest for firms
with low cash flow volatility.
Further, we interact the implications of cash flow volatility with financial con-
straints that firms face. First, considering firms with the same volatility, investment-
cash flow sensitivities will be higher for financially constrained firms (i.e. those
facing an inelastic supply of external finance). Indeed, for a given change in cash
flow, the change in the demand for external funds will be the same, but the change
in the price of external funds will be greater for firms facing a more restricted,
inelastic supply. These are basically the FHP results. Second, considering firms
with the same level of financial constraints, investment-cash flow sensitivities will
be higher for firms with low cash flow volatility. Indeed, for a given change in
cash flow, the elasticity of the supply of external funds is the same, but the change
in the price of external funds will be greater for firms with a larger change in the
demand of funds. Cleary (2006) pointed out that cash flow volatility is inherently
related to financial health, as frequently used in the KZ strand of the literature,
and thus these findings are consistent with the KZ findings.
Our findings are important because, in contrast to earlier research, they might not
only be able to explain the contradictory findings between FHP and KZ, they also
give a clear indication about the mechanism that drives them, namely, changes in
the cost of external finance. An interesting avenue for future research would be
to use the COMPUSTAT data of FHP and KZ and investigate to what extent the
opposite findings are driven by cash flow volatility.
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.7: Definition of variables
p ft gross fixed capital formation deflatort
pgt GDP deflatort
Iit+1 (tangible f ixed assetsit+1/p
f
t+1− tangible f ixed assetsit/p ft +depreciationit+1/p ft+1
Kit=0 tangible f ixed assetsit=0
Kit+1 Kit ∗ (1−δ)∗ (p ft+1/p ft )+ Iit+1
kit log(Kit )
salesit nominal salesit/p
g
t
sit log(salesit)
CFit cash f lowit/p
g
t
cost o f employeesit nominal cost o f employeesit/p
g
t
∆empit log(cost o f employees)it − log(cost o f employees)it−1
stdevi(CFit/Kit−1) standard deviation (CFit/Kit−1)
CVCFi standard deviation (CFit)/mean (CFit)
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Table 3.8: Descriptive statistics: identification of financial constraints
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
f inconLOW 55% 56% 58% 53% 67% 65%
f inconHIGH 45% 44% 42% 47% 33% 35%
age 29 18 18 25 12 10
total assets 1.34 0.68 0.94 0.58 0.62 1.22
meanCF/K 0.37 0.51 0.69 0.44 0.28 0.66
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Notes. In the top part, the Table shows the share of firms in a country that are classified in a given constraint group. In the
bottom part, the variable means are presented for the given variables that are used to calculated the position of the supply
curve of external finance. Age is in number of year. Totalassets is in million euro. For non-euro countries the exchange
rate used for conversion is that of januari 1999. In concreto: EXR swedish krona/euro = 9.0826, EXR Czech koruna/euro
= 35.107, EXR Hungarian forint/euro = 250.79 . Mean CF/K is the average cash flow to capital ratio of all observations
for a given firm. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of the firm’s cash flow to capital ratio, scaled by the
firm’s mean cash flow to capital ratio.
Table 3.9: Descriptive statistics: industrial composition of the sample
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
agriculture and mining 1% 1% 4% 5% 12% 6%
manu f acturing 38% 20% 24% 21% 50% 41%
construction 11% 18% 15% 15% 8% 12%
retail and wholesale 39% 32% 26% 27% 20% 36%
hotel and restaurant 1% 11% 4% 4% 1% 0%
services 9% 11% 19% 21% 7% 5%
health and other 1% 7% 8% 7% 2% 1%
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Notes. The Table shows the share of firms in a country that belong to the given sector in our sample. The nace 2-digit level
is used to compose the sectors.
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As robustness check we also consider the time varying counterpart of our two
volatility measures (the standard deviation of the cash flow to capital ratio and
the coefficient of variation of cash flow). The time varying counterparts are con-
structed as the moving average of a five year rolling window of the respective
volatility measures. Again we generate dummy variables related to the distribu-
tion of the time varying volatility measures to test the hypotheses developed in
section 4.2.
First, three dummies LOWVOL1tvit , MEDVOL1
tv
it and HIGHVOL1
tv
it are created,
where LOWVOL1tvit takes the value 1 if firm i’s time varying standard deviation of
cash flow to capital is among the lowest 25 percentile of its industry in year t, and
0 otherwise. Vice versa HIGHVOL1tvit , takes the value 1 if firm i’s time varying
standard deviation of the cash flow to capital ratio is in the highest quartile in i’s
industry in year t, and 0 otherwise. The dummy MEDVOL1tvit represents then all
remaining observations in between, i.e. 1 - LOWVOL1tvit - HIGHVOL1
tv
it .
Secondly, LOWVOL2tvit , MEDVOL2
tv
it and HIGHVOL2
tv
it are created, where LOW -
VOL2tvit takes the value 1 if firm i’s time varying coefficient of variation of cash
flow is lower than the 25 percentile of its industry time varying coefficient of vari-
ation of cash flow in year t, and 0 otherwise. MEDVOL2tvit , takes the value 1 if
firm i’s time varying coefficient of variation of cash flow lies in the second or third
quartile in its industry in year t, and 0 otherwise. The dummy HIGHVOL2tvit is
equal to 1 when firm i’s time varying coefficient of variation of cash flow is among
the highest 25 percentile in its industry in year t, and is equal to 0 otherwise.
Table 3.10 shows the relation between all the measures of cash flow volatility and
age and size. The Table shows subsample means and standard deviations, where
a firm are considered young (old) when its age is below (above) the median age
in the firms industry in a given year. A firm is categorized as small (large) if the
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firm’s totalassets are below (above) the median totalassets in the firms industry
in a given year. It can first be noted that the time varying volatility measures are
generally lower than the time invariant counterpart. Further, cash flow tends to be
more volatile for young or small firms rather than old or large firms, and this is
especially true for the distinction between small and large when the (time varying)
coefficient of variation of cash flow is used to measure volatility.
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Table 3.10: Descriptive statistics: sample means and standard deviations of the volatity
variables
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
stdevi(CFit/Kit−1)
young 0.311 0.361 0.661 0.508 0.329 1.144
(0.499) (0.282) (0.797) (0.744) (0.788) (3.516)
old 0.295 0.348 0.622 0.474 0.242 1.015
(0.469) (0.276) (0.783) (0.733) (0.409) (4.242)
small 0.300 0.345 0.613 0.526 0.314 1.214
(0.448) (0.266) (0.749) (0.714) (0.633) (4.344)
large 0.306 0.362 0.672 0.459 0.273 0.849
(0.518) (0.290) (0.828) (0.761) (0.670) (2.718)
CVCFi
young 0.560 0.546 0.650 1.507 0.822 0.805
(0.602) (0.369) (0.797) (2.193) (1.175) (1.239)
old 0.599 0.558 0.633 1.361 0.808 0.745
(0.665) (0.382) (0.540) (2.020) (1.308) (1.074)
small 0.598 0.641 0.734 1.756 0.924 0.837
(0.674) (0.421) (0.607) (2.386) (1.443) (1.173)
large 0.560 0.463 0.550 1.123 0.728 0.737
(0.588) (0.299) (0.450) (1.751) (1.027) (1.138)
stdevit(CFit/Kit−1)
young 0.113 0.174 0.227 0.390 0.119 0.197
(0.204) (0.126) (0.250) (0.660) (0.316) (0.633)
old 0.107 0.162 0.210 0.355 0.107 0.183
(0.165) (0.120) (0.236) (0.638) (0.154) (0.311)
small 0.111 0.172 0.224 0.403 0.123 0.216
(0.203) (0.123) (0.232) (0.626) (0.183) (0.650)
large 0.109 0.164 0.215 0.344 0.106 0.164
(0.203) (0.123) (0.255) (0.671) (0.306) (0.213)
CVCFit
young 0.494 0.468 0.580 1.232 0.865 0.750
(0.747) (0.417) (0.662) (2.250) (1.711) (1.375)
old 0.522 0.477 0.559 1.112 0.802 0.722
(0.805) (0.449) (0.669) (2.122) (1.568) (1.373)
small 0.521 0.567 0.682 1.526 1.009 0.809
(0.787) (0.497) (0.767) (2.569) (1.925) (1.499)
large 0.494 0.378 0.457 0.827 0.699 0.671
(0.765) (0.332) (0.521) (1.663) (1.373) (1.119)
Notes. The Table shows sample means and in parentheses the corresponding standard deviations. The subscript i indexes
firms, and the subscript t, time, where t = 1996-2008. A firm is categorized as young (old) when its age is below (above)
the median age in the firms industry in a given year. A firm is categorized as small (large) if the firm’s totalassets are below
(above) the median totalassets in the firms industry in a given year.
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Table 3.11: Volatility interactions: time varying standard deviation of CFit/Kit−1
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit−1/Kit−2 -0.091 -0.168*** -0.234*** -0.106*** -0.007 -0.150***
(0.079) (0.021) (0.039) (0.014) (0.031) (0.048)
kit−2− sit−2 -0.219*** -0.196*** -0.278*** -0.165*** -0.138*** -0.239***
(0.071) (0.017) (0.044) (0.016) (0.026) (0.059)
∆sit 0.201*** -0.077 0.301*** 0.121*** 0.102*** 0.120
(0.059) (0.066) (0.091) (0.025) (0.039) (0.216)
∆sit−1 0.211*** 0.183*** 0.296*** 0.170*** 0.139*** 0.248***
(0.061) (0.026) (0.046) (0.015) (0.026) (0.097)
∆empit−1 0.011 -0.018 0.003 0.003** 0.052*** 0.046***
(0.015) (0.042) (0.007) (0.002) (0.015) (0.017)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗LOWVOL1tvit (α6a) 0.179** 0.101*** 0.208*** 0.183** 0.218** 0.277
(0.081) (0.025) (0.063) (0.092) (0.107) (0.653)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗MEDVOL1tvit (α6b) 0.199*** 0.088*** 0.074** 0.200*** 0.150** 0.171
(0.054) (0.017) (0.036) (0.039) (0.060) (0.124)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗HIGHVOL1tvit (α6c) 0.080** 0.063*** 0.018 0.047*** 0.074** 0.093
(0.034) (0.011) (0.023) (0.011) (0.030) (0.083)
sector/year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
#instruments 184 152 161 183 307 168
m2 0.60 0.15 0.98 0.13 0.39 0.47
J 0.61 0.25 0.11 0.62 0.15 0.19
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Wald tests
H0 : α6a−α6b = 0 0.70 0.27 0.00*** 0.84 0.46 0.85
H0 : α6b−α6c = 0 0.02** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.19 0.32
H0 : α6a−α6c = 0 0.21 0.02** 0.00*** 0.14 0.18 0.76
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (3.3). The estimates are robust
to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial
correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments,
under the null of instrument validity. The Wald test shows the p-values. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and
***, respectively at the 5% or 1% level.
CHAPTER 3. ICFS: THE ROLE OF CASH FLOW VOLATILITY 90
Table 3.12: Volatility interactions: time varying coeficient of variation of CFit
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit−1/Kit−2 -0.075 -0.148*** -0.211*** -0.098*** -0.002 -0.135***
(0.062) (0.011) (0.034) (0.012) (0.028) (0.042)
kit−2− sit−2 -0.201*** -0.214*** -0.251*** -0.163*** -0.131*** -0.223***
(0.046) (0.013) (0.040) (0.013) (0.023) (0.045)
∆sit 0.168* 0.014 0.183*** 0.107*** 0.133*** 0.130**
(0.094) (0.058) (0.038) (0.022) (0.032) (0.061)
∆sit−1 0.196*** 0.229*** 0.260*** 0.167*** 0.137*** 0.236***
(0.043) (0.021) (0.035) (0.013) (0.023) (0.046)
∆empit−1 0.010 0.023*** 0.012** 0.004*** 0.051*** 0.042***
(0.015) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.015) (0.015)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗LOWVOL2tvit (α6a) 0.105** 0.065*** 0.040** 0.118*** 0.124** 0.197**
(0.047) (0.011) (0.020) (0.042) (0.050) (0.088)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗MEDVOL2tvit (α6b) 0.063* 0.062*** 0.032** 0.046*** 0.128*** 0.064
(0.034) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.041) (0.067)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗HIGHVOL2tvit (α6c) 0.025 0.047*** 0.030 0.032* 0.027 0.074
(0.033) (0.013) (0.021) (0.017) (0.022) (0.083)
sector/year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
#instruments 242 155 538 205 367 247
m2 0.75 0.28 0.42 0.23 0.37 0.61
J 0.33 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.35 0.74
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Wald tests
H0 : α6a−α6b = 0 0.28 0.47 0.65 0.08* 0.94 0.04**
H0 : α6b−α6c = 0 0.32 0.04** 0.94 0.57 0.02** 0.90
H0 : α6a−α6c = 0 0.13 0.02** 0.69 0.06* 0.07* 0.19
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (3.2). The estimates are robust
to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial
correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments,
under the null of instrument validity. The Wald test shows the p-values. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and
***, respectively at the 5% or 1% level.
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Table 3.13: Financial constraints and volatility interactions: time varying standard devi-
ation of CFit/Kit−1
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit−1/Kit−2 -0.117** -0.149*** -0.234*** -0.101*** 0.017 -0.160***
(0.056) (0.016) (0.025) (0.014) (0.033) (0.048)
kit−2− sit−2 -0.243*** -0.204*** -0.277*** -0.160*** -0.115*** -0.273***
(0.047) (0.016) (0.029) (0.016) (0.029) (0.054)
∆sit 0.192*** -0.024 0.209*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.156**
(0.053) (0.047) (0.041) (0.025) (0.039) (0.066)
∆sit−1 0.233*** 0.224*** 0.286*** 0.165*** 0.119*** 0.285***
(0.045) (0.022) (0.027) (0.015) (0.029) (0.055)
∆empit−1 0.013 0.045 0.012** 0.003* 0.047*** 0.006
(0.013) (0.030) (0.005) (0.002) (0.016) (0.095)
f inconLOWit∗
CFit/Kit−1 ∗LOWVOL1tvit (α6a) 0.183* 0.069*** 0.108** -0.014 0.188 -0.035
(0.096) (0.021) (0.045) (0.120) (0.153) (0.227)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗MEDVOL1tvit (α6b) 0.186*** 0.061*** 0.012 0.144*** 0.194** 0.022
(0.051) (0.014) (0.020) (0.040) (0.077) (0.201)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗HIGHVOL1tvit (α6c) 0.055* 0.049*** 0.011 0.043*** 0.068* -0.026
(0.030) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.038) (0.074)
f inconHIGHit∗
CFit/Kit−1 ∗LOWVOL1tvit (α7a) 0.227*** 0.086*** 0.130*** 0.305*** 0.365** 0.727*
(0.092) (0.022) (0.049) (0.104) (0.172) (0.379)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗MEDVOL1tvit (α7b) 0.226*** 0.078*** 0.068** 0.275*** 0.231** 0.093
(0.073) (0.015) (0.030) (0.053) (0.110) (0.225)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗HIGHVOL1tvit (α7c) 0.126*** 0.051*** 0.010 0.057*** 0.116** 0.014
(0.036) (0.011) (0.021) (0.018) (0.053) (0.155)
sector/year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
#instruments 211 305 390 201 283 219
m2 0.41 0.85 0.41 0.15 0.28 0.46
J 0.48 0.07 0.29 0.74 0.07 0.80
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Wald tests
H0 : α7a−α7c = 0 0.24 0.04** 0.00*** 0.02** 0.15 0.09*
H0 : α7a−α6a = 0 0.61 0.21 0.61 0.01*** 0.21 0.02**
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (3.3). The estimates are robust
to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial
correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments,
under the null of instrument validity. The Wald test shows the p-values. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and
***, respectively at the 5% or 1% level.
CHAPTER 3. ICFS: THE ROLE OF CASH FLOW VOLATILITY 92
Table 3.14: Financial constraints and volatility interactions: time varying coefficient of
variation of CFit
Belgium France Finland Sweden Czech Rep Hungary
Iit−1/Kit−2 -0.150*** -0.154*** -0.215*** -0.143*** -0.018 -0.116***
(0.056) (0.017) (0.023) (0.012) (0.034) (0.035)
kit−2− sit−2 -0.189*** -0.182** -0.257*** -0.209*** -0.140*** -0.191***
(0.027) (0.018) (0.025) (0.014) (0.030) (0.039)
∆sit 0.127*** 0.000 0.200*** 0.149*** 0.144*** 0.086**
(0.032) (0.054) (0.040) (0.022) (0.046) (0.039)
∆sit−1 0.184*** 0.196*** 0.268*** 0.210*** 0.144*** 0.198***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.013) (0.030) (0.037)
∆empit−1 0.028** -0.006 0.012** 0.003** 0.042*** 0.045***
(0.012) (0.032) (0.005) (0.001) (0.015) (0.015)
f inconLOWit∗
CFit/Kit−1 ∗LOWVOL2tvit (α6a) 0.076** 0.074*** 0.004 0.024 0.096* 0.259***
(0.039) (0.012) (0.019) (0.024) (0.053) (0.084)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗MEDVOL2tvit (α6b) 0.060** 0.076*** 0.011 0.023* 0.078 0.048
(0.024) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.065) (0.064)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗HIGHVOL2tvit (α6c) 0.008 0.054*** 0.005 0.024 0.024 0.024
(0.021) (0.014) (0.023) (0.021) (0.029) (0.057)
f inconHIGHit∗
CFit/Kit−1 ∗LOWVOL2tvit (α7a) 0.123** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.060* 0.236*** 0.198*
(0.058) (0.014) (0.030) (0.036) (0.062) (0.108)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗MEDVOL2tvit (α7b) 0.112*** 0.078*** 0.052** 0.037** 0.043 0.235***
(0.030) (0.014) (0.022) (0.018) (0.058) (0.086)
CFit/Kit−1 ∗HIGHVOL2tvit (α7c) 0.074** 0.072*** -0.021 -0.008 0.066 0.008
(0.035) (0.016) (0.037) (0.015) (0.062) (0.121)
sector/year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
#instruments 506 179 390 290 257 321
m2 0.06 0.11 0.43 0.08 0.56 0.92
J 0.49 0.01 0.12 0.09 0.30 0.88
#obs 17,117 404,366 58,097 141,475 13,697 7,443
Wald tests
H0 : α7a−α7c = 0 0.44 0.20 0.01*** 0.07* 0.04** 0.20
H0 : α7a−α6a = 0 0.42 0.14 0.00*** 0.31 0.02** 0.48
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (3.3). The estimates are robust
to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial
correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments,
under the null of instrument validity. The Wald test shows the p-values. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and
***, respectively at the 5% or 1% level.
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4
Do Firms Use the Trade Credit
Channel to Manage Growth?1
4.1 Introduction
Trade credit is an important source of finance for firms, especially when firms
find it difficult to obtain external funding via credit institutions. Over recent
years, trade credit in the form of accounts payable and receivable of euro area
non-financial firms has moved broadly in line with the business cycle. This con-
1This chapter is the result of joint work with Annalisa Ferrando (ECB).
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firms the typically procyclical pattern of accounts payable and receivable, as they
are closely linked to the exchange of goods and services and, hence, to economic
activity (see Figure 4.1). In general, the flows of trade credit have remained a
stable source of finance for euro area companies but tended to decline when bank
credit was becoming easily accessible since 2005.
Figure 4.1: Trade credit, short-term loans and euro area GDP (annual percentage
changes)
Source: ECB and Eurostat, euro area integrated accounts. Notes: Annual percentage changes are calculated as the four-
quarter sum of transactions over the amounts outstanding four quarters earlier. Accounts receivable and payable are esti-
mated by the ECB on the basis of partial information. The year-on-year percentage changes in euro area GDP are expressed
in seasonally adjusted current prices.
During the recent financial crisis there has been an increase in the use of trade
credit, in particular from mid-2009, likely to compensate the strong decline in
short-term bank loans, which can be seen in Figure 4.1. Interestingly, the fact that
the decline in the annual growth of accounts payable and receivable between non-
financial firms has been less pronounced than that in nominal GDP growth may
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indicate that trade credit between companies has played a buffer role in the recent
crisis.
If so, it is important to know through which mechanism trade credit plays this
role. Trade credit is provided when there is a delay between the delivery of goods
and services and the payment for them. While early trade credit theories relate the
use of trade credit to the presence of information asymmetries and the monitor-
ing advantage that suppliers have over banks, more recent analyses focus on the
importance of trade credit (mainly in the form of accounts receivable) as a cash
management tool. As illustrated in Figure 4.2, the use of trade credit of a firm
is indeed twofold and is interlinked with the need to finance production. A firm
can be seen as a supplier and therefore its accounts receivable (TCR) are a proxy
for how much it lends to customers. However, a firm is also a customer and its
accounts payable (TCP) are its borrowing from suppliers. Moreover it is often
shown that firms that receive trade credit from their own suppliers are more likely
to extend trade credit to their customers.
Figure 4.2: Firm performance and the financial environment
Notes. Figure based on Petersen and Rajan (1997).
In this paper we argue that it is the combination of both aspects of trade credit (ac-
counts payable and receivable) that is important for a firm’s performance. First,
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because firms manage both their accounts payable and accounts receivable to op-
timize their firm performance. And second, because in our view there is an inter-
action between the financial market and this trade credit channel. In the textbook
example, all firms in a production chain finance their production through a fi-
nancial intermediary, and so, every firm is paid for his goods at the moment of
delivery. If, for some reason, these financial intermediaries do not (or no longer)
provide sufficient means to finance production, firms might deliver the goods to
their costumers down the chain without requiring immediate payment. Hence each
customer, as seen in Figure 4.2, will receive trade credit (TCP) from his supplier
and in turn he will extend trade credit (TCR) to his own customers. This chain
continues until the final firm sells his goods to the households, after which the fi-
nal goods firm repays his trade credit and, after that, every firm up the production
chain.
Overall, it is thus crucial for a firm to receive trade credit from its suppliers in
order to finance production, but it is also important to extend trade credit in order
to sell its goods to its constrained customers. We argue that firms do not need
to finance these accounts receivable with internal funds fully, but that firms may
have a contract with a financial intermediary which allows them to draw on short
term liabilities to finance a large portion of their accounts receivable. Mester et al.
(2001) cite such a contract between a small-business borrower and a Canadian
bank:
“Total outstandings are not to exceed 75% of good accounts receiv-
able, excluding accounts over 90 days and inter-company accounts
plus 50% of inventory, up to a maximum of $5 million dollars, includ-
ing raw material, work in process and finished products, less priority
claims.”
Basically, such credit lines imply that most of a firm’s accounts receivable do not
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affect the firm’s working capital and that the bank is indirectly financing the firm’s
customers, while it is still the firm (and not the bank) that is bearing the monitoring
costs and the default risk.2 This mechanism, where receivables are partially self-
financing, has not received much attention in the literature, although it has been
noted by few authors (Stowe et al., 1980; Mian and Smith, 1992; Mester et al.,
2001; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004).
In order to protect their accounts receivables from credit risk related to losses,
firms can purchase credit insurance. Moreover, firms with insured receivables
will be more likely to get a bank contract that allows them to draw on short term
liabilities with receivables as pledged collateral. According to the International
Credit Insurance and Surety Association (ICISA) in 2010 its members insured
trade credit in excess of 1,6 trillion euro. This popular form of protection thus en-
ables suppliers to significantly increase their overall sales turnover, reduce credit
risk related losses and improve the profitability of their business.3
The balance sheet data used in this paper (see below) provide some ’smoking gun’
evidence of the mechanism. Looking at Table 4.1, the first two columns show the
mean of accounts receivable scaled by total assets and the mean of short term
liabilities, excluding accounts payable, scaled by total assets. The table reveals
that they are similar in magnitude and therefore does not reject the hypothesis that
firms draw on short term liabilities to finance a large part of their receivables rather
than using cash. More importantly, column 3 of Table 4.1 shows the correlation
between the flow of accounts receivable and the flow of short term liabilities,
where the flow is measured as the year-on-year change and both flows are scaled
by total assets. We find that increases in accounts receivable are strongly related
2As argued in the literature, there are many economic reasons why a firm would perform these
tasks rather than a financial intermediary.
3See for instance Jones (2010) or “Credit Insurance for European SMEs: A Guide to Assessing
the Need to Manage Liquidity Risk” published by the European Commission in 2003.
CHAPTER 4. TRADE CREDIT AND FIRM GROWTH 103
to increases in short term liabilities, moreover, the fourth column of Table 4.1
shows that increases in accounts receivable are much less related to decreasing
cash balances. The correlations in columns 3 and 4 can be seen as further evidence
of the mechanism just explained. Even though the destination of these additional
short term liabilities is fixed, namely to be invested in sales, the mechanism gives
the firm more freedom to invest its cash, its accounts payable or other short term
loans, and ultimately it favours growth in addition to boosting the firm’s sales.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics: correlations
TCR
totalassets
ST liabilities
totalassets Corr(
∆TCR
totalassets ,
∆ST liabilities
totalassets ) Corr(
∆TCR
totalassets ,
∆Cash
totalassets )
BE 0.35 0.29 0.40*** -0.01
DE 0.20 0.25 0.13*** -0.03***
ES 0.39 0.27 0.50*** -0.04***
FI 0.17 0.29 0.31*** -0.03***
FR 0.31 0.34 0.36*** -0.06***
IT 0.37 0.32 0.34*** -0.05***
NL 0.35 0.34 0.52*** -0.04***
PT 0.34 0.35 0.28*** -0.12***
Source: AMADEUS, Bureau van Dijk Electronic publishing, authors’ calculations. Notes. TCR are accounts receivable, ST liabilities are short-term liabilities
excluding accounts payable. Cash is cash and cash equivalent. *** indicates significance at 1% level.
There are several reasons why we choose to sum accounts receivable and payable
into what we call ’the trade credit channel’. First and foremost, both types of
trade credit are an indication of how much of the firm’s operations are shielded
from developments in the financial sector. Either from the firm’s own financing
perspective (the firm can finance production with more ease if its suppliers pro-
vide working capital) or that of its customers (the firm can sell more if it can
alleviate the financial constraints of its customers). Taking the sum thus gives an
idea of how much of the firm’s production is independent of frictions or imper-
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fections in the financial market. In this perspective, our paper also adds to the
revived literature on the link between the financial sector and the real economy.
Secondly, because we are interested in the implications of the total trade credit
channel on firm growth, we want both accounts payable and receivable simulta-
neously in the analysis. Unfortunately, as they are strongly correlated with each
other, in the regression analysis this would give rise to multicollinearity problems.
Therefore, we take the sum to see the total impact of trade credit on firm growth.
The drawback of this approach is that we are unable to capture the exact impact of
each type of trade credit. However, we will test whether one of both components
has a different impact on growth, or stated differently, we will test whether the
composition of the trade credit channel is important4
For the above stated reasons, we think that the trade credit channel could be par-
ticularly important for firms located in countries where the financial intermediary
sector is not sufficiently developed, or within a country for firms that typically
suffer more from financial market imperfections, e.g. young or small firms. These
hypotheses are respectively elaborated in section 4.4.2 and section 4.4.3.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several important ways. First,
while many theories of accounts payable and accounts receivable are related to
firm performance, there have been no direct tests on whether firms actively use
them to manage their growth. By our knowledge, only the work of Fisman and
Love (2003) tries to investigate this link. Their work resembles our paper the most,
but Fisman and Love’s data are on industry level. By contrast, this paper uses ap-
proximately 2.5 million firm level observations, which consist mainly of small
and medium sized enterprises, to test whether firms depend on the trade credit
channel for growth. Secondly, we use a dynamic growth model as empirical spec-
4Table 4.11 in the Appendix refers to this question, but we come back to this is issue later in
section 4.4.
CHAPTER 4. TRADE CREDIT AND FIRM GROWTH 105
ification in contrast to a static model as used by Fisman and Love (2003). Our
findings thus shed some additional light on the robustness of their results. And
thirdly, we argue that it is not only the accounts payable, but also the accounts
receivable that are important for a firm’s performance. Moreover, we show that
firms that are more likely to be financially constrained, i.e. young or small firms,
rely more on the trade credit channel to grow. Our analysis focuses on 8 euro area
countries, which are characterised by some degree of heterogeneity in their finan-
cial systems. The econometric results indicate that the overall conditions of the
financial market matter for the importance of the trade credit channel for growth.
Also noteworthy, in countries where the trade credit channel is more present, the
marginal impact is lower, but the total impact tends to be higher. The remainder
of the paper is structured as follows: section 4.2 reviews the relevant literature
with a focus on the link between trade credit and firm performance. Section 4.3
presents the dataset used in the analysis and some stylized facts based on them.
Section 4.4 introduces the empirical approach and the econometric results. Also
the implications for firm performance related to firm heterogeneity and country
heterogeneity will be discussed. Some conclusions are given in the final section.
4.2 Literature
In a model without bank loans, Bougheas et al. (2009) show that, for a given liq-
uidity, an increase in production will require an increase in trade credit. A higher
production is associated with a higher production cost which, for a given (insuffi-
cient) amount of liquidity, implies that the firm will need to take more trade credit.
So trade credit works as an alternative mean to finance production. Also Cuñat
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(2007) argues that fast growing firms may finance themselves with trade credit
when other types of finance are not sufficiently available. Fisman and Love (2003)
extend the analysis to link trade credit substitutability for institutional financing to
the overall development of the financial sector. They find evidence that industries
that use more trade credit grow relatively faster in countries with poorly developed
financial markets. More empirical support of a link between trade credit and firm
performance comes from Boissay and Gropp (2007), who show that firms that are
confronted with a liquidity shortage (shock) try to overcome this distressed situa-
tion by passing on one fourth of the shock to their suppliers by taking more trade
credit.
In addition to taking credit from their suppliers, firms simultaneously offer trade
credit to their customers. In fact, most firms have higher amounts of accounts
receivable than accounts payable (See Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 in the Appendix).
Firms use trade receivables as a tool for implicit price discrimination across cus-
tomers, in cases where it is not possible, for instance on account of legal restric-
tions, to discriminate directly on the basis of prices (Meltzer, 1960). In such
cases, firms with a stronger market position may choose to make greater recourse
to accounts receivable, selling to customers on credit with a view to enhancing
their competitive position in the market. Petersen and Rajan (1997) showed that
firms with high profit margins, i.e. those that would benefit most from making
additional sales via price discrimination, indeed have higher accounts receivable.
More recent, Bougheas et al. (2009) argue that accounts receivable are important
for the performance of inventory management. For a given aggregate demand,
higher production increases inventories in their model; and minimization of the
(inventory) costs implies that firms will increase accounts receivable offered in
order to sell more and consequently hold less inventories. Furthermore, accounts
receivable are proven to be a useful tool when there is considerable uncertainty
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about the quality of a firm’s product among potential customers. The firm can
increase its sales by allowing delayed payments, such that the customer can wit-
ness the quality before paying (Ng et al., 1999; Deloof and Jegers, 1996). Finally,
firms provide more trade credit to customers that are in temporary distress. This
also enhances their sales, since otherwise the distressed customer would not be
able to buy the goods. Firms will however only offer additional trade credit when
they believe there is a future surplus of having a long-lasting relation with that
customer (Cuñat, 2007).
Although the above stated theories of accounts receivable are positively related to
firm performance, they seem to be in contrast with the idea that accounts payable
are used to finance the firm. On first sight, one could argue that each euro of
accounts payable cannot be used to finance the activities when the firm provides
that same euro as accounts receivable to a customer. Actually, as stated in the
introduction, the main reason why this is not so, and probably also why firms
are willing to offer so much accounts receivable, is because banks are willing
to provide loans once the accounts receivable are pledged as collateral. This is
especially the case when firms insure their receivables against the probability that
the customer defaults.
4.3 Data
Our firm level data is taken from AMADEUS, a commercial database provided by
Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. This is a comprehensive, pan-European
database containing financial information on over 10 million public and private
companies. We select non-financial firms in the euro area between 1993 and 2009
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that have reported non-negative accounts payable and receivable in their balance
sheets. After performing some data filtering in order to clean the data (see the
Appendix), we obtain an unbalanced panel of approximately 600.000 firms and
2.5 million observations. The final sample contains data for eight euro area coun-
tries (Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal)
for which we have enough observations to run our econometric analyses. Due to
different accounting reporting practises for Spain, we restricted the Spanish sam-
ple to companies having strictly positive instead of non-negative accounts payable.
Compared with the data from Cayssials and Kremp (2010), this does not affect the
representativeness of our Spanish sample5. As shown in Table 4.2, in spite of the
large number of observations, the coverage differs a lot across countries. French
companies cover almost half of the entire sample while on average the percent-
age of SMEs is around 90% but ranging from less than 40% in the Netherlands
to more than 98% in Spain (See Table 4.8 in the Appendix). The low percent-
age of SMEs in the Netherlands is due to the low coverage of Dutch SMEs in
AMADEUS. Finally, firms are on average relatively mature and SMEs are mostly
also the youngest.
Looking at our variables of interest, it is evident that the use of trade credit dif-
fers a lot across euro area countries, sectors of activity and size. In general, firms
appear to have more accounts receivable than payable on their balance sheets.
Approximately 64% percent of the firms in our sample have more accounts re-
ceivable than accounts payable. Moreover, trade credit (payable and receivable)
is relatively more prevalent in Mediterranean countries (see Figure 4.5 and Figure
4.6 in the Appendix). In general, country differences may be accounted for by
the heterogeneous institutional structures and trade credit payment conditions. A
5Cayssials and Kremp (2010) use data from the European BACH (Bank for the Accounts of
Companies Harmonised) and ESD (European Sectoral references Database) databases.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics: sample means
BE DE ES FI FR IT NL PT
growthav 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.08
bank loans 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.10 0.23 0.11 0.27
growths 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02
log(size) 9.04 8.55 9.11 6.21 6.62 7.64 10.7 5.99
age 25.9 27.0 20.3 16.2 17.2 17.4 35.5 16.1
TCchannel 0.35 0.15 0.45 0.14 0.30 0.51 0.27 0.44
TCPdays 54 21 63 21 48 83 27 58
TCRdays 73 33 103 30 60 103 69 102
# obs 67,408 53,728 167,697 88,318 1,171,221 590,569 14,017 281,365
# f irms 9,988 23,290 28,470 22,461 228,634 187,379 3,152 110,050
Source: AMADEUS, Bureau van Dijk Electronic publishing, authors’ calculations. Notes. The Table shows the sample means of the regression variables for each
country. Growthav is defined as the rate of growth of real added value; bank loans is the sum of short term and long term bank loans, scaled by total sales; growths
is defined as the rate of growth of real sales; size is measured by total assets; age is the age of firms in years; TCchannel is the sum of accounts payable and receivable
divided by sales. TCPdays and TCRdays is the average maturity of accounts payable and receivable in terms of days.
possible explanation for this is that trade credit should be more important than
bank credit when creditor protection is weaker, because cash is easily diverted,
while this is more difficult in the case of inputs, and the illiquidity of inputs facil-
itates trade credit.6 This is found to hold true for French Civil Law countries (BE,
FR, IT, NL, PT and ES), which are characterised by weaker legal protection.7 Ef-
fective payment periods are longer in Mediterranean countries. In Germany and
Finland, the average maturity of trade credit payable and receivable is around one
month. For countries like Spain, Italy or Portugal the average days of outstanding
trade credit payables is well over fifty days, while for trade credit receivables it is
even more than hundred days. These differences are in line with the evidence pro-
vided by Cayssials and Kremp (2010). Country differences are mainly attributed
to the characteristics of the underlying contracts. As explained by Marotta (2005),
the initial terms of payment are usually longer for instance in Italy, Spain and Por-
6Burkart and Ellingsen (2004); Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002)
7La Porta et al. (1998)
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tugal with respect to Nordic countries, the availability of discounts is more limited
and often there are no penalties for late payments in the former group of countries.
Another stylized fact derived from our dataset is that trade credit is more diffused
in sectors where there is a physical good involved, although it relates also to the
provision of services (Figure 4.3). Furthermore, as in Giannetti et al. (2011), the
use of trade credit is higher for manufacturers of differentiated goods than for
those of standardized goods8.
Figure 4.3: Trade payables and trade receivables across sectors and firm size (% of sales)
Source: AMADEUS, Bureau van Djik Electronic publishing and own calculations. Notes. Based on an unbalanced panel
of 600.000 companies that are reporting the use of trade credit. Average period:1993-2009. AMF: agriculture, mining and
fishing; M/S: manufacturing/standardized goods; M/D: manufacturing/differentiated goods; CON: construction; WHO:
wholesale trade; RET: retail trade; TR/T: transport and telecom, OTH: other business activities; HOT: hotels and restau-
rants. The definitions of small, medium and large firms are as defined in Table 4.8 in the Appendix.
Viewed in terms of firm size, trade credit is particularly important for SMEs, in
8See the Appendix for a definition on differentiated and standardized goods manufacturing
goods.
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particular in times of financial strains, when firms find it difficult to obtain external
funding from credit institutions. Early trade credit theories relate the use of trade
credit to the presence of information asymmetries and the monitoring advantage
that suppliers have over banks.9 More specifically, the line of reasoning is usually
as follows: some firms (typically small firms with little collateral) are unable to
obtain bank loans because it is too costly for the bank to monitor them. For sup-
pliers of those firms, by contrast, monitoring and bargaining costs may be lower in
the context of an established long-term relationship, since they frequently conduct
business with the small firms and may also have the power to cut off the supply
to such firms or to repossess the goods in the event of defaulted repayment. The
aforementioned informational and bargaining advantages that a supplier has over a
bank might provide the supplier with an opportunity to extend credit to the buyer,
even if that buyer does not seem creditworthy to the bank.10 Nonetheless, as our
data show, trade credit is also widely used by large firms, but mainly as a cash
management tool: by delaying payments, firms may be better able to match their
cash flow to their needs. Firms that receive trade credit from their own suppliers
are more likely to extend trade credit receivables to their customers.
9See Petersen and Rajan (1997) for a review of the literature and Fisman and Love (2003).
10See Petersen and Rajan (1997); Frank and Maksimovic (2005).
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4.4 Empirical approach and estimation
4.4.1 The baseline specification
Our econometric model follows Coluzzi et al. (2012) who use an augmented
version of the law of proportionate effect (LPE), as proposed by Goddard et al.
(2002), to estimate the impact of financing obstacles on firm performance. The
basic intuition of the LPE (equation (1)) is that firm growth is mean reverting to its
optimal industry size. Coluzzi et al. (2012) add economic meaning to the simple
LPE specification through the inclusion of economic variables that are believed to
deterministically affect growth. Although our paper is most closely related to the
work of Fisman and Love (2003), we do not follow their empirical strategy be-
cause we believe that growth is a dynamic process. Therefore, we prefer a simple
dynamic growth model rather than the static model of Fisman and Love (2003).
growthavit = α0+α1 growth
av
it−1+α2 TC Channelit−1+α3 bank loansit−1
+ α4 growthsalesit−1 +α5 log(size)it−1+α6 log(age)it−1
+ υi+υt +υ jt + εit (4.1)
Where the growth of added value (growthav) is calculated as the difference be-
tween the real11 added value and lagged real added value, divided by the lagged
real added value. Added value is defined as the sum of profit (loss) for the period
and minority interest, taxation, cost of employees, depreciation and interest paid.
11A variable in real terms is calculated as the variable in nominal terms divided by the GDP
deflator.
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The trade credit channel is constructed as the sum of accounts payable and ac-
counts receivable, scaled by total sales. Following Coluzzi et al. (2012) and Hes-
mati (2001), who showed that access to bank loans is an important driver of firm
growth, we also include the sum of short term and long term bank loans scaled by
total sales in the specification. We try to account for firm opportunities by includ-
ing sales growth12, which is the growth rate of real total sales. Further, by taking
the log of total assets and the log of age into account we ensure that any impact of
the trade credit channel on growth is not driven by firm size or age. The explana-
tory variables are lagged one period to reduce possible endogeneity problems. For
the trade credit channel this is also important to avoid a potential accounting cor-
relation between higher sales via receivables, which lead directly to higher added
value via profits. By keeping sales growth constant and by keeping bank loans per
production (proxied by sales) constant, the trade credit channel measures the ef-
fect of having a higher share of the firm’s production shielded from developments
in the financial sector; either because suppliers finance a higher share of produc-
tion, or because constrained customers buy a higher share of production on credit.
The error term consists of four components: an unobserved firm specific compo-
nent υi, a time component to filter out business cycle effects υt , a time component
which varies over industries accounting for industry specific effects υ jt and finally
an idiosyncratic component εit .
All specifications are estimated with the first difference General Method of Mo-
ments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The first differ-
ence GMM estimator is appropriate since it controls for biases due to unobserved
firm-specific effects and the possible endogeneity of explanatory variables. Blun-
dell and Bond (1998) showed that adding instruments in levels to estimate the
12For instance Gomes (2001) suggests to use changes in profit or sales to account for growth
opportunities.
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differenced equation considerably improves the efficiency of the first difference
estimator in smaller samples. Given the size of our sample we use the first differ-
ence GMM.
Table 4.3: Baseline estimation: specification (1)
BE DE ES FI FR IT NL PT
growthav -0.075** -0.067** -0.055 -0.139*** -0.319*** -0.121*** -0.160*** -0.103***
TCchannel 0.593*** 0.454*** 0.525*** 1.006*** 0.740*** 0.327*** 0.727*** 0.342***
bank loans 0.301*** 0.089* 0.413*** 0.471*** 0.067** 0.012 0.144* 0.301***
growths 0.110** 0.048*** 0.064** 0.091*** 0.568*** 0.128*** 0.080*** 0.076***
log(size) -0.469** 0.056 -0.391*** -0.472*** -0.257*** -0.102** -0.306*** -0.296***
log(age) -0.073 -0.161*** -0.066* -0.049* -0.008 -0.111*** -0.039 -0.143***
m2 0.75 0.41 0.13 0.27 0.53 0.17 0.71 0.92
J 0.07 0.35 0.12 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.29 0.00
# obs 67,408 53,728 167,697 88,318 1,171,221 590,569 14,017 281,365
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (1). The estimates are robust
to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial
correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments,
under the null of instrument validity. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at the 5% or 1%
level. For the definition of the variables see notes of Table 4.2.
Table 4.3 shows the results for the first difference GMM estimation of the baseline
specification. The m2 statistics provide no indication that the instruments would
be correlated with the error term. The null hypothesis of no second order serial
correlation cannot be rejected in all the regressions. We also report the results of
the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions J as a test for instrument validity,
although Blundell et al. (2000) report Monte-Carlo evidence that this test tends to
over-reject, especially when the data are persistent and the number of time-series
observations large. According to the information derived from the m2 statistics
and the Sargan test, we used different sets of lagged instruments across countries,
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ranging from instruments starting in t−2 for Belgium and The Netherlands till in-
struments starting in t−7 in France. For each country we choose the lag structure
that best fits the m2 and J tests. We believe that different growth dynamics of firms
between countries could be driving this, and so we need different lag structures to
take this into account. As the results across countries are not coming from esti-
mations with identical instruments, we focus more on the economic and statistical
significance of the independent variables. However, Table 4.9 in the Appendix
shows that the results in Table 4.3 do not significantly change when specification
(1) is estimated with identical instruments (t−2 and further) for all countries.
Starting from the estimated coefficients of past firm growth rates, they are negative
and significant in most countries, thus rejecting the LPE hypothesis of growth not
depending on past performance. Further, the implication of the LPE that initial
size should also not affect growth is not supported by the results, namely larger
firms grow significantly slower and firms that have grown a lot in the previous
period are more likely to grow slower this period. Table 4.3 further shows that
access to bank loans fosters growth in all countries except Italy. Firms with bet-
ter opportunities -proxied by sales growth- grow faster in all countries. Next, the
stylised fact that younger firms tend to grow faster is confirmed as age is nega-
tively related to firm growth, although the coefficients are not always statistically
significant. More importantly, the parameter on the trade credit channel is positive
and significantly different from zero in all countries investigated, confirming the
hypothesis that firms use the trade credit channel to manage their growth.
A useful exercise is to compare the quantitative impact of the trade credit channel
within each country. In order to draw meaningful cross-country conclusions from
this exercise, it is necessary that the results are drawn from identical estimations
for each country. For this reason, and also to check whether the results in Table
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4.3 are robust to the instruments used, we show in Table 4.9 in the Appendix the
estimation results for the baseline specification (1) with identical instruments. The
results appear to be very robust to the different sets of instruments.
The first two columns of Table 4.4 report the estimated α2 and the average size
of the trade credit channel within each country. Interestingly, if these figures
are compared, it appears that the sensitivity of growth to the variation in the
trade credit channel is largest for countries where the trade credit channel itself
is smaller, like Germany or Finland, but also in the Netherlands. In countries
where the trade credit channel is intensively used, like Spain, Italy or Portugal,
the marginal impact of the channel on growth is lower. However, when we quan-
tify the overall impact we find that this is still higher in countries where the trade
credit channel is large. In the third column of Table 4.4 the difference in the
growth rate of added value is calculated, keeping all other things equal, between
a firm of the 25th and 75th percentile of the trade credit channel. In countries
where the total value of accounts payable and receivable is less than one fourth
of the value of total sales, the difference in firm growth between firms in the 25th
and 75th percentile of the trade credit channel is more or less 10%. In countries
where almost half of the total sales is sold and bought on credit, this difference
in growth is more than 14%. The last column of Table 4.4 displays the impact
of a one standard deviation increase in the trade credit channel on firm growth,
measured in units standard deviation of growth of added value. One standard de-
viation is measured, for each country, as the mean of all the firm level standard
deviations. In countries where the trade credit channel is less widespread, a one
standard deviation increase in the channel leads -ceteris paribus- to a 0.09-0.13
standard deviation increase in firm growth. In Portugal and Spain, where goods
are commonly bought and sold on credit, a one standard deviation change in the
trade credit channel implies a 0.13-0.16 standard deviation change in firm growth.
CHAPTER 4. TRADE CREDIT AND FIRM GROWTH 117
Table 4.4: Quantitative impact of the trade credit channel within countries
GMM TCchannel (25 vs 75) (1 std.dev.)
BE 0.567*** 0.35 12% 0.15
DE 0.468*** 0.15 6% 0.09
ES 0.530*** 0.45 16% 0.16
FI 1.006*** 0.14 12% 0.15
FR 0.517** 0.30 13% 0.15
IT 0.373*** 0.52 13% 0.13
NL 0.688*** 0.27 11% 0.14
PT 0.342*** 0.44 14% 0.13
Notes. The Table first shows the output for the parameter on the trade credit channel in the first difference GMM estimation
of specification (1) with the same lag length used as instruments for all countries. The total output of these estimations can
be found in Table 9 in the Appendix. The estimates are robust to heteroscedastic standard errors. The specifications were
estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies. The second column gives the mean
of the trade credit channel, i.e. TCP+TCRsales . The third column gives the -ceteris paribus- percentage difference in growth
induced by the TC Channel between a firm in the 25th percentile of the TC Channel and 75th percentile. The fourth column
gives the -ceteris paribus- standard deviation difference in growth induced by a standard deviation in the TC Channel. *
indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at the 5% or 1% level.
In Table 4.10 in the Appendix, specification (1) is augmented with the trade credit
channel interacted with the ratio of payables to receivables to test whether the
composition of the trade credit channel is relevant for the importance of the trade
credit channel on growth. Or stated differently: to test whether the significant
impact of the trade credit is only driven by the accounts payable or only by the
accounts receivable. The interaction term appears to be never significant. This
indicates that is thus equally important for a firm to receive trade credit from its
suppliers in order to finance production independent from financial intermediaries,
or to extend trade credit in order to sell the production to its customers, indepen-
dent from their access to finance. Furthermore, Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 in the
Appendix show, respectively, that only including accounts payable or accounts re-
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ceivable in the regressions tends to overestimate the importance of the trade credit
channel.
4.4.2 Implications of firm heterogeneity: size and age
As reported in the literature, small firms, which are characterised by a small
amount of collateral relative to their liabilities, tend to have more problems to
access external finance. In this respect, accounts payable could be particular im-
portant as alternative source of finance. At the same time, the cash management
tool argument suggests that also large firms tend to use accounts payable but also
accounts receivable. In order to test the behaviour of firms with different sizes,
we construct a dummy variable -SMALL- where firms are classified according to
their total assets falling below the 25th percentile.13 Table 4.5 reports the country
estimations of our baseline model (1) augmented by the interaction of the trade
credit channel variable with the size dummy. The estimations confirm that the
trade credit channel is important for firm growth in general, but the magnitude of
its impact is higher for smaller firms in each country, and significantly so in six
out of eight countries. For small firms it is thus more important to manage growth
via the trade credit channel than for large firms.
Turning to age, Gertler (1988) was one of the first to argue that firm age is an im-
portant determinant of financial constraints. Because young firms are more likely
to experience difficulties in raising external funds, we hypothesize that the trade
credit channel should play a bigger role for young firms than for older firms. To
test this, again we augment the baseline specification (1) by interacting the trade
13The dummies are constructed per year and per sector. A firm i is for instance small in year t
when its total assets are in the 25th percentile of all the firms in that year t in the same sector.
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Table 4.5: Firm heterogeneity: Size
BE DE ES FI FR IT NL PT
growthav -0.152*** -0.067*** -0.154*** -0.140*** -0.309*** -0.117*** -0.162*** -0.085**
TCchannel 0.801*** 0.344*** 0.296** 1.017*** 0.762*** 0.432*** 0.722*** 0.325***
TCchannelSMALL 0.435** 0.090 1.905*** 0.646*** 0.888** 0.198*** 0.183 0.357***
bank loans 0.270*** 0.068 0.270*** 0.478*** 0.126** 0.153*** 0.133* 0.393***
growths 0.144* 0.051*** 0.146*** 0.089*** 0.570*** 0.130*** 0.079*** 0.160***
log(size) -0.309*** 0.126 -0.310*** -0.491*** -0.310*** -0.104 -0.284*** -0.386***
log(age) -0.068* -0.205*** -0.082*** -0.040 0.015 -0.119*** -0.025 -0.006
m2 0.43 0.38 0.60 0.24 0.82 0.11 0.69 0.35
J 0.09 0.18 0.02 0.18 0.10 0.00 0.47 0.00
Notes. The Table shows the output for the first difference GMM estimation of specification (1) augmented with an interac-
tion term. The estimates are robust to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies
and time dummies interacted with industry dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error
terms, under the null of no serial correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying
restrictions of the instruments, under the null of instrument validity. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and
***, respectively at the 5% or 1% level. TCchannelsmall is defined as the product of the trade credit channel and a size dummy
identifying small companies (below 25th percentile of total assets). For the definition of the other variables see notes of
Table 4.2.
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credit channel variable with a dummy for age -YOUNG. We define young firms
those firms that are less than 5 years old, which involves between 5 to 10 percent
of our sample (see Table 4.8 in the Appendix). Table 4.6 confirms once again
that the accounts payable and receivable form an important channel to manage
firm growth. Moreover, the younger a firm is, the more important this channel be-
comes. A straightforward finding since more mature firms are more likely to have
successful track records and may enter repeated relations with lenders, which both
mitigate the problem of information asymmetries and thereby relaxes the need for
an alternative financing channel (Gertler, 1988). This appears to be true for most
countries in our sample, although the impact of age interacted with the trade credit
channel is not always significant.
Table 4.6: Firm heterogeneity: Age
BE DE ES FI FR IT NL PT
growthav -0.189** -0.210*** -0.177*** -0.138*** -0.302** -0.130*** -0.158*** -0.143***
TCchannel 0.545*** 0.323*** 0.250** 0.975*** 0.792*** 0.419*** 0.641*** 0.379***
TCchannelYOUNG 0.200** 0.361** 0.120** 0.084 0.063** 0.094*** 0.091 0.087*
bank loans 0.290*** 0.103** 0.348*** 0.480*** 0.146** 0.181*** 0.133* 0.367***
growths 0.127** 0.111*** 0.147*** 0.088*** 0.548*** 0.160*** 0.084** 0.163***
log(size) -0.432* 0.064 -0.460*** -0.490*** -0.337*** -0.238*** -0.249* -0.557***
log(age) -0.032 -0.232*** -0.004 -0.040 0.028 -0.020*** -0.016 -0.008
m2 0.95 0.34 0.30 0.29 0.82 0.29 0.75 0.29
J 0.15 0.27 0.09 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.45 0.00
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (1). The estimates are robust
to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial
correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments,
under the null of instrument validity. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at the 5% or 1%
level. For the definition of the variables see notes of Table 4.2.
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4.4.3 Implications of country heterogeneity
It has recently been shown that developed and well functioning financial markets
are important in promoting economic growth. Mainly because in such markets,
financial intermediaries allocate sufficient funds until marginal revenues equalise
marginal costs, without discriminating among borrowers. Thus, first of all, the
size of the financial sector needs to be large enough, otherwise some firms would
need to resort to other channels to finance their activities. Research has indicated
that firms use more trade credit when access to credit institutions is difficult, ei-
ther because financial markets are less developed (Fisman and Love, 2003) or
when the financial market is not liberalised (Ge and Qiu, 2007). Secondly, even in
developed financial markets, when monetary authorities are conducting a restric-
tive policy, the supply of external finance may decrease significantly, such that a
sufficient allocation of funds to all demanding borrowers may no longer be possi-
ble, creating the need for alternative channels to finance growth. Several empirical
studies have shown that firms substitute bank loans for trade credit in an effort to
limit the impact of the traditional bank lending channel (Nilsen, 2002; De Blasio,
2005; Choi and Kim, 2005; Guariglia and Mateut, 2006) or, as shown in Figure
4.2, to limit the impact of a financial crisis (Love et al., 2007).
Even though all eight countries in our euro area sample are considered to have well
developed financial markets, they are still quite heterogeneous today and they have
changed significantly throughout the last two decades, which is almost entirely
covered by our sample period 1993-2009. When we consider the total amount
of bank loans as a percentage of GDP, for instance, bank loan availability has
increased more than 30 percentage points in Belgium and almost 150 percentage
points in Spain over the sample period. The heterogeneity is even bigger in the
debt securities market. The issuance of debt securities as a fraction of GDP was on
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average around 6 percent in 1993 and doubled in 2009 up to 12 percent of GDP.
However, differences across countries remain large with the issuance of French
firms at around 18 percent and that of Spanish firms still less than 2 percent. This
gives us an opportunity to test whether there is an interaction between the state
and evolution of the financial market on the one hand and the trade credit channel
on the other hand. Based on the theories and previous empirical findings stated
above, we expect a negative relation.
Further, the evolution of the bank loan to GDP ratio might have a trend over the
period, which could also capture developments in the regulation of the product
market. These product market deregulations could also have reduced market im-
perfections and thus the role of trade credit. In an attempt to disentangle this
additional factor, we include a variable that captures the deregulation process in
the product markets that took place during the period.14
To test the hypotheses related to the development of the financial market, we ap-
pend the data for all eight countries into one panel containing all countries and we
generate two interaction variables. The first is TCchanneli jt ∗ bankloans jtGDP jt , which inter-
acts the trade credit channel of firm i in country j in year t with the total amount
of bank loans as a fraction of GDP in that country j in that year t. In Table 4.7
this interaction is indicated as TCchannelCAP1 . Table 4.7 shows that euro area firms use
the trade credit channel to finance growth, moreover, this channel is less impor-
tant in years/countries where there is a larger supply of bank loans. And while
the estimate on the interaction seems rather small, it is economically important. It
implies that for Italy, everything else equal, the marginal impact of the trade credit
14The indicator used in the analysis measures the knock in effects of non-manufacturing regula-
tion on the cost structures faced by firms that use the output as intermediate inputs in the production
process (Nicoletti et al., 2000; Conway and Nicoletti, 2008). It is found that tight regulation of the
product markets have a large negative impact on investment (Alesina et al., 2005) and profitability.
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channel declined by almost 9% between 1993 and 2009 because of the increase in
bank loan availability.
Table 4.7: Country heterogeneity: financial market development
ALL COUNTRIES ALL COUNTRIES ALL COUNTRIES
growthav -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.120***
TCchannel 0.520*** 0.551*** 0.424***
TCchannelCAP1 -0.0003*
TCchannelCAP2 -0.0065***
TCchannelPMR 0.491***
bank loans 0.232*** 0.212*** 0.252***
growths 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.090***
log(size) -0.278*** -0.226*** -0.293***
log(age) -0.088*** -0.096*** -0.087***
PMR -0.731*** -0.400*** -0.584***
m2 0.31 0.25 0.37
J 0.00 0.00 0.00
# obs 2,429,618 2,429,618 2,429,618
Notes. The Table shows the output for the first difference GMM estimation of specification (1) augmented with the given
interaction term indicating the level of market capitalisation, where CAP1 stands for bankloans jtGDP jt and CAP2 for
debtsecurities jt
GDP jt
.
The OECD indicator of Product Market Regulation (PMR) is a variable that measures the degree to which policies promote
or inhibit competition in areas of the product market where competition is viable. The indicators cover formal regulations
in the following areas: state control of business enterprises; legal and administrative barriers to entrepreneurship; barriers
to international trade and investment. The indicator varies across sectors, countries and time. Data are available until 2007.
The estimates are robust to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time
dummies interacted with industry dummies. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at the 5%
or 1% level.
Second, we generate TCchanneli jt ∗ debtsecurities jtGDP jt , which interacts the trade credit
channel of firm i in country j in year t with the total amount of debt securities
issued as a fraction of GDP in that country j in year t. In Table 4.7 this interaction
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is indicated as TCchannelCAP2 . Column 2 of Table 4.7 provides evidence in favour of
the hypothesis that the use of the trade credit channel to manage firm growth is
more important in years/countries where firms issue less debt securities to finance
themselves. Again, the interaction term is economically relevant. In 2009 using
the trade credit channel to stimulate growth was 13% more important in Finland
than in Portugal, because of a smaller debt securities market in Finland.
Finally, Table 4.7 shows that firms operating in higher regulated product markets
seem to display lower growth levels, indicating that deregulation fosters growth.
Moreover, the third column of Table 4.7 reveals that the trade credit channel is
more important for firms in higher regulated product markets. An in depth analysis
of this finding goes beyond the scope of this paper, but it is clear that this should
be on the agenda for future research.
4.5 Conclusion
The use of trade credit of a firm is a twofold process in which a firm can receive
trade credit from its suppliers (accounts payable) and, in turn, can extend trade
credit to its customers (accounts receivable). While many theories of accounts
payable and receivable are related to firm performance, there has not been a direct
test whether firms actively use both to manage their growth. In this paper we argue
that it is not just the accounts payables or just the accounts receivable that matter,
but the sum of the two, which works as a credit channel of trade. As a contribution
to previous studies, we perform an augmented version of the Gibrat LPE to test
whether the trade credit channel has a direct impact on firm performance after
having taken into consideration the usual determinants of growth.
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The results show that the economic impact of the trade credit channel is indeed
important and that this is particularly true for firms in those euro area countries
where the trade credit channel is more present. Further, the richness of our dataset
allows us to focus on two different types of heterogeneity: at country level as
we analyse eight euro area countries, and at firm level as our analysis is based
on 600.000 firms. Focusing on country heterogeneity, we find that the degree of
development of the financial system matters. In those countries where the supply
of bank loans or debt securities is larger, the sensitivity of firm growth to the trade
credit channel is smaller. Focusing on the heterogeneity across firms, we find that
those firms that are more vulnerable to financial market imperfections (i.e. young
or small firms) rely more on the trade credit channel to grow.
Our results also fit the revived literature on the link between the financial market
and the real economy. Firm operations that make more use of the trade credit
channel can be more shielded from developments in the financial sector. This
would however only be valid under the assumption that firms’ use of accounts
receivable as collateral to draw on short term liabilities is still valid in periods of
restricted credit supply. Future research in this direction is needed to validate our
findings. The found relation between trade credit and product market regulation
is another interesting avenue for future work.
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4.6 Appendix
Both consolidated and unconsolidated annual accounts are available in Amadeus
and these are comparable across countries. Amadeus also provides qualitative in-
formation such as number of employees and if a firm is listed on a stock market. In
our sample we are careful to consider firms with unconsolidated accounts (mainly
small and medium-sized ones) only when they do not present consolidated ac-
counts in Amadeus. We construct nine non-financial sectors15: 1) agriculture,
mining and fishing; 2) manufacturing of standardized goods; 3) manufacturing of
differentiated goods; 4) construction; 5) wholesale trade; 6) retail trade; 7) trans-
port and telecommunications; 8) hotel and 9) other business activities. We exclude
other non-financial sectors such as (utility firms, renting, leasing and holding com-
panies) for which trade credit does not appear to be important. The original dataset
contains financial information for the period 1990-2009; we drop the first three
years because of poor coverage and we lose another year of observations to com-
pute variables as first differences of the balance sheet items. We only use end of
year data. Concerning our variables of interest, we apply a series of filters. We
eliminate the observations of firms with errors in their financial statements (for
instance when total assets are negative) and when their values are unreasonable
(for instance when trade credit payables or receivables over total assets are greater
than 1). Finally we eliminate 1% of the extreme values taking into consideration
differences across sectors and countries and we consider only firms with at least 4
15Following Giannetti et al. (2011) we take the nature of the manufactured good into account:
standardized good or differentiated good, because they argue that use of trade credit is significantly
different given the type of good. Differentiated manufacturing goods are in the following sectors:
furniture and fixture, printing and publishing, rubber and plastic products, stone, glass and clay
products, fabricated metal products, machinery, electrical and electronic equipment, transportation
equipment, instruments and miscellaneous products. All other goods produced in the remaining
sectors within manufacturing industry are considered standardised goods.
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consecutive years of observations. Table 4.2 and Table 4.8 report the descriptive
statistics for the sample that is finally used in the regressions.
Table 4.8: Sample distribution across firms size
BE DE ES FI FR IT NL PT
small 50% 49% 93% 89% 88% 83% 7% 91%
medium sized 37% 27% 6% 8% 9% 14% 34% 7%
large 13% 24% 1% 3% 3% 3% 59% 2%
young 4% 8% 4% 12% 11% 9% 5% 11%
# obs 67,408 53,728 167,697 88,318 1,171,221 590,569 14,017 281,365
# f irms 9,988 23,290 28,470 22,461 228,634 187,379 3,152 110,050
Source: AMADEUS, Bureau van Dijk Electronic publishing and own calculations. The table reports the distinction based
on the official definition of the European Commission that considers small firms those with less than 50 employees, up to
10 million euro of turnover and 10 million euro of assets, large firms those with more than 250 employees, more than 50
million euro of turnover and 43 million euro of assets. Medium size firms are those between small and large. Young firms
are those that are younger then 5 years old.
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Table 4.9: Baseline estimation: specification (1) with identical instruments (t-2 and fur-
ther)
BE DE ES FI FR IT NL PT
growthav -0.156*** -0.074*** -0.127*** -0.139*** -0.146*** -0.097*** -0.156*** -0.103***
TCchannel 0.567*** 0.468*** 0.530*** 1.006*** 0.517*** 0.373*** 0.688*** 0.342***
bank loans 0.249*** 0.125*** 0.380*** 0.471*** 0.192*** 0.108*** 0.131* 0.301***
growths 0.104*** 0.043*** 0.105*** 0.091*** 0.122*** 0.065*** 0.079*** 0.076***
log(size) -0.361*** -0.108 -0.430*** -0.472*** -0.135*** -0.119*** -0.276*** -0.296***
log(age) -0.062** -0.111* -0.033 -0.049* -0.101*** -0.151*** -0.031 -0.143***
m2 0.52 0.41 0.98 0.27 0.88 0.01 0.77 0.92
J 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (1). The estimates are robust
to heteroscedastic standard errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies. m2 shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial
correlation. Values presented for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments,
under the null of instrument validity. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at the 5% or 1%
level. For the definition of the variables see notes of Table 4.2.
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Table 4.10: Importance of the composition of the trade credit channel
BE DE ES FI FR IT NL PT
growthav -0.227*** -0.069*** -0.216*** -0.129*** -0.301*** -0.122*** -0.162*** -0.075*
TCchannel 0.607*** 0.467*** 0.628*** 1.248*** 0.444** 0.369*** 0.619*** 0.338***
TCchannel ∗ TCPTCR 0.022 0.031 0.002 -0.006 0.079 0.009 0.218 0.017
bank loans 0.300*** 0.221*** 0.368*** 0.562*** 0.405*** 0.182*** 0.149 0.269***
growths 0.147*** 0.043** 0.196*** 0.067* 0.456*** 0.137*** 0.082*** 0.167***
log(size) -0.501** -0.217* -0.556*** -0.544*** -0.596*** -0.289*** -0.296 -0.347***
log(age) -0.107** -0.086 -0.021 -0.012 0.059* -0.055*** -0.033 -0.023
m2 0.78 0.70 0.32 0.11 0.65 0.20 0.65 0.19
J 0.11 0.40 0.00 0.70 0.51 0.00 0.12 0.03
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (1), augmented with the trade
credit channel interacted with the ratio of payables to receivables. The estimates are robust to heteroscedastic standard
errors. All specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies. m2
shows the p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial correlation. Values presented
for the J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments, under the null of instrument
validity. * indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at the 5% or 1% level. For the definition of the
variables see notes of Table 4.2.
CHAPTER 4. TRADE CREDIT AND FIRM GROWTH 130
Table 4.11: Baseline estimation: accounts payable overestimates the impact of the tade
credit channel
BE DE ES FI FR IT NL PT
growthav -0.153*** -0.060** -0.103** -0.136*** -0.313*** -0.122*** -0.159*** -0.100***
TCP 1.047*** 0.437*** 0.705*** 1.550*** 0.931*** 0.517*** 1.297*** 0.385***
bank loans 0.342*** 0.055 0.455*** 0.465*** 0.072** 0.188*** 0.211 0.281***
growths 0.101*** 0.043** 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.563*** 0.145*** 0.070 0.075***
log(size) -0.544** 0.150 -0.315*** -0.439*** -0.255*** -0.226*** -0.312 -0.144***
log(age) -0.056 -0.180*** -0.092** -0.054* -0.004 -0.061*** -0.045 -0.193***
m2 0.70 0.44 0.60 0.31 0.61 0.16 0.70 0.93
J 0.13 0.68 0.10 0.23 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (1), but with accounts payable
scaled by total sales instead of the trade credit channel. The estimates are robust to heteroscedastic standard errors. All
specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies. m2 shows the
p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial correlation. Values presented for the
J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments, under the null of instrument validity. *
indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at the 5% or 1% level. For the definition of the variables
see notes of Table 4.2.
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Table 4.12: Baseline estimation: accounts receivable overestimates the impact of the tade
credit channel
BE DE ES FI FR IT NL PT
growthav -0.155** -0.060** -0.077** -0.129*** -0.287*** -0.122*** -0.162*** -0.104***
TCR 0.636*** 0.514*** 0.604*** 0.752*** 0.921*** 0.462*** 0.905*** 0.397***
bank loans 0.288*** 0.027 0.498*** 0.513*** 0.064** 0.192*** 0.164 0.328***
growths 0.112** 0.043** 0.074*** 0.091*** 0.537*** 0.140*** 0.073 0.077***
log(size) -0.379 0.124 -0.716*** -0.518*** -0.228*** -0.285*** -0.412 -0.332***
log(age) -0.093 -0.182*** -0.045 -0.044 -0.015 -0.064*** -0.025 -0.126***
m2 0.69 0.44 0.25 0.70 0.97 0.18 0.70 0.87
J 0.05 0.74 0.04 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.34 0.00
Notes. The Table shows the output for the GMM first difference estimation of specification (1), but with accounts receivable
scaled by total sales instead of the trade credit channel. The estimates are robust to heteroscedastic standard errors. All
specifications were estimated with time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies. m2 shows the
p-value of the test of serial correlation in the error terms, under the null of no serial correlation. Values presented for the
J-statistic are p-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments, under the null of instrument validity. *
indicates significance at, the 10% level; ** and ***, respectively at the 5% or 1% level. For the definition of the variables
see notes of Table 4.2.
CHAPTER 4. TRADE CREDIT AND FIRM GROWTH 132
Figure 4.4: Firm growth and the trade credit channel
Source: AMADEUS, Bureau van Djik Electronic publishing and own calculations. Notes. The Figure shows mean
growth rates of added value for the observations belonging to each percentile of the trade credit channel in our sample.
Figure 4.4 provides some evidence of a positive relation between the trade credit
channel and firm growth. The graph displays the mean growth rate of added value
for all observations belonging to a percentile of the trade credit channel from 1993
to 2009 for all 8 euro area countries in our sample.
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Figure 4.5: Accounts payable as percentage of total sales
Source: AMADEUS, Bureau van Dijk Electronic publishing and own calculations.
Figure 4.6: Accounts receivable as percentage of total sales
Source: AMADEUS, Bureau van Dijk Electronic publishing and own calculations.
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5
Firms’ Financial Constraints: Do
Perceptions Match the Actual
Situation?1
5.1 Introduction
The financial positions of firms and the access to external finance of firms are
crucial for the investment in and the development of an economy. This statement
1This chapter is the result of joint work with Annalisa Ferrando (ECB).
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has become conventional wisdom in the finance literature. Most contributions to
this literature have either used balance sheet data to show the link between (con-
strained) investment or growth and financial characteristics (Fazzari et al., 1988,
2000; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002), or survey data to show the link between
perceived financing obstacles and growth (Beck et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2011).
Unfortunately, the first strand is lacking direct information on the financing ob-
stacles that firms face, while the second strand lacks balance sheet and profit and
loss account data of the firms investigated. Therefore it has not yet been possible
to relate financing obstacles to the financial positions of firms. Yet, the existence
of this link is crucial for the relevance of the policy recommendations made in
the two strands of the literature stated above. A number of authors have tried to
fill this gap by using survey data to construct an index of financing obstacles and
then applied this formula to a second dataset with balance sheet information, in
order to relate this index to firm level investment or growth (Lamont et al., 2001;
Coluzzi et al., 2009; Hadlock and Pierce, 2010).2
This paper attempts to fill this gap by taking the opposite approach, namely we
match data from a large dataset containing balance sheet information with the
data from a survey on financing obstacles. This way we obtain a unique dataset
containing direct information on the financing obstacles that firms face linked
with the financial characteristics of those firms. Moreover, the survey that we use
for our analysis was conducted during the financial crisis, which makes financing
obstacles likely to be present and therefore this creates an excellent opportunity to
examine the link between financial characteristics and financing obstacles.
We draw on the Survey on the Access to Finance of small and medium-sized En-
2See Silva and Carreira (2012) for an overview on the literature related to measuring financial
constraints.
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terprises (SAFE)3 for a sample of more than 10.000 firms in the euro area and try
to match these firms with their balance sheet information in the Bureau van Dijk
Amadeus database (containing approximately 2.3 million firms). The main chal-
lenge is that the identity of the firms in the SAFE survey -as with most surveys-
is confidential, and thus we need to develop a statistical matching approach based
on characteristics common in both datasets to overcome the identity problem. In
order to maximize the use of the data available in the survey, the non-parametric
Nearest Neighbour Distance Hot Deck (NNDHD) matching procedure as sug-
gested by D’Orazio et al. (2006) is applied. Then, using this unique dataset we
investigate which financial and non-financial characteristics are correlated with fi-
nancial constraints. This way we hope to get a better understanding of the nature
of financial constraints.
From the survey results we measure financing obstacles through firms’ self-assess-
ment on whether access to finance constitutes their most pressing problem. We
also consider a more objective measure of financing obstacles which is related to
the results of firms’ actual applications to external financing. To relate financing
obstacles to the financial positions of firms, we regress the two variables on a set
of financial (profitability, liquidity, leverage) and non-financial (age, size) charac-
teristics, which are commonly used in the literature to assess whether firms are
financially constrained and control for the ownership of the firm, the year, and the
country and sector in which the firm is located.
Our findings show that age and profitability are important for explaining access
to external finance. Younger firms are more likely to perceive access to finance
as highly problematic. Moreover, they are also more likely to face actual financ-
3The survey is conducted by the ECB and European Commission. See Ferrando and
Griesshaber (2011) and Artola and Genre (2011) for a thorough analysis of the survey results.
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ing obstacles. Firms with lower profit margins, lower return on equity or higher
coverage ratios have a higher probability of facing actual financing obstacles, but
there is no relation with the perceived problems of access to finance. On the con-
trary, the perceived financial constraints, but not the actual constraints, increase
significantly when firms have more short term debt. Finally, we find some indi-
cations that firms with sufficient liquidity and firms with lower leverage ratios are
less likely to be financially constrained. Although the latter findings are not robust
when we include firm age and size in the regressions, the analysis indicates that
information derived from "hard" data is useful to determine the probability that
firms perceive and face actual financial obstacles.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the
data sources and the methodology we used in the matching procedure. Section
5.3 introduces the measures of financial constraints as derived from the survey
and from the financial accounts with a quick glance to the existing literature on
financial constraints. The section also includes a first comparison of the charac-
teristics of firms that are self-reporting financing obstacles. Section 5.4 describes
the empirical results while section 5.5 includes some robustness checks. Section
5.6 draws some conclusions.
5.2 Data and methodology
The two main data sources for our analysis are the ECB and European Commis-
sion survey on access to finance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SAFE)
and the AMADEUS database gathered by Bureau van Dijk.
The SAFE has been carried out five times between the summer of 2009 and
CHAPTER 5. FIRMS’ FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 143
September 2011. It contains firm-level information mainly related to major struc-
tural characteristics (size, sector, firm autonomy, turnover, firm age and owner-
ship) as well as to firms’ assessments of recent short-term developments regard-
ing their financing needs and access to finance4. The sample contains only non-
financial firms, excluding those in agriculture, public administration and financial
services. For the purposes of our analysis, we draw on the second, the third and
the fifth wave of the survey5, which are covering the developments of the second
half of 2009, and the second and third quarter of 2010 and 2011, respectively.
This period is marked by the financial crisis, which has left deep scars in the fi-
nancial markets. Moreover, the at that time emerging debt crisis also put serious
pressure on the profitability of the banking sector, making the general conditions
for firms to access external capital in the euro area very tough6. Pooling together
the three waves allows us to have a panel with 13291 observations of which most
firms are only present once, making it a highly unbalanced sample7. We consider
firms from countries in the euro area, and due to data availability the final sam-
ple includes firms from Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
Balance sheet information is derived from the complete AMADEUS database.
4A report containing the main results of the survey is published in the ECB website every six
months For more information regarding the survey as well as the reports on the individual waves
see http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/sme/html/index.en.html. See also ECB (2011).
5Because we match with yearly balance sheet data, we use only one wave per year that corre-
sponds best to the balance sheet data. For instance, the first and the second wave cover the same
accounting year, so we choose to retain the second. The fourth wave of SAFE covers the last
quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of 2011, and thus leaves the question to which accounting
year that this wave corresponds.
6See the results of the ECB’s bank lending survey in January 2010 and October 2010.
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html
7See Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 in the appendix for more details on the composition of our panel.
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This is a comprehensive, pan-European database containing financial information
on over 10 million public and private companies. The information is collected
by specialised national service providers and is homogenised applying uniform
formats in order to allow accurate cross-country comparisons. We select non-
financial corporations in the euro area in 2008, 2009 and 20108. After performing
some data filtering in order to clean the data, we obtained an unbalanced panel of
approximately 2.3 million firms and 3.2 million observations. 115.000 firms are
present in all years, 674.000 firms are present in two years, and 1.5 million firms
are present only once.
5.2.1 Construction of the matched panel
We use the non-parametric Nearest Neighbour Distance Hot Deck (NNDHD)
matching to match each firm in SAFE with its ’nearest neighbour balance sheet’
in Amadeus.
The procedure applies as follows. First, we classify all firms in SAFE and in
Amadeus in a priori defined groups so that firms from one dataset can only be
matched with firms in the same group in the other dataset. The groups take into
account the following characteristics, which are mainly derived from the structural
characteristics of the SAFE: nationality, sector, turnover-class and year. Both in
SAFE and Amadeus, we consider firms located in Belgium, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal or Spain. In these countries we
identify seven sectors: mining; construction; manufacturing, wholesale and re-
8We match the survey data of a given year with balance sheet data of the year prior to the
survey year. For example, we match the 2008 balance sheet data with the second half of 2009
survey data. The rationale is that these are the most recent balance sheet data that firms had
available to convince financial intermediaries to provide them external finance.
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tail trade; transport and storage; real estate; and other services to business and
persons. Further, within each sector, firms are grouped according to their yearly
turnover: turnover lower than 2 million euro; between 2 million euro and 10 mil-
lion euro; between 10 and 50 million euro; and higher than 50 million euro. Fi-
nally, firm-year observations belong to 2009, 2010 or 2011. The specification of
9 countries, 7 sectors, 4 turnover-classes and 3 years leads to a maximum of 756
groups, and each firm-year observation in SAFE and in Amadeus belongs to one
of these groups. It is important to note that this classification ensures us that,
for instance, a Belgian manufacturing firm with 5 million euro turnover that re-
sponded to the SAFE survey in 2011 can only be matched with a firm in Amadeus
that is a Belgian manufacturing firm with turnover between 2 and 10 million euro
in 2010. Table 5.4 describes how rich the Amadeus dataset is to match with. For
instance, a French firm in SAFE has on average 43126 possible matches available
in Amadeus, but there is a group in France for which a firm in SAFE has only 42
possible matches in the same group in Amadeus and there is a group in France for
which a firm in SAFE has 94929 possible matches in the same group in Amadeus.
Table 5.4 HERE
In a second step, we apply the NNDHD matching procedure within the identified
groups on the basis of the number of employees and the exact age of the firm,
using the Gower distance function9. This procedure computes the distance dS,A
among the values in vector S (for SAFE) (for both variables, age and number of
employees) and all n rows of A (for Amadeus) (the same 2 variables (age and
employees) observed on n firms) and then matches the firm from the SAFE with
the firm from Amadeus with the smallest distance:
9See D’Orazio et al. (2006) for programming details.
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dS,A =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
[
1
2
|XageS −XageA |
Rangeage
+
1
2
|XemplS −XemplA |
Rangeempl
]
(5.1)
This means that within a certain group, a firm in SAFE is matched with the firm
from Amadeus that is the best match in terms of age and number of employees
for all available years. If a firm in SAFE can be matched with several firms in
Amadeus that have the same minimum distance, then one of these firms is chosen
at random. In the sample, the number of available matches at minimum distance
ranges from 1 to 1279 firms. In 31% of the matches, the minimum distance is zero,
implying a perfect match in terms of group, age and number of employees.10 Fur-
ther, the Gower distance has the attractive feature that the distance is normalised
between zero and one, allowing some interpretation of the distance obtained. 77%
of our matches has a distance less than 0.01, indicating a close match.
One obvious drawback of the matching is that one can never be completely certain
that the firm from SAFE would have the same financial characteristics as the firm
from Amadeus that it is matched with. However, we believe that we can over-
come this problem with the careful setup of the panel. Financial characteristics of
firms are generally specific to the turnover class, the age of the firm, the sector that
the firm operates in, and to a lesser extent the country of residence. On the con-
trary, the financial characteristics vary much less within these groups and the same
holds for the variation in perceived problems of access to finance in the survey.
Table 5.6 shows that the variance of the financial characteristics is smaller within
a group than within the total sample in 78% of the cases. (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3
for a definition on the financial characteristics and financial constraints.) By only
allowing matching within the groups identified in the previous section, we avoid
that firms in the survey would be matched with firms that generally have different
10Note that by construction there will always be a perfect match in terms of group.
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financial characteristics. Table 5.5 further illustrates this importance. It can be
seen in the second and third column that the experience of financial constraints,
which we derive from the survey, decreases with the turnover class of the firm and
depends on the year. Column four and five of Table 5.5 uses balance sheet infor-
mation to show that financial characteristics also depend on the groups defined.
For instance the debt burden, which can be seen as the interest rate that firms pay
on their debt, decreases with size of the firm’s turnover and also decreased during
the crisis period, in line with the decrease of the ECB’s main policy rate. Addi-
tionally, firms with high turnover appear to have lower cash holdings and during
the crisis firms have tried to increase their cash balances as they try to take pre-
cautionary measures. Therefore, it will be important to restrict the matching to
within the 756 groups.
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 HERE
Moreover, taking a closer look at the matched panel also provides some evidence
that validates the matching strategy. In question Q2 of the survey firms are asked
whether their profit margin has increased, remained unchanged or decreased in
the past six months. The comparison of their answers to the actual profit margin
after the matching (as calculated from the balance sheet) shows Table 5.7 that, in-
deed, those firms that signalled an increase in their profit margin display a higher
profit margin than the other firms in the matched sample. In question Q2 firms
are also asked whether their turnover has increased, remained unchanged or de-
teriorated during the past six months. After the matching we find that the sales
growth of firms that indicated an increasing turnover is significantly higher than
other firms. Additionally in question Q2 firms are asked whether their net interest
expenses have increased, remained unchanged or decreased during the past six
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months. Table 5.7 reveals that firms, for which the interest expenses increased,
pay significantly more interest on their debt than the other firms. Further, in ques-
tion Q4(e) firms indicate if they have used trade credit in the past 6 months or not.
Comparing the answer of the trade credit use in question Q4(e) to the actual trade
credit (measured as a percentage of total assets or as a percentage of total sales) of
the firm after matching, shows in Table 5.7 that firms that did not use trade credit
in the past six months hold significantly less trade credit on their balance sheets.
Table 5.7 HERE
5.3 Assessing financial constraints
5.3.1 Measures derived from survey data
Following Ferrando and Griesshaber (2011), the presence of major financing ob-
stacles is measured via the following question (Q0 in the questionnaire): "What
is currently the most pressing problem your firm is facing?". Firms could choose
among a set of potential problems ranging from finding customers and the pres-
ence of competition to increased costs of production of labour and the presence of
regulation. Firms that choose the "Access to Finance" from the provided options
are then considered as facing major financing obstacles. It is important to note
that the wording of the question in SAFE is very different from the wording of the
surveys used in the preceding literature (Beck et al., 2006). SAFE asks respon-
dents to pick the most pressing problem from a set of seven different possibilities,
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whereas the other surveys typically ask firms to rank a given problem on a certain
scale (e.g. 4, major obstacle to 1, no obstacle, see Beck et al. (2006)). Conse-
quently, in SAFE we do not observe the actual levels of financing obstacles within
a firm as well as whether access to finance is the second most pressing problem or
the third most pressing, etc. (firms cannot signal more than one problem), whereas
we consistently observe the degree of financing obstacles in the other surveys. In
this way it could be that at in our sample we underestimate the existence of firms
that consider access to finance as a pressing (although not the most pressing) prob-
lem. Nevertheless, our measurement has a bright side as we avoid the danger of
bias caused by possible tendencies of some firms to give generally more negative
(or positive) evaluations. In the SAFE, firms are forced to put the existence of fi-
nancing obstacles in relation to other potential problems. Therefore, their answer
is more likely to reflect a serious problem or obstacle that the respective firm is
facing.
However the reply may of course only be based on the general perception of the
respondent and is not a priori based on its actual experience. An alternative way to
identify firms facing financing constraints can be based on their actual experience
in applying for either a loan, trade credit or other external financing tools. In-
deed, respondents to the SAFE survey are being asked in questions Q7A and Q7B
whether they have applied or not for a bank loan and whether they were success-
ful in getting any type of financing, and what was the reason not to have applied
for external finance. From these questions we generate our two main categorical
variables of interest: finance problem and finance obstacle (See Table 5.3).
Finance problem takes the value 1 when a firm has chosen ‘access to finance’ as
its most pressing problem, and 0 otherwise. Importantly, access to finance seems
to be a persistent variable in our short panel. More than 51 percent of the firms
that chose access to finance as most pressing problem signalled that it was still the
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main problem during the next wave. Moreover, 92 percent of the firms that did
not signal access to finance as most pressing problem in one wave also did not in
the following wave. The second variable, finance obstacle, is also a categorical
variable and takes the value 0 when a firm has successfully applied for a source of
external finance11 (i.e. no obstacle), and 1 when a firm has applied but the appli-
cation has been rejected or when a firm received only a part of the finance it has
requested. Finance obstacle also takes the value 1 when a firm had to refuse a loan
because the costs were too high or the terms and conditions were too bad. Also for
this variable we find persistence in the sample: 74 percent of the firms that faced
actual financing obstacles in a given wave encountered the same problems almost
a year after, and around 79 percent of the firms without problems in one wave
reported similarly in the following wave. Table 5.8 shows the percentage of firms
that perceived access to finance as most pressing problem (finance problem) or
that actually encountered problems to access external financing sources (finance
obstacle) as reported by the survey. Major heterogeneities are clearly related to
the geographical environment. In general it can be noted that firms located in the
southern European countries suffer more from financial constraints. Some differ-
ences can be noted at country level as a higher percentage of Dutch and Belgian
firms encounter actual financing constraints relative to their perceived financing
constraints. Note that finance obstacle has much less observations. This is mainly
because many firms indicated that they did not apply for external finance because
they have sufficient internal funds at their disposal. As they did not demand exter-
nal funds, we cannot discriminate whether they face external financing obstacles
or not, and they are therefore not taken into account. We also did not take firms
into account that acknowledged that they did not apply for external finance be-
11This includes bank loans, trade credit and other external financing sources. Other external
financing sources include equity or debt issuance, leasing, factoring and loans from other lenders.
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cause they feared a possible rejection. However, a sensitivity test where the firms
that feared a possible rejection are included in the variable finance obstacle will
shed some interesting light on the role of firm size for financial constraints, but
we will come back to this later.
Table 5.8 HERE
5.3.2 Determinants of financial constraints using firms’ accounts
and firms’ characteristics
The way financial constraints are measured is a very sensitive issue in the litera-
ture investigating the link between financial variables and firm behaviour. Theory
offers only limited guidance in this domain, so that a clear-cut consensus has still
to emerge. The theoretical model of Myers and Majluf (1984) shows that firms
may give up valuable investment opportunities when internal sources of funds are
not sufficient. Consequently, the higher sensitivity of investment or firms’ growth
to internal sources was taken as evidence for the presence of financing constraints
(Fazzari et al., 1988, 2000; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). However, after the
seminal paper of Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000), several studies have criti-
cised the empirical test based on the cash flow sensitivity. One of the arguments
has been that even financially successful firms may rely systematically on inter-
nal sources of financing because of factors not related to the unavailability of low
cost external funds, and consequently they may exhibit high investment-cash flow
sensitivity. Additional critiques have been put forward by Ericson and Whited
(2000); Alti (2003); Bond et al. (2004), all arguing that the cash flow already
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contains information about a firm’s investment opportunities. A different way of
testing the presence of financing constraints focuses on the role played by the cash
flow sensitivity of cash holdings (Almeida et al., 2004).
Alternative strategies consist of simply classifying firms according to various
proxies of informational asymmetries (as these represent the main source of fi-
nancial market imperfections). Hence, variables such as size, age, dividend policy,
membership in a group or conglomerate, existence of bond rating, and concentra-
tion of ownership are used to capture ways to cope with imperfect information,
which hinders access to capital markets (see for instance Gertler (1988); Devereux
and Schiantarelli (1990); Hoshi et al. (1991); Bond and Meghir (1994); Gilchrist
and Himmelberg (1995); Schiantarelli (1995); Cleary (2006)).
In this paper we rely on a set of measures of financial constraints that take into
consideration the above-mentioned contributions to the literature. The set com-
prises profitability ratios, liquidity ratios, leverage ratios and variables that typi-
cally proxy the presence of asymmetric information. We are aware of the short-
comings in these measures. For instance, they often capture one dimension of
access to financial markets: a firm may be liquid but nonetheless present a bad
financial situation; on the other hand strong fundamentals may compensate for a
temporary shortage of liquid assets. Similarly, a high leverage, while signalling
potential dangers, suggests also that the firm has enjoyed, at least in the recent
past, wide access to external financial funds. Hence, one could argue that highly
leveraged firms are not always financially constrained. In the next section we
discuss the financial indicators used in the empirical analysis and their expected
relation with financial constraints.
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Profitability
More profitable firms should have easier access to external finance as they gener-
ate more cash flow which increases the likelihood that they will be able to repay
their loans. At the same time, more profitable firms have more internal funds at
their disposal which might decrease their actual demand for external funds. It
is therefore important to note that in this paper we control for this demand ef-
fect by excluding those firms that replied they were not searching for external
finance because of sufficient internal funds from our dependent variable financing
obstacle. The effect that we measure is therefore the impact of solvability on the
willingness of financial intermediaries to grant external finance to firms. First,
the return on equity, measured as the ratio of profit/loss for the period scaled by
total shareholder funds, indicates the firm’s efficiency in generating value for it’s
shareholders and can be considered as a general indicator of a firm’s solvency. A
second variable that we construct is the coverage ratio which measures the oper-
ating risk of the firm and is calculated as the ratio of operating profits (or loss) to
interest paid. If it’s greater than 1 it means that the firm generates sufficient op-
erating profits to cover the interest expenses on it’s debt. (Guariglia and Mateut,
2006; Carbò-Valverde et al., 2011) Finally, we test whether the profit margin is an
important determinant of perceived or actual financing obstacles. The profit mar-
gin is constructed as the ratio of net profits/losses for the period to total sales. We
expect that firms that are able to generate more euro profits per euro sales will be
less likely to perceive access to finance as problematic. Moreover, as high profit
margins are sometimes related to market power (Petersen and Rajan, 1997), these
firms can more easily increase their surplus when needed, and are therefore less
likely to default and face actual financing obstacles.
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Liquidity
As argued by Holmström and Tirole (2000), firms need to manage their liquidity
balances such that they can continue their investment and production plans even
in the occurrence of a negative liquidity shock. By discontinuing its investments
the firm lowers its expected future profits which increases its likelihood of default
and thus increases the probability that banks will be unwilling to supply external
finance. Generally, the importance of working capital and the value of cash in the
presence of financial constraints have been highlighted by several authors (Fazzari
and Petersen, 1993; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Dasgupta and Sengupta, 2007).
To test these theories, we first measure the firm’s working capital as current assets
less current liabilities, scaled by total assets. Secondly, we calculate the working
capital required as the sum of the firm’s inventories and accounts receivable less
accounts payables, again scaled by total assets. Finally, by measuring the firms
cash position as the amount of cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets, we
investigate the role of the firm’s cash.
Leverage
The positive relation between leverage and default probability follows from the
rationale that firms with higher debt-to-asset ratios need higher profits to be able
to repay their debt, and are therefore more likely to default. This relationship is
also reflected by the firm’s rating in case the firm has one. (Molina, 2005) We
first measure the firm’s leverage by its debt-to-assets ratio, and expect a negative
relation with the actual financing obstacle that firms face. The expected relation
between leverage and perceived financing problem is twofold. On the one hand, a
high leveraged firm might feel unconstrained as it holds a lot of debt on its balance
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sheet, but on the other hand, this might make it difficult or costly for the firm to
find new debt.
As cash is commonly viewed as negative debt, most valuation models subtract
the amount of cash from the level of outstanding debt to know the firm’s ’true’
leverage. The reasoning is that firms can use their cash to reduce their debt imme-
diately. They might choose to do so when the cost of borrowing is significantly
higher than the yield on cash, and increasing debt when a new investment project
arises is not a constraint. However, Acharya et al. (2007) showed that even con-
strained firms might use excess cash flows to reduce their debt, rather than to
transfer the cash to future periods. Therefore, we construct a variable: leverage
cleaned, which subtracts the firm’s cash from its total outstanding debt, and scales
that by total assets.
The maturity structure of the firm’s outstanding debt can play a role in the firm’s
perceived access to finance. Firms that finance a high share of their assets with
short term liabilities need to roll over a high share of their debt yearly, which
might become very costly when market conditions turn for the worse. Indeed,
Love et al. (2007) showed that firms with higher short term debt to asset ratios
were more vulnerable to financial market imperfections during the East-Asian
financial crisis. To test the importance of this in the euro area during the global
financial crisis, we construct the variable: short term loans, which is the amount
of debt (loans and marketable securities) maturing at the end of the year scaled by
the firm’s total assets.
Asymmetric information
(Gertler, 1988) was one of the first to argue that firm age is an important deter-
minant of financial constraints. The rationale for this is that more mature firms
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are more likely to have successful track records and may enter repeated relations
with lenders, both mitigating the problem of information asymmetries and thereby
decreasing the probability of being financially constrained. Additionally, the lit-
erature suggests that small firms, which are characterised by a small amount of
collateral relative to their liabilities, tend to have more problems to access ex-
ternal finance (Schiantarelli, 1995). Hence, small-sized enterprises (Berger and
Udell, 2005) and young enterprises (Rauh, 2006; Fee et al., 2009) face different
and often greater financing problems than public, large and more mature firms.
More recently, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) focus on the importance of the combi-
nation of firm size and age as predictors of potential asymmetric and contracting
problems. In order to determine the relevance of the financial ratios derived in the
above sections on financing obstacles, it would be important to control for the age
and size of the firm. Thus, we consider both the log of age and the log of total
assets.
5.3.3 What are financially constrained firms like?
Before turning to the empirical section, we perform a simple t-test on the equality
of the means of the groups defined by our variables of interest. Do firms that
signalled access to finance as main problem have other characteristics than firms
that indicated another problem as most pressing problem? And what about firms
that face actual financing obstacles? Table 5.10 reveals that firms that signal access
to finance to be their most pressing problem and firms that face actual financing
obstacles have similar characteristics. Namely, they seem to be significantly less
profitable as measured by their return on equity, coverage ratio or profit margin.
They also tend to be less liquid, more specific they have significantly less working
capital and less working capital required. Further, they finance a higher share
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of their assets with short term loans and have a higher debt to asset ratios, even
when debt is cleaned for cash holdings. Finally, they appear to be younger and
smaller than unconstrained firms. Almost all of these findings are in line with
our expectations and can hence, in our view, also be seen as a validation of the
matching strategy.
Table 5.10 HERE
5.4 Empirical approach and estimation
Our empirical analysis aims to investigate the existence of underlying factors that
determine both firms’ perception of financing obstacles and firms’ actual financ-
ing obstacles. As in previous studies we model the probability of firms facing
financing obstacles as a linear function of the characteristics available from the
survey data (as in Ferrando and Griesshaber (2011)) and to this we add the set of
financial ratios derived from the balance sheet data:
FinanceProblemi,t = α0+α1FinancialRatioi,t +∑
j
α jFirmControls( j)i,t +
∑
k
αkCountryk +∑
s
αsSectors+∑
t
αtYeart + εi,t (5.2)
FinanceObstaclei,t = β0+β1FinancialRatioi,t +∑
j
β jFirmControls( j)i,t +
∑
k
βkCountryk +∑
s
βsSectors+∑
t
βtYeart +µi,t (5.3)
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where FinanceProblem and FinanceObstacle are the responses by firm i at time
t that indicates access to finance as most pressing problem and the actual financ-
ing obstacles faced, respectively. FinancialRatio is the set of ratios that sum-
marises the financial conditions of the firm, as elaborated in section 3.2.1 to sec-
tion 3.2.3. FirmControls is a vector of major firm attributes, namely ownership
structure, firm age and size.12 Country is a vector of country dummies to con-
trol for country-specific impacts on firms’ responses. Sector is a vector of sector
dummies, controlling for sectoral speficic effects of financial constraints and Year
is a set of year dummies. Given that both dependent variables are dichotomous,
we consider a probit model to estimate the two equations. We assume that the
disturbance parameters, εi,t and µi,t , have a normal distribution and use standard
maximum likelihood estimation. As it is likely that the two dependent variables
are correlated and determined from a similar set of explanatory variables, we use
a bivariate probit model. Formally, we consider that the two equations are simul-
taneously estimated together under the assumption that:
COV
(
µi,k,t ,εi,k,t
)
= ρ 6= 0
As explained in the literature (Poirer, 1980), the use of a bivariate probit estima-
tion is more efficient than the use of two independent equations when the error
terms of the two decisions are correlated. The results show that the assumption of
a correlation in the errors is valid (See Tables 5.11-5.15) as ρ is statistically dif-
ferent form zero and equal to 0.6. As expected, firms that faced actual financing
obstacles between the last six months of 2009 until the third quarter of 2011 tend
to report that access to finance was the most pressing problem.
12In the estimations we always control for ownership, in a second set of regressions we also
include firm age and firm size as controls.
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Tables 5.11 to 5.13 HERE
In all the estimations we always include country, sector and year dummies as well
as a control dummy for ownership (Panel A); in a second set of regressions we also
include firm age and firm size as controls (Panel B). The ownership dummy takes
the value 0 if a firm is owned by shareholders, other firms or business associates
and the value 1 if the owner is a single person, a family, or when the firm has
venture capital or business angel funding.
Focusing first on the variables that measure the profitability of the firm, panel A
of Table 5.11 shows that firms with a lower return on equity or a higher coverage
ratio are more likely to face actual credit constraints. The profit margin of the firm
seems to be important in explaining the likelihood of both the perceived access
to finance and the actual finance obstacle. Firms with higher profit margins are
less likely to perceive access to finance as their most pressing problem; moreover
they are also less likely to face actual financing obstacles. Panel B indicates that
the profit margin no longer appears to be significant for the perceived financing
problems once controlled for age and size. Further, panel B shows that all three
profitability measures: the return on equity, the coverage ratio and the profit mar-
gin are significantly related to the experience of actual financing obstacles, even
after controlling for size and age. This finding shows that the balance sheet chan-
nel might play an important role in transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Namely, a decreasing policy rate is associated with lower costs of funding (see for
instance Table 5.5 and decrease in the debt burden over the sample period), which
should contribute positively to the profitability of firms and hence their net worth
increases, leading to a lower probability of facing a constrained supply of credit.
Table 5.12 shows the results for the variables that capture the liquidity of the firm.
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Panel A and B reveal that firms with better liquidity positions as measured by
working capital, are less likely to be constrained in their actual applications for
external finance or to perceive access to finance problematic, even after control-
ling for age and size. Surprisingly, the more narrow definition working capital
requirement or the cash holdings of firms do not seem to contain information re-
garding the perceived and actual financing obstacles.
The impact of leverage on financial constraints is shown in Table 5.13. Panel
A shows that firms with higher leverage are more likely to perceive access to
finance as most pressing problem as well as to face actual credit obstacles. The
same is found for the leverage cleaned variable, where debt is reduced by the
cash holdings. However, once we control for age and size, panel B indicates that
leverage is not significant anymore. In contrast to what we expected, the amount
of short term debt seems to play no significant role in the perceived and actual
financing obstacles.
In a last set of tests, we jointly estimate a model with a significant profitability,
liquidity and leverage measure. Tables 5.14 and 5.15 show that the conclusions
drawn above generally hold. Firms with higher return on equity are less likely to
face actual financing obstacles and firms with more working capital are less likely
to perceive access to finance problematic or face financing obstacles. Leverage ap-
pears to be no longer significant once controlled for the profitability and liquidity
of the firm.
Table 5.14 and 5.15 HERE
Further, firm age, but not firm size, is significant and negatively related to both
our measures of financial constraints. Younger firms are not only the ones that
perceive access to finance as their most pressing problem, they are also more
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likely to face actual financing obstacles. This is in line with the recent findings
of Berger and Udell (2005); Rauh (2006); Fee et al. (2009); Hadlock and Pierce
(2010) and indicates that capital market imperfections play an important role. It
is however remarkable that, in contrast to these authors, we do not find a strong
significant impact of firm size. Curiously, when we include ‘did not apply out of
fear of rejection’=1 in our dependent variable FinanceObstacle, size is negative
and strongly significant in all regressions, while the conclusions regarding the
other variables remain largely unchanged.13 This indicates that those firms that
are self-selecting them out of the loan-application process are especially small
firms.
Finally, we take a look at our control variables (For brevity, the ownership dummy,
country dummies, sector dummies and time dummies are not shown in the tables,
but were always included in the regressions). The ownership dummy is significant
and positively related to both perceived financing problems and actual financing
obstacles. This stresses the importance of the role of ownership and the existence
of internal capital markets for the financial constraints that firms belonging to
groups (do not) face. Country dummies with SMEs located in Spain and Greece
are facing significantly higher constraints than firms in Belgium (which is our ref-
erence country in the estimation). We control also for the sectors of SMEs but
sectoral dummies are almost never significant. As for the time dummies, it is
found that firms are more likely to face actual obstacles in 2010 and 2011 relative
to 2009. The time dummies show no significant differences across time concern-
ing the perceived access to finance.
In sum, we find that financial characteristics can explain self-reported financial
13Table 5.16 shows this for one regression, the other regressions are not shown here for brevety
but are available upon request from the authors.
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constraints by firms. This implies that firms should thoroughly consider their
financial decisions. However, also firm age plays a large role for financial con-
straints. Small firms appear not to apply for external finance ‘out of fear of re-
jection’, although we find no evidence that they have different financial character-
istics. Therefore, they are not less likely to obtain finance than other firms with
the same age or financial characteristics and thus they should be encouraged to
actually apply.
5.5 Robustness
Our matching strategy randomly picks a match when multiple matches are avail-
able at the same minimal Gower distance. This random feature is appealing as it
does not create any unwanted dependency in our sample; however, it also implies
that the characteristics of our matched sample may be partly specific to this ran-
domness. Especially because approximately 37 percent of the matches involved
a random draw between two or more corresponding firms.14 And so, the esti-
mated parameters and the inference based on our matched sample might be bi-
ased. Secondly, 13291 observations from the total euro area population might be
a too small subsample, also leading to biased estimates. For these considerations,
we bootstrap 200 subsamples with replacement from our full SAFE survey sam-
ple and redo the matching for every bootstrapped subsample. This leaves us with
200 ’new’ samples from the total population, for which we then do the bivariate
probit analysis. Tables 5.18 to 5.20 show the median parameter estimate found
for these 200 bivariate probit regressions, and between brackets the 95 percentile
14Table 5.17 in the Appendix shows that most multiple matches are available in those countries
or sectors where most data is available in Amadeus (see Table 5.1).
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confidence interval, given by the 2.5 and the 97.5 percentile of that parameter esti-
mate from those 200 estimates, to indicate the likelihood of the median parameter
estimate.
Tables 5.18 to 5.20 HERE
It can be seen in Table 5.18 that our findings concerning profitability are quite
robust. Especially after controlling for age and size, we find that firms with higher
return on equity, with lower coverage ratio and with higher profit margins are less
likely to face actual financing obstacles. Again there seems to be no impact of
profitability on the perceived financial problems. Looking at the effect of the liq-
uidity ratios on our measures of financial constraints in Table 5.19, it can be seen
that the results are less strong than what the analysis of the full matched sample
suggested. Firms that lack working capital are more likely to face actual financing
problems and they are more likely to put access to finance as their main prob-
lem, however, this relation seems to be insignificant once controlled for the age
and size of the firm. For the working capital required and the cash balances we
find again no significant role. Further, Table 5.20 shows that firms with higher
leverage ratios have a higher probability of being financially constrained. This
finding does not hold when we take into account that cash may be viewed as neg-
ative debt and calculate the leverage cleaned for cash holdings, and both leverage
measures are not significant when we control for firm age and size. Interestingly,
the importance of the maturity structure of the debt seems to be more clear once
controlled for the potential bias related to multiple matches. Firms that finance
a high share of their assets with short term liabilities are more likely to have the
perception that access to finance is difficult; presumably because they need to roll
over a high share of their debt yearly during a financial crisis. This perception
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is still significant after controlling for size and age. The results from the boot-
strapped panel regressions also indicate that age is an important determinant of
financial constraints. Younger firms are significantly more likely to perceive and
face actual financing constraints. Size does again not seem to be significant.
Table 5.21 HERE
In a final test, we jointly estimate a model with profit margin, working capital and
short term loans. Table 5.21 shows that the conclusions drawn above mainly hold.
Firms with higher profit margins are less likely to face actual financing obstacles
and firms that finance a higher share of their assets with short term loans are more
likely to perceive access to finance problematic, taking into account the age and
size of the firm.
5.6 Conclusion
The main aim of this paper was to investigate the role of financial and non-
financial firm characteristics to get a better understanding of the nature of per-
ceived and actual financing obstacles during the recent financial crisis. Its novelty
is related to the availability of a unique dataset containing direct information on
financing obstacles as reported by firms in the SAFE survey and the financial char-
acteristics of those firms. To obtain this dataset we use a non parametric matching
procedure to match 11886 firms from the SAFE survey dataset with their balance
sheet information out of the Amadeus dataset with 2.3 million firms.
Perceived financial constraints are measured through firms’ self-assessment on
whether access to finance constitutes their most pressing problem. We also con-
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sider a more objective measure of financing obstacles which is related to the firms’
actual applications for external financing. It is then investigated whether the firms
that self-report to be financially constrained have different characteristics than fi-
nancially unconstrained firms.
Our empirical results based on a bivariate probit model show that various mea-
sures related to the profitability of the firm are more significant and robust in
predicting the financing obstacles encountered by firms than liquidity or leverage
ratios. The finding that more profitable firms are less likely to face actual ex-
ternal financing obstacles can be seen as support for the balance sheet channel.
Further, firms that finance a higher share of their assets with short term loans are
more likely to perceive access to finance as problematic. This is due to the fact
that these firms need to roll over a high share of their debt yearly and they expect
that this might become very difficult or costly when market conditions turn for
the worse. Finally, we show that firm age, but surprisingly not size, is negatively
related with perceived and actual access to external finance. We have argued that
this can be due to the fact that small firms appear to self-select them out of the
loan-application process due to ‘fear of rejection’.
The results indicate that firms should strive for the highest profitability possible
and should pounder on the desired maturity structure of their debt. Still, policy
makers should be aware that firms may also be discriminated on the basis of age.
Further research is desirable to confirm the pecular role that size might play for
the self-selection out the loan-application process.
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5.7 Appendix
Table 5.1: Description of the unbalanced panel
Year 2009 Year 2010 Year 2011 #obs (total)
#obs 2,799 2,799
#obs 2,671 2,671
#obs 5,187 5,187
#obs 700 700 1,400
#obs 279 279 558
#obs 74 74 148
#obs 176 176 176 528
#obs (total) 3,749 3,826 5,716 13,291
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Figure 5.1: Firm distribution in SAFE (in percentage of the total sample)
Table 5.2: Construction of Variables (as denominated in Amadeus)
Variable Definition
Return on equity profit or loss of the period / total shareholder funds
Coverage ratio operating profit or loss / interest payment
Profit margin profit or loss of the period / total sales
Workcap (current assets - current liabilities) / total assets
Workcap required (accounts receivable + inventories - accounts payable) / total assets
Cash cash and cash equivalent / total assets
Debt current liabilities + non current liabilities
Leverage debt / total assets
Leverage cleaned (debt - cash and cash equivalent) / total assets
Short term loans loans with maturity less than one year / total assets
Log(age) log(1+ age)
Log(total assets) log(1+ total assets)
Debt burden interest payment / (debt-accounts payable)
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Table 5.3: Construction of Variables (as denominated in SAFE)
Question Answer Variable Value
Q0
What is currently your finding customers finance problem 0
most pressing problem? Competition finance problem 0
Access to finance finance problem 1
Costs of production or labour finance problem 0
Availability skilled staff/managers finance problem 0
Regulation finance problem 0
Other finance problem 0
DK/NA finance problem missing
Q7a
In the past 6 months which Didn’t apply, sufficient internal funds finance obstacle missing
action did you take with Didn’t apply because other reasons finance obstacle missing
respect to bank loans, Didn’t apply out of fear of rejection finance obstacle missing
trade credit or other Applied finance obstacle go to Q7b
external finance? DK/NA finance obstacle missing
Q7b
If you applied for bank loans, Applied and got everything finance obstacle 0
trade credit or other external Applied but only got part of it finance obstacle 1
finance in the past 6 months, Applied but refused, cost too high finance obstacle 1
what was the outcome? Applied but was rejected finance obstacle 1
DK/NA finance obstacle missing
D6
Who are the owners of Shareholders/quoted firm ownershipdummy 0
your firm? Other firms or business associates ownershipdummy 0
family or entrepreneurs ownershipdummy 1
Venture capital firm/business angels ownershipdummy 1
Natural person/one owner only ownershipdummy 1
Other ownershipdummy missing
DK/NA ownershipdummy missing
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Table 5.4: Available matches in Amadeus within each group
mean median min max total
BE 1,909 1,480 10 4,232 65,920
DE 921 732 1 2,319 29,143
ES 33,308 34,107 2 67,663 440,784
FI 1,800 1,814 5 3,867 61,560
FR 43,126 41,729 42 94,929 884,855
GR 2,923 3,231 1 5,047 67,929
IT 37,841 39,359 20 70,352 972,321
NL 261 225 1 572 8,232
PT 51,028 45,704 4 88,524 705,609
mining 556 527 1 1,009 14,344
construction 14,013 15,464 3 26,356 206,594
manufacturing 32,649 34,107 17 70,352 840,508
retail and wholesale 53,052 54,884 77 94,925 1,202,486
transpot and storage 7,310 8,874 8 12,465 171,782
real estate 6,541 6,448 1 13,043 94,697
other services 42,623 45,704 21 72,708 705,942
X≤2 mill. euro 50,683 54,014 4 94,930 2,196,194
2 mill. euro<X≤10 mill. euro 18,348 16,026 1 39,625 688,373
10 mill. eruo<X≤50 mill. euro 7,560 6,052 1 16,884 267,317
X>50 mill. euro 1,690 1,292 1 3,959 84,469
2008 35,337 32,095 3 85,398 1,083,822
2009 45,542 41,703 1 94,929 1,309,480
2010 36,519 39,359 1 88,232 843,051
Notes. The Table shows the number of observations in each group in Amadeus that is available for the matching.
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Table 5.5: Financial constraints, financial characteristics and the importance of groups
Finance Problem Finance Obstacle Debt Burdent−1 Casht−1
Turnover Class
X≤2 mill. euro 18.5% 45.2% 2.87% 0.125
2 mill. euro<X≤10 mill. euro 17.1% 40.7% 2.33% 0.105
10 mill. eruo<X≤50 mill. euro 13.8% 36.8% 2.15% 0.081
X>50 mill. euro 11.7% 34.3% 2.24% 0.059
Year
2009 19.2% 37.8% 3.20% 0.111
2010 15.0% 42.4% 2.66% 0.115
2011 16.2% 43.0% 2.02% 0.125
Notes.
Table 5.6: Descriptive statistics
% groups where
# groups variance within group < variance total sample
Return on equity 733 74%
Coverage ratio 733 62%
Profit margin 733 72%
Workcap 733 87%
Workcap requirement 733 87%
Cash 733 77%
Leverage 733 84%
Leverage cleaned 733 83%
Short term loans 733 75%
Total 733 78%
Notes. The first column shows the number of groups that are used for the NNDHD matching. The second column shows
the percentage of groups for which the given variable has a smaller variance within the group than in the total sample.
Calculations are done on the total Amadeus sample out which is matched.
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Table 5.7: Comparison of firms’ qualitative answers on changes in turnover, profit mar-
gin, interest rates and use of trade credit
Data source
Profit margin increased=0 Profit margin increased=1 T-test safe
Profit margin 0.008 0.015 0.12 amadeus
Turnover increased=0 Turnover increased=1 T-test safe
Sales growth -0.026 0.027 0.05** amadeus
Interest rate increased=0 Interest rate increased=1 T-test safe
Debt burden 2.3% 2.6% 0.01*** amadeus
Trade credit used=0 Trade credit used=1 T-test safe
Trade Credit to assets 0.146 0.167 0.02** amadeus
Trade Credit to sales 0.112 0.158 0.00*** amadeus
Notes. The Table gives the mean values of the variables split by the bivariate outcome of the categorical variable and the
p-value of the corresponding t-test on the equality of the means. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.8: Country distribution, finance problem and finance obstacle
Finance Problem #obs Finance Obstacle #obs
BE 7.3% 740 21.3% 80
DE 13.6% 2,376 25.4% 311
ES 26.4% 2,336 39.3% 638
FI 6.7% 658 6.5% 46
FR 12.7% 2,385 19.1% 408
GR 33.8% 745 47.2% 178
IT 16.2% 2,413 29.5% 572
NL 12.1% 848 50.0% 66
PT 16.6% 790 32.1% 131
total 16.7% 13,291 31.1% 2,430
Notes. The Table shows the number of observations that belong to that country in our sample and the percentage of those
observations that had more than one possible match at minimal distance (i.e. the percentage of observations that involved
a random draw).
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Table 5.9: Descriptive statistics
mean median minimum maximum #obs
Profitability
Return on equity 0.106 0.071 -2.444 2.177 13,291
Coverage ratio 7.355 2.344 -50.75 99.90 13,291
Profit margin 0.009 0.012 -0.874 0.343 13,291
Liquidity
Workcap 0.161 0.155 -1.000 1.000 13,291
Workcap requirement 0.287 0.259 -0.788 1.000 13,291
Cash 0.113 0.051 0.000 0.950 13,291
Leverage
Leverage 0.708 0.712 0.000 4.232 13,291
Leverage cleaned 0.595 0.621 -0.814 4.000 13,291
Short term loans 0.085 0.023 0.000 0.815 13,291
Asymmetric info
Age 23.28 19.00 1.000 160.0 13,291
Log(assets) 7.884 7.760 1.098 18.51 13,291
Debt burden 2.50% 2.03% 0.00% 31.4% 13,291
Notes. The Table shows the mean, median, minimum and maximum for the variables of the matched sample.
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Table 5.10: Firm characteristics by constraint-group: t-test on the equality of means
Finance Finance Finance Finance
Problem=0 Problem=1 T-test Obstacle=0 Obstacle=1 T-test
Profitability
Return on equity 0.108 0.094 0.08* 0.099 0.062 0.02**
Coverage ratio 10.14 8.725 0.01*** 8.153 6.445 0.02**
Profit margin 0.010 0.002 0.00*** 0.011 -0.000 0.00***
Liquidity
Workcap 0.162 0.144 0.01*** 0.160 0.123 0.00***
Workcap requirement 0.282 0.313 0.00*** 0.288 0.312 0.01***
Cash 0.113 0.110 0.18 0.099 0.099 0.52
Leverage
Leverage 0.706 0.719 0.04** 0.697 0.730 0.00***
Leverage cleaned 0.592 0.609 0.02** 0.598 0.632 0.01***
short term loans 0.083 0.095 0.00*** 0.091 0.101 0.04**
Asymmetric info
age 23.98 19.76 0.00*** 24.67 20.88 0.00***
log(assets) 7.928 7.663 0.00*** 8.323 8.073 0.00***
debt burden 2.5% 2.7% 0.00*** 2.4% 2.5% 0.07*
Notes. The Table gives the mean values of the variables split by constraint-group and the p-value of the corresponding
t-test on the equality of the means between the constrained observations and the unconstrained observations. Significance
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5.11: Bivariate probit regression: Profitability
(A1) (A2) (A3)
Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance
Panel A Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Return on equity -0.009 -0.113*
(0.061) (0.062)
Coverage ratio -0.001 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Profit margin -0.527* -0.621**
(0.281) (0.285)
ρ 0.637*** 0.626*** 0.635***
(0.026) (0.039) (0.039)
Control dummies YES YES YES
#obs 2,381 2.267 2,381
(B1) (B2) (B3)
Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance
Panel B Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Return on equity -0.036 -0.137**
(0.060) (0.061)
Coverage ratio -0.001 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.039)
Profit margin -0.437 -0.563**
(0.285) (0.285)
log(total assets) -0.023 -0.006 -0.024 -0.003 -0.021 -0.004
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
log(age) -0.144*** -0.135*** -0.123*** -0.124*** -0.143*** -0.127***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
ρ 0.626*** 0.618*** 0.625***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039)
Control dummies YES YES YES
#obs 2,381 2,267 2,381
Notes. The Table shows the results of the bivariate probit estimation for the matched panel. Heterscedasticity robust
standard errors in parentheses. Control dummies: ownership dummy, country dummies, sector dummies and year dummies
are included in all regressions. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5.12: Bivariate probit regression: Liquidity
(A1) (A2) (A3)
Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance
Panel A Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Workcap -0.253*** -0.251***
(0.090) (0.088)
Workcap requirement 0.147 -0.088
(0.112) (0.109)
Cash 0.032 -0.134
(0.215) (0.212)
ρ 0.633*** 0.638*** 0.636***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Control dummies YES YES YES
#obs 2,381 2.381 2,381
(B1) (B2) (B3)
Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance
Panel B Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Workcap -0.193** -0.205**
(0.090) (0.061)
Workcap requirement 0.169 -0.064
(0.113) (0.110)
Cash -0.059 0.095
(0.219) (0.216)
log(total assets) -0.022 -0.005 -0.021 -0.007 -0.023 -0.005
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
log(age) -0.134*** -0.120*** -0.148*** -0.127*** -0.143*** -0.129***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
ρ 0.624*** 0.628*** 0.626***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Control dummies YES YES YES
#obs 2,381 2,381 2,381
Notes. The Table shows the results of the bivariate probit estimation for the matched panel. Heterscedasticity robust
standard errors in parentheses. Control dummies: ownership dummy, country dummies, sector dummies and year dummies
are included in all regressions. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5.13: Bivariate probit regression: Leverage
(A1) (A2) (A3)
Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance
Panel A Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Leverage 0.184** 0.200**
(0.092) (0.090)
Leverage cleaned 0.142* 0.140*
(0.081) (0.079)
Short term loans 0.302 0.106
(0.211) (0.203)
ρ 0.634*** 0.635*** 0.636***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Control dummies YES YES YES
#obs 2,381 2.381 2,381
(B1) (B2) (B3)
Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance
Panel B Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Leverage 0.081 0.127
(0.094) (0.091)
Leverage cleaned 0.073 0.087
(0.082) (0.079)
Short term loans 0.319 0.120
(0.211) (0.202)
log(total assets) -0.021 -0.004 -0.022 -0.006 -0.023 -0.006
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
log(age) -0.139*** -0.121*** -0.139*** -0.123*** -0.144*** -0.129***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
ρ 0.626*** 0.626*** 0.626***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Control dummies YES YES YES
#obs 2,381 2,381 2,381
Notes. The Table shows the results of the bivariate probit estimation for the matched panel. Heterscedasticity robust
standard errors in parentheses. Control dummies: ownership dummy, country dummies, sector dummies and year dummies
are included in all regressions. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5.14: Bivariate probit regression: Total
(1) (2)
Finance Finance Finance Finance
Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Return on equity -0.009 -0.117* -0.035 -0.138**
(0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.061)
Workcap -0.236** -0.267*** -0.167* -0.213**
(0.129) (0.092) (0.095) (0.092)
Short term loans 0.129 -0.105 0.192 -0.054
(0.220) (0.213) (0.221) (0.213)
log(total assets) -0.022 -0.006
(0.016) (0.015)
log(age) -0.138*** -0.125***
(0.036) (0.035)
ρ 0.634*** 0.625***
(0.039) (0.039)
Control dummies YES YES
#obs 2,381 2,381
Notes. The Table shows the results of the bivariate probit estimation for the matched panel. Heterscedasticity robust
standard errors in parentheses. Control dummies: ownership dummy, country dummies, sector dummies and year dummies
are included in all regressions. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CHAPTER 5. FIRMS’ FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 178
Table 5.15: Bivariate probit regression: Total
(1) (2)
Finance Finance Finance Finance
Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Return on equity -0.012 -0.117* -0.036 -0.137**
(0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.061)
Workcap -0.226** -0.205* -0.225** -0.200*
(0.113) (0.110) (0.114) (0.110)
Leverage 0.046 0.081 -0.057 0.009
(0.116) (0.112) (0.120) (0.114)
log(total assets) -0.023 -0.005
(0.016) (0.015)
log(age) -0.138*** -0.125***
(0.036) (0.035)
ρ 0.633*** 0.625***
(0.039) (0.039)
Control dummies YES YES
#obs 2,381 2,381
Notes. The Table shows the results of the bivariate probit estimation for the matched panel. Heterscedasticity robust
standard errors in parentheses. Control dummies: ownership dummy, country dummies, sector dummies and year dummies
are included in all regressions. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5.16: Bivariate probit regression: Total, finance obstacle including fear of rejection
(1) (2)
Finance Finance Finance Finance
Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Return on equity 0.035 -0.094* 0.010 -0.131***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Workcap -0.241** -0.160* -0.246** -0.174*
(0.097) (0.095) (0.097) (0.095)
Leverage 0.026 0.135 -0.098 -0.031
(0.105) (0.105) (0.108) (0.107)
log(total assets) -0.032** -0.057***
(0.014) (0.013)
log(age) -0.134*** -0.153***
(0.030) (0.030)
ρ 0.665*** 0.546***
(0.033) (0.033)
Control dummies YES YES
#obs 3,192 3,192
Notes. The Table shows the results of the bivariate probit estimation for the matched panel. Heterscedasticity robust
standard errors in parentheses. Control dummies: ownership dummy, country dummies, sector dummies and year dummies
are included in all regressions. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5.17: Country and sectoral distribution, percentage matches with multiple donors
at minimal distance
#obs % multiple matches
BE 740 18.11%
DE 2,376 5.38%
ES 2,336 42.21%
FI 658 35.25%
FR 2,385 52.91%
GR 745 41.20%
IT 2,413 56.69%
NL 848 9.31%
PT 790 60.63%
total 13,291 37.43%
mining 128 4.69%
construction 1,336 25.67%
manufacturing 3,456 29.63%
retail and wholesale 3,414 50.00%
transpot and storage 687 25.18%
real estate 102 29.41%
other services 4,168 40.59%
total 13,291 37.43%
Notes. The Table shows the number of observations that belong to the given sector or country in our sample and the percent-
age of those observations that had more than one possible match at minimal distance (i.e. the percentage of observations
that involved a random draw).
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Table 5.18: Robustness check with bootstrapped sample. Bivariate probit regression:
Profitability
(A1) (A2) (A3)
Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance
Panel A Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Return on equity 0.016 -0.067
[-0.096,0.131] [-0.199,0.074]
Coverage ratio -0.001 -0.003**
[-0.004,0.002] [-0.006,-0.000]
Profit margin -0.424 -0.875***
[-1.252,0.328] [-1.513,-0.189]
Control dummies YES YES YES
(A1) (A2) (A3)
Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance
Panel A Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Return on equity -0.016 -0.095*
[-0.130,0.105] [-0.232,0.043]
Coverage ratio -0.001 -0.003*
[-0.004,0.003] [-0.006,0.000]
Profit margin -0.333 -0.814**
[-1.158,0.443] [-1.444,-0.149]
log(total assets) -0.021 -0.004 -0.022 -0.002 -0.019 -0.003
[-0.059,0.012] [-0.038,0.023] [-0.059,0.010] [-0.038,0.026] [-0.054,0.015] [-0.034,0.026]
log(age) -0.147*** -0.137*** -0.134*** -0.133*** -0.154*** -0.140***
[-0.211,-0.075] [-0.210,-0.066] [-0.223,-0.064] [-0.242,-0.067] [-0.217,-0.081] [-0.217,-0.071]
Control dummies YES YES YES
Notes. The Table shows the median parameter estimate of the bivariate probit estimation on 200 bootstrapped samples.
The 90 percent confidence interval corresponding to those 200 bootstrapped sample estimates is shown between squared
brackets. Control dummies: ownership dummy, country dummies, sector dummies and year dummies are included in all
regressions. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5.19: Robustness check with bootstrapped sample. Bivariate probit regression:
Liquidity
(A1) (A2) (A3)
Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance
Panel A Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Workcap -0.176* -0.188***
[-0.340,0.019] [-0.367,-0.018]
Workcap requirement 0.061 -0.094
[-0.200,0.255] [-0.329,0.125]
Cash 0.057 0.096
[-0.375,0.461] [-0.345,0.476]
Control dummies YES YES YES
(A1) (A2) (A3)
Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance
Panel A Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Workcap -0.109 -0.134
[-0.283,0.092] [-0.302,0.053]
Workcap requirement 0.081 -0.072
[-0.172,0.289] [-0.291,0.141]
Cash -0.029 0.073
[-0.452,0.442] [-0.384,0.472]
log(total assets) -0.022 -0.004 -0.020 -0.005 -0.022 -0.003
[-0.060,0.011] [-0.039,0.024] [-0.058,0.012] [-0.041,0.021] [-0.057,0.011] [-0.039,0.025]
log(age) -0.138*** -0.124*** -0.148*** -0.132*** -0.147*** -0.135***
[-0.204,-0.068] [-0.201,-0.051] [-0.213,-0.079] [-0.208,-0.060] [-0.211,-0.076] [-0.206,-0.064]
Control dummies YES YES YES
Notes. The Table shows the median parameter estimate of the bivariate probit estimation on 200 bootstrapped samples.
The 90 percent confidence interval corresponding to those 200 bootstrapped sample estimates is shown between squared
brackets. Control dummies: ownership dummy, country dummies, sector dummies and year dummies are included in all
regressions. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5.20: Robustness check with bootstrapped sample. Bivariate probit regression:
Leverage
(A1) (A2) (A3)
Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance
Panel A Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Leverage 0.197 0.287**
[-0.021,0.424] [0.048,0.542]
Leverage cleaned 0.081 0.109
[-0.061,0.237] [-0.061,0.255]
Short term loans 0.432* 0.172
[-0.014,0.861] [-0.263,0.548]
Control dummies YES YES YES
(A1) (A2) (A3)
Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance
Panel A Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Leverage 0.065 0.190
[-0.186,0.340] [-0.065,0.501]
Leverage cleaned 0.004 0.048
[-0.151,0.192] [-0.107,0.221]
Short term loans 0.427* 0.168
[-0.012,0.845] [-0.260,0.549]
log(total assets) -0.024 -0.005 -0.021 -0.004 -0.022 -0.004
[-0.060,0.008] [-0.042,0.023] [-0.057,0.012] [-0.037,0.023] [-0.057,0.012] [-0.038,0.023]
log(age) -0.132*** -0.109*** -0.146*** -0.130*** -0.147*** -0.133***
[-0.207,-0.053] [-0.185,-0.032] [-0.212,-0.074] [-0.205,-0.059] [-0.209,-0.077] [-0.207,-0.062]
Control dummies YES YES YES
Notes. The Table shows the median parameter estimate of the bivariate probit estimation on 200 bootstrapped samples.
The 90 percent confidence interval corresponding to those 200 bootstrapped sample estimates is shown between squared
brackets. Control dummies: ownership dummy, country dummies, sector dummies and year dummies are included in all
regressions. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5.21: Robustness check with bootstrapped sample. Bivariate probit regression: To-
tal
(A1) (A2)
Finance Finance Finance Finance
Panel A Problem Obstacle Problem Obstacle
Profit margin -0.361 -0.785** -0.319 -0.769**
[-1.114,0.446] [-1.439,-0.073] [-1.082,0.528] [-1.423,-0.039]
Workcap -0.094 -0.189* -0.023 -0.126
[-0.303,0.089] [-0.357,0.020] [-0.227,0.178] [-0.291,0.109]
Short term loans 0.389 0.044 0.415* 0.085
[-0.066,0.837] [-0.371,0.496] [-0.011,0.884] [-0.336,0.515]
log(total assets) -0.020 -0.004
[-0.056,0.014] [-0.035,0.026]
log(age) -0.150*** -0.131***
[-0.220,-0.075] [-0.209,-0.059]
Control dummies YES YES
Notes. The Table shows the median parameter estimate of the bivariate probit estimation on 200 bootstrapped samples.
The 90 percent confidence interval corresponding to those 200 bootstrapped sample estimates is shown between squared
brackets. Control dummies: ownership dummy, country dummies, sector dummies and year dummies are included in all
regressions. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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